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Abstract
This dissertation traces the architectural and urban history of the privatization of the public realm. At the
center of the research is New York City during the "urban crisis" years of the 1960s, as the city grappled
with issues of civil rights, urban policy, and physical decline. The period saw an ongoing shift in how city
and state governments initiated, financed, and managed architecture and urban development. As an
administrative apparatus of crisis management, the public-private partnership was the fiscal and legal
device that was at the center of this shift. With the public-private partnership, there was an increased
emphasis on transactions between jurisdictional authorities and private sector actors. These transactions
privileged negotiations and bargains that exchanged power, responsibilities, resources, expertise, and
narratives across a network of public and private sector entities such as city and state governments, quasi-
governmental agencies and thinktanks, developers, design practices, and nonprofits.
The 1960s saw the beginnings of an organized cultivation of private sector participation by city
and state governments, in the funding, management and provision of public goods (parks, plazas and
housing). Privately-owned public plazas, privately-managed public parks, privately-owned and managed
low-income housing and Special Zoning Districts are some of the outcomes of these partnerships that
have shaped and influenced New York City's public realm ever since. By examining the ecology and
economy of these public-private partnerships, this dissertation seeks to examine the privatization of the
public realm in New York City as a series of complex intersections between the city's economic, political,
urban, architectural and real-estate histories beginning in the 1960s.
Thesis Supervisor: Arindam Dutta, Associate Professor of the History of Architecture, Dissertation
Supervisor
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Introduction
"What draws the rationalized bureaucratized corporate behemoths to New York
is the ancient longing for desire and display. New York is now a new bazaar, with
sleek symbols glorifying "Seagram" or "PanAm" or "Lever Brothers" or
"PepsiCola" -the new doges of Park Avenue."'
The quote above is from sociologist Daniel Bell's essay, "The Three Faces of New York." The
essay featured in the "New York, NY" summer issue of Dissent magazine in 1961. The issue was
dedicated to New York City with essays from literary critic Irving Howe, playwright Lionel
Abel, and novelist Norman Mailer, among others. In his essay, Bell characterizes New York as a
marketplace with a fast-moving business environment, high turnover rate, sudden rises and falls
in wealth and specialized facilities and skills that form its external economies. However, he
wonders why large corporations still bother to come and stay in New York in 1961, especially
with the ongoing decline of the manufacturing industry. The answer, in Bell's opinion, was New
York's recent transformation into the "new bazaar," where the onus was on the symbolic
economy of the city's large corporations and their gleaming skyscraper towers, which were
replacing small industries. There was a shift in the nature of the transactions as well. The
garment industry still displayed its wares in the city, but they outsourced the actual sewing to
' Daniel Bell, "The Three Faces of New York," Dissent. Vol. v.8: no.3, 1961, 222. Bell had just
published his well-received collection of essays on the end of humanistic ideologies after the Second
World War titled The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties in 1960. In
its early years, Dissent Magazine sought to find a third position between conservatism and liberalism
in the United States with what they called radical democracy.
2 Ibid.
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New Jersey. Similarly, the publishing industries had their editorial offices in New York, but they
contracted out the actual publishing.
The transformation of New York City into a new bazaar in 1961, is a useful metaphor for
this dissertation that traces an architectural history of the privatization of the public realm in the
postwar city. A bazaar is a site for bargains, negotiations, trades and maneuvers that are
continually pushing the boundaries of what is acceptable and legal. The object of exchange finds
its value through the terms of the transaction between buyer and seller. There are aspects of
salesmanship, display, and marketing that work between a network of friendships and alliances,
which allow the transactions to be more than just an economic exchange.
Privatization at its core, as this dissertation contends, is a transaction between two
entities-the State and the business community, the public and private sectors-a partnership
that entails an exchange of incentives for investments. It can be understood as the incursion of
business into an area that was previously monopolized by the State. Alternatively, it could also
be seen as the withdrawal of the State, its functions, assets and institutions. Privatization by itself
does not adhere to fixed meanings, categories or periodization. It is the partnerships and
transactions that offer the processes of privatization its significance.
New York City was indeed a "new bazaar" by the early 1960s. Behind the gleaming skyscraper
towers that Bell discussed in his essay, were the early days of what came to be called the "urban
crisis," when the city grappled with pronounced upheavals on issues of civil rights, urban policy,
and physical decline.: New York was also experiencing an ongoing shift in how city and state
, The urban crisis comes up several times in this dissertation. I have discussed it in Chapter One and
Chapter Four to some detail. This dissertation relied on several sources to get a grasp on the period,
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governments initiated, financed, and managed architecture and urban development. As an
administrative apparatus of crisis management, the public-private partnership was the fiscal and
legal device that was at the center of this shift. With the public-private partnership, there was an
increased emphasis on transactions that privileged negotiations and bargains between
jurisdictional authorities and private sector actors. City and state governments authorized an
exchange and transfer of power, responsibilities, resources, expertise, and narratives across a
network of public and private sector entities with the introduction of new regulatory mechanisms
that operated through these partnerships (discretionary zoning laws, public-benefit corporations,
privately funded conservancies, housing vouchers).
The 1960s saw the beginnings of an organized cultivation of private sector participation
by city and state governments, in the funding, management, and provision of public services (fire
stations, schools) and public goods (parks, plazas and housing). Privately-owned public plazas,
privately-managed public parks, privately-owned and managed low-income housing and special
zoning districts are the products of these transactions that have shaped and influenced New York
City's public realm ever since. The dissertation argues that with this shift, the city transformed
into transactional terrains, where public goods that were assumed to be non-exclusive and non-
rival came to be redefined through allocatory and exclusionary mechanisms that were part of
Wendall Pritchett, "Which Urban Crisis? Regionalism, Race, and Urban Policy, 1960-1974,"
Journal of Urban History, Vol. 34 No. 2, January 2008 266-286; Irving Kristof, "It's not a Bad Crisis
to Live In," New York Times Magazine, January 22, 1967; Alice O'Connor, "The Privatized City The
Manhattan Institute, the Urban Crisis, and the Conservative Counterrevolution in New York,"
Journal of Urban History 34, no. 2 (2008): 333-53; David R Jones, "Urban Crisis and the Federal
Government's Retreat: Catalyzing Public Policy Choices to Save Our Cities," Fordham Urb. LJ 19
(1991): 665. Barry Gottehrer, "Urban Conditions: New York City," The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 371 (1967): 141-58.
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these partnerships (park permits, income limits, plaza design guidelines and air right ownerships
for example).-
In order to trace an architectural history of the privatization of the public realm, the
dissertation first seeks to complicate the ways by which architecture as a disciplinary construct,
is implicated in privatization's processes. To this end, my research will examine the ecology and
economy of public-private partnerships to unravel the terms of the transactions that determined
the design, viability, and function of architecture and urban development projects in New York
City. The nature of these transactions dictated that developers, financiers and other members of
the private sector offer investments in the form of funds, expertise and human resources in the
provision and management of public services and public goods to the government. In return, the
government offered incentives such as tax cuts, floor area bonuses, zoning variances and board
memberships.
My research centers around a few fundamental questions: what does the privatization of
the public realm mean in legal, aesthetic and economic terms? How have questions of aesthetics,
real estate speculation, bureaucratic management and expert culture operated through the terms
of these transactions? How were the particulars of ownership, use, and design in a public park or
, As it will be clarified later in this introduction, public and private are ideologically loaded terms that
are relative, complementary and not absolute. With that said, in order to define public goods I reach
out to economist Paul Samuelson who in 1954 defined it as products that an individual can consume
without reducing its availability to another individual, and from which no one can be excluded. The
terms nonrival" and "non-exclusive" comes from this definition. Public goods can include natural
living conditions (clean air, water, etc.), cultural heritage (the arts, architecture, customs, etc.),
provision for sustenance (education, health, knowledge, etc.) as well as the supply and preservation
of the material infrastructure (parks, plazas, traffic routes, etc.) However, many of them do not
entirely satisfy the conditions for being non-rival or non-exclusive. While governments are
traditionally involved in producing public goods, they may also be naturally available. When I
discuss the public realm I mean the streets, squares, parks, green spaces and other outdoor places that
in theory, are available for everyone to use.
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public plaza, for example, altered by these partnerships? Most importantly, how has this
restructuring of the public realm redefined the many imaginaries of the postwar city? By
imaginaries, I mean the social imaginaries that emerge from the experiential, historical, physical
and geographic aspects of the city, which are sites for conflicting cultural, social, economic,
political, aesthetic ideologies and discourses.
Architectural and urban historians are inclined to accept privatization as an economic and
political force that is external, and often folded into the "neoliberal."' The privatization of the
city or the public realm is examined as an end result: New York's Privately Owned Public
Spaces (POPS) or Zuccotti Park after the Occupy Wall Street protests, for example.' This
dissertation's disciplinary motive is to extract the privatization discourse from its
multidisciplinary theoretical moorings in economics, sociology, political economy, public policy
and urban theory, and study the history of the privatization of the public realm as a series of
i By this, I mean that privatization is often wrapped into the broader more nebulous term "neoliberal."
At various times, neoliberal has been referred to as late-capitalist economy, a set of ideas, a globally
engaging set of policy measures and also a hegemonic cultural force. There is an interesting article
by Professor of History at Princeton Daniel Rogers who describes neoliberalism, as the "linguistic
omnivore of our times, a neologism that threatens to swallow up all the other words around it."
Interestingly, the essay led to an open forum online on Dissent's website, where everyone was
accused of being neoliberal: Trump, Hillary and the writers, which drives home the point of the
article. Daniel Rodgers, "The Uses and Abuses of 'Neoliberalism," Dissent 65, no. 1 (2018): 78-87.
'For example, Jerold S. Kayden, Privately Owned Public Space: The New York City Experience,
(John Wiley & Sons), 2000.; Michael Kwartler, "Zoning as Architect and Urban Planner," New York
Affairs 8, no. 4 (1985): 104-19. They are both excellent works, but they both engage with
privatization by studying Privately Owned Public Spaces (POPS) and zoning. Then there are articles
such as Arthur Eisenberg, "Beyond Zuccotti Park: Privatization Of Public Assets And Public Space,"
Van Alen Institute, 2013; and Thomas Honan, "These Parks Are Our Parks: An Examination of the
Privatization of Public Parks in New York City and the Public Trust Doctrine's Protections," CUNY
L. REV. F. 107, 2015. These two again do not historicize or theorize privatization as much as look at
it as an existing legal and political construct.
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complex and multifarious intersections between the city's economic, political, urban, and
architectural histories beginning in the 1960s.
The dominant narrative on privatization in cities ties it to the mid-1970s and early 1980s
with the international stock market crash and oil embargo, which spelled an end to western
Keynesian welfare state politics and the rise of a Frederick Hayek-inspired neo-liberal moment,
with an argument for deregulation, retrenchment of government, tax cuts and urban competition.
The writings of geographer David Harvey, sociologists Harvey Molotch and Sharon Zukin,
urban theorist Neil Brenner and so many others have epitomized this moment.,
My research backdates the history of privatization in the American city to the 1960s. By
doing this, the research reveals how the processes of privatization saw their early beginnings in
this period of expansion of governmental regulatory powers, at a moment when the city was
experiencing intense upheavals. The dissertation asserts that privatization did not always result in
the dismantling, retrenchment and shrinking of government. Instead, these were lateral
displacements to informal techniques of government- what sociologist Thomas Lemke called a
"prolongation of government," where power relations between state and civil society actors were
simply restructured. Control was merely handed over from one set of bureaucrats to another set
of experts.-
, Neil Brenner and Theodore Nikolas, "Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North
America and Western Europe," (Blackwell, 2002); Harvey Luskin Molotch, Portland State
University, and Institute for Policy Studies, The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political
Economy of Place: A Summary of a Paper and Presentation, Portland, Or: Institute for Policy
Studies, Portland State University, 1980; David Harvey, From Managerialism to
Entrepreneurialism: The Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism, 1989; Sharon
Zukin. The Cultures of Cities, (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995).
Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique, (Boulder, Colo.: Paradigm Publishers,
2011), 11
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There are several common threads in the dissertation's chapters that define the context of New
York City in the period. The first of these threads is the notion of crisis. The 1960s were beset by
the "urban crisis," while the "fiscal crisis" shaped the 1970s. The category of crisis has been
theorized at various times as an instigator of interventions that can be instrumentalized and
appropriated to fit the uncertainties of the moment or stabilize what are presumed to be
aberrations., The quotes around the terms signify the imprecision and fuzziness of their
definitions.- The urban crisis and fiscal crisis were constructs that had statistics and images
ascribed to them, but were nevertheless, deliberately open to interpretation. Much like the
constructs of urban or even city, they can selectively engage with a multiplicity of signifiers.
They can also be manipulated and deployed as cohesive wholes when needed.
, Crisis has been theorized and historicized by historian Reinhard Koselleck and Michaela Richter.
Reinhart Koselleck and Michaela W. Richter, "Crisis," Journal of the History of Ideas 67, no. 2
(April 1, 2006): 357-400. Scientist Thomas Kuhn has also spoken about crisis as the antecedent of
"paradigmatic change." Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, (Chicago, IL:
University of Chicago Press, 1996). Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels discussed crisis as an intrinsic
part of the contradictions of capitalistic production. Economist Joseph Schumpeter analyzed a crisis
situation through his theory of creative destruction which he claimed to be an essential part of
industrial mutation. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Can Capitalism Survive?: Creative Destruction and the
Future of the Global Economy, (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009); Author Naomi Klein explores
crisis through the notion of disaster capitalism and neoliberalism. Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine:
The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2007). A text that I have
returned to several times through the dissertation to clarify my position on crisis and crisis narratives
is the JAE issue dedicated to "Crisis" which has been particularly useful: Journal of Architectural
Education 69, no. 1 (2015); and Architectural Histories, 1(1), Art. 17. (2013).
- The Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies-which was supported by the Ford Foundation to
address the intellectual and policy issues "confronting a nation experiencing widespread
demographic, economic and social changes,"-published a set of essays called The Metropolitan
Enigma: Inquiries into the Nature and Dimensions of America's "Urban Crisis" in 1968.
Interestingly, their deliberate quotes around the word "urban crisis" instantly gave the term
imprecision, and allowed a spectrum of responses and negotiable alternatives to respond to the
implied urgencies of crises.
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This dissertation will not focus on theorizing crisis as a category as there already exists
literature on the subject." What this dissertation will engage with are the crisis narratives that
emanated from New York City in the period, which spoke about the city through nostalgia, fear,
pragmatism, cynicism, and hope and that was internalized into the political, journalistic, literary
and policy-driven vocabulary. They were deployed by both public and private sector actors at
various times to legitimize policy and regulatory shifts to "manage" crises. Through the 1960s,
New York City was struggling with a host of welfare programs it could no longer provide due to
short-term and long-term debts.2 The city experienced riots, protests, demonstrations and sit-ins
for a myriad of causes and grievances, including the failures of urban renewal, destruction of
historic landmarks, chronic shortage of housing, unrestrained office building construction and a
nation-wide civil rights movement.
By the mid-1970s, New York was in crisis mode again. The city was now facing
imminent bankruptcy and possible default of outstanding debt against the context of an
international stock market crash and oil embargo. As New York approached bankruptcy towards
the end of 1975, the city encountered strikes and protests yet again.", With President Gerald Ford
at the helm, the federal government took a stand not to bail out New York. Ford claimed the act
would set a precedent for other cities and that the federal government should not assume a
- Refer to footnote 8.
- The dissertation's chapters each discuss the nature of New York City's debt through the 1960s and
1970s to some detail.
'The mid-70s saw a garbage strike, postal strike, transit strike, public school strike and a city-wide
blackout. Chapter Four discusses the fiscal crisis in some detail.
18
burden that is not of its own making."- He deemed New York symptomatic of all urban liberal
centers in the country that routinely promised more than they can provide. While Ford lost
subsequent elections, his position on New York City as emblematic of cities that offer benefits at
the cost of taxpayer money endured.
Through this period there were publications, articles and reports on New York City's
predicament: The Threatened City, Exodus from Fun City, The Unheavenly City, A City
Destroying Itself, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, and It's Not a Bad Crisis to Live
In, among others." Fortune and Time Magazine each ran special issues on the "economic and
social demise of urban America" with New York City as the case study.- Ford Foundation and
Rockefeller Foundation supported studies on "inner city problems," which included research on
the nature and causes of urban ghettos with the National Urban League and the Metropolitan
Applied Research Center.", Landmark films from the 1960s and 1970s shot on location due to
mayor Lindsay's pioneering efforts at changing the processes of acquiring filming permits,
- President Gerald Ford's position on the fiscal crisis can be gleaned from his speech given in 1975.
President Gerald Ford, "Address to the National Press Club," October 29, 1975. The original
documents are located in Box 18, "10/29/75 - Address to the National Press Club" of the President's
Speeches and Statements: Reading Copies at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library. These were his
exact words on New York's bankruptcy: "If we go on spending more than we have, providing more
benefits and more services than we can pay for, then a day of reckoning will come to Washington
and the whole country just as it has to New York City . . . When that day of reckoning comes, who
will bail out the United States of America?"
- New York (N.Y.), Mayor's Task Force on Urban Design and William S. Paley, The Threatened
City: A Report on the Design of the City of New York, [New York]: [publisher not identified], 1967;
"Exodus from Fun City," Time Magazine, February 24, 1967; Jon Soder, Edward Banfield, "The
Unheavenly City," 1972; Richard J Whalen, "A City Destroying Itself: An Angry View Of New
York," 1965; Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 1961.
"A Special Issue on Business and the Urban Crisis," Fortune Magazine, January 1968.
Ford Foundation endowed the National Urban League and the Metropolitan Applied Research
Center with over 17.8 million between 1966-1977 for research on Equal Opportunities in New York.
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etched the image of gritty New York permanently in our minds-the Times Square of Midnight
Cowboy(1968) and Taxi Driver (1976), the upper west side of The Panic in Needle Park (1971),
Bushwick of The French Connection (1971) Williamsburg of Serpico (1973), Manhattan of
Godfather (1972), Mean Streets (1973), Death Wish (1974) and Annie Hall (1977).
Two very distinct responses emerged from a spectrum of reactions to New York City's
problems. At one end, was the perception that suggested the city's upheavals were the product of
racial, social and economic inequities which needed to be addressed-a view shared by President
Lyndon Johnson's Kerner Commission for example." On the other end was the growing
conservative movement that quite like Ford, believed the city's difficult predicament was the
product of urban liberalism, unbridled union powers, welfare overloads and an ever-expanding
bureaucracy. Sociologists Patrick Moynihan, Nathan Glazer, and journalist Irving Kristol put
forward these theories through publications such as Public Interest and National Review."
In this milieu of crisis narratives, the rhetoric for participation, collaboration and
engagement that emanated from both Republican and Democratic leaders in New York City
(John Lindsay, Abraham Beame, Ed Koch and Governor Nelson Rockefeller) was key to the rise
of the public-private partnership -best epitomized in one of Lindsay's campaign speeches in
1965 when he said, "if New York were Pittsburgh, the Mellons could have done it all."- In other
- United States and National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The Kerner Report: The 1968
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, (New York: Pantheon Books,
1988). Mayor Lindsay was part of the Commission.
Public Interest was a quarterly neo-conservative public policy journal founded by Daniel Bell and
Irving Kristol in 1965 that shut down in 2005. National Review is also a semi-monthly conservative
magazine founded by the William F Buckley Jr. in 1955.
- Joseph P. Viteritti, Summer in the City: John Lindsay, New York, and the American Dream, (JHU
Press, 2014), 111
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words, New York City had become too big and complex and everyone, especially the business
community, needed to pitch in. This rhetoric was as much about governments soliciting funds
and expertise from the private sector as it was about curbing corporations from leaving the city
by allowing them to be a part of the city's decision-making processes.
A second thread that determined the political and economic context of New York in the period
was the rise of managerialism in urban governance in the 1960s. Managerialism included the
organizational restructuring of governmental bureaucracies, seeking expertise and incentive
structures, and operating with ideological confidence that the performance of all organizations
including city government, can be optimized by the application of project management skills and
theory.I The Lindsay administration, for example, collaborated on research with universities and
think tanks, appointed project management teams from consulting firms such as McKinsey and
Company, and deployed research from New York City-Rand Institute as part of a broader
management ethos to control and manage the "the major problems of urban life."2 An advisory
commission of twenty-six business leaders called the Economic Development Council was also
formed in 1966 to "bridge the no man's land of indifference between wall street and city hall."-
They lent management experts to city hall for accounting and organizing systems, headed
nonprofits and advised the government on how to keep businesses from leaving New York City.
- Chapter One discussed the rise of managerialism in urban governance in 1960s New York City to
much detail.
- Report to the Private Sector from Mayor John Lindsay," Box 25, Folder Summer 1968: Private
Programs, John Lindsay Archives, John Vliet Lindsay Papers (MS 592). Manuscripts and Archives,
Yale University Library.
2 Seth S King, "Business Leaders Joining Officials on City Problems," New York Times, April 7,
1967.
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City and state governments formulated new roles that could arbitrate between the
government, business community and general public. The urban designer in city government
who did not need to pass the civil service exams but worked with the Planning Commission; the
landscape architect and historian as Parks Administrator who was appointed by the mayor, paid
by a nonprofit Conservancy and reported to the Parks Commissioner; the urban planner and
public administrator who becomes the CEO of a public-benefit corporation that existed outside
of political jurisdictions and the oversight of voters and taxpayers.- These new positions claimed
a critical distance both from their disciplines and from the government while assuming the
narrative of expertise for better design, preservation and economic development.
A third thread that connects the various aspects of this dissertation is how both public and private
sector actors reduced New York City's problems to its aesthetic register. This was as an essential
strategy that allowed the intentions of redevelopment to be introduced as valid responses to the
city's needs. It was also a crucial aspect of place marketing that valorized certain parts of the city
as aesthetically pleasing, culturally significant, unique, safe and ready for investments, even as
exclusionary mechanisms were incorporated in their very processes that promoted a particular
type of use and user. For example, in Chapter One of this dissertation, Lindsay discusses the
urban crisis by repeatedly emphasizing on New York City's appearance-the "dismal and
shabby physical city," the "visual anarchy of junkyards and billboards."- In response, the
Each of these newly roles and positions will appear in the dissertation's chapters. The urban
designer in Chapter One, the Parks Administrator in Chapter Two and the CEO of a public-benefit
corporation in Chapter Three.
- John Lindsay., "Remarks by Mayor John Lindsay before the Design-In Conference," May 13, 1967,
Box 70, John Vliet Lindsay Papers (MS 592). Manuscripts and Archives.
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Planning Commission introduced discretionary zoning laws that were legislated to regulate both
design and private sector investments. Similarly, Central Park is described by the New York
Times in 1972 as the "20--century ruin that nobody wanted," a quote that appears in Chapter
Two. It triggered a sense of urgency for the rehabilitation of Central Park to its picturesque
Olmstedian 19h-century pastoral roots.26 Planner Ed Logue changes the narrative of public
housing in Chapter Three by explicitly highlighting how the new housing projects on Roosevelt
Island were different from the tall and bleak tower-in-the-park model of urban renewal. In
Chapter Four, laid off public sector employees paint a grim picture of New York City's physical
deterioration with the "Fear City" pamphlet, which was then used as a bargaining chip with the
city government to protest the city's austerity measures.
In essence, the dissertation unpacks the story of the quintessential postwar American city that
came out of the 1950s into the tumultuous 1960s as a declining manufacturing base. By the end
of the 1970s, New York had to compete for investments and resources with other urban centers,
both nationally and internationally. To attract and keep place-based industries such as real estate
and tourism, New York adopted the image of a clean and safe city that was suitable for middle-
class families and corporations. Best echoed in the "I Heart New York" campaign of 1977 which
is part of my fourth and final chapter, that cemented a new narrative for the city as a consumable
and timeless given that was on the mend for economic development.
- "Zero for Central Park," New York Times, January 22, 1975.
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Existing Research
This dissertation is situated within a multidisciplinary field that reaches out to policy, urban
design, planning, law and architectural, urban and real estate histories. Critical research on
privatization has emerged from the disciplines of sociology, political economy, public policy,
urban theory, and economics. Significant among them are economist Paul Starr's essays, "The
Meaning of Privatization" and "The Limits of Privatization" that both present a very nuanced
idea of privatization as a policy movement, idea, theory and rhetoric.,-
Historian Alice O'Connor's essay "Privatized City" discusses how the urban crisis
energized the conservative movement that leads to a new model of the city-that she calls the
"post-liberal city"-which embraced the rhetoric of privatization, free market choice, and
government retrenchment.- Urban theorist Neil Brenner and geographer and theorist David
Harvey have both discussed privatization through their formulation of the neoliberal moment at
the end of the 1970s.- Sociologists Sharon Zukin and Thomas Lemke have discussed
privatization through the notion of symbolic economy and neoliberal governmentality,
respectively.-
7 Paul Starr, "The Limits of Privatization." Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 36, no. 3
(1987): 124-37.; Paul Starr, "The Meaning of Privatization." Yale Law & Policy Review 6, no. 1
(1988): 6-41.
- Alice O'Connor, "The Privatized City The Manhattan Institute, the Urban Crisis, and the
Conservative Counterrevolution in New York," Journal of Urban History 34, no. 2 (2008): 333-53.
2 Neil Brenner and Theodore Nikolas, "Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North
America and Western Europe," (Blackwell, 2002).
3 Sharon Zukin, "Gentrification: Culture And Capital In The Urban Core," Annual Review of
Sociology 13, no. 1 (1987): 129-47.
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Both political theorist Susan Fainstein and art historian Rosalyn Deutsche have written
extensively on urban politics and New York City. While Fainstein has focused on municipal
regimes in the 1980s and their involvement in the city's urban development as part of economic
development strategies, Deutsche speaks more directly to the relationship between art and urban
politics. Urban planner Jerold Kayden and architect Michael Kwartler talk about the privatization
of public space from the perspective of zoning and its impact on open space and public plazas in
New York City.
There are other recent and excellent works that have unraveled the postwar moment in
New York from multiple perspectives. Samuel Zipp's Manhattan Projects, McLain Clutter's
Imaginary Apparatus, David Gissen's Manhattan Atmospheres, Mariana Mogilevich's Summer
in the City and Mariam Greenberg's Branding New York have each offered a critical
understanding of New York City politics and its intersections with architecture and urban
development from the standpoint of public housing, film production, environmental history of
interiors, Lindsay's mayoral tenure and the rise of city branding, respectively.
In this milieu, my dissertation offers a history of the transformation of the public realm in
New York City that began in the tumultuous years of the 1960s. The research engages with
privatization as more than an externally deployed economic or political constraint that operates
through regulatory and legal mechanisms, but rather as a set of partnerships, transactions, and
bargains between the government and the business community that transformed the funding,
management and provision of public services and public goods in the city. In doing this, the
dissertation offers the missing methodological apparatus to examine how architecture and its
processes intersect the processes of privatization.
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In keeping with the transdisciplinary nature of the project, my research has drawn from
legislative, legal and planning documents, governmental reports and white papers, mayoral and
administrative archives, newspaper and magazine archives, and architectural drawings,
documents, and projects. I have relied on oral histories in the form of personally conducted
interviews with urban planner Jonathan Barnett, lawyers Donald Elliott and Stephen Lefkowitz
and architect Robert Stem, and previously recorded interviews with architect Kevin Lynch,
commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt, urban theorist William Whyte, critic Ada Louise Huxtable,
architect Richard Weinstein, and mayors John Lindsay and Ed Koch., Guy Debord, Jean
Baudrillard, Georg Simmel, Henri Lefebvre and Leonardo Benevolo and their writings on the
City are works I have returned to several times through the writing of this dissertation.
Public-Private
"It is as if, on finding two boxes labeled public and private, we were to open the
private box and find two more boxes labeled public and private, which we would
do again and again-opening even smaller boxes until we reached the individuals
far inside, whom we could then split into respective offices and persons. If the
- Beverly Moss Spatt's interview is available at: Interview of Beverly Moss Spatt by Sarah Dziedzic,
Greenwich Village Society for Historic Preservation Oral History Project, August 24, 2017. Richard
Weinstein's interview: Interview with Richard S. Weinstein by Sharon Zane, The Museum of Modem
Art Oral History Program, June 7, 1994, The Museum of Modem Art. Some of William Whyte's
interviews and appearances are available at: William Whyte, Night Watch, Today Show, William
Whyte Papers. Rockefeller Archive Center.
- Guy Debord, The society of the spectacle. New York: Zone Books, 1994.; Jean Baudrillard,
Simulacra and Simulation, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.; Georg Simmel and Kurt
H Wolff. The sociology of Georg Simmel, 1950.; Henri Lefebvre, The production of space. Oxford,
OX, UK; Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell, 1991. Leonardo Benevolo, The History of the City,
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980.
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boxes have been assembled by reasonably competent lawyers, they may be
extremely intricate and some will have misleading labels. But this complexity and
the legal manipulation of the categories do not invalidate their usefulness or
underlying meaning.. .public and private give us relative locations.",,
Concepts such as privatization, private, public, public and private sector will appear several
times in this dissertation. These are ideologically loaded terms. The quote above from sociologist
Paul Starr highlights the fuzziness of their meaning and contends that notions such as public and
private are relative, complementary and not absolute. This dissertation echoes this assertion at
the onset. Public and private are not simple opposites as open and closed, or relational terms such
as the whole are to the part. Nor do they have clear boundaries. The public can include the
market and politics versus the family structure which is private. The public and private can also
merely be defined as the state and market respectively. With classical liberalism's divide
between public and private, the relationship was close to that of transparent versus opaque,
wherein the government is in the service of the public and hence transparent and accessible,
versus the individual who has private rights against the state. Here again, there are nuances such
as eminent domain where the government overrides private property rights for public use or
when businesses control the workings of the government through lobbying activities. The
fuzziness in the meanings of these terms, however, should not deter the importance of a
discussion on the privatization of the public realm.
- Paul Starr, "The Meaning of Privatization," Yale Law & Policy Review 6, no. 1 (1988): 6-41.
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Chapter Overview
The dissertation's chapters are not chronological. Chapters One to Three center on a public-
private partnership and the consequent restructuring of a public good, arranged around the broad
rubrics of zoning, open space and housing. Chapter Four investigates the broader transformation
of New York City in this period, from the 1960s to the 1980s through the notion of the image.
The chapters reveal how privatization is not a straight directional shift, but rather a series of
processes that work with inherited systems and institutions.
Chapter One examines discretionary zoning laws that were enacted in New York City in
1967 by the New York City Planning Commission in coordination with a new agency, the Urban
Design Group (UDG). Discretionary zoning laws were markedly different from the existing rule-
based zoning laws, as the Department of City Planning and the Planning Commission enforced
them on a case-by-case basis through negotiations with individual developers and owners. In
essence, they were the product of several very particular partnerships between the city
government and developers, where the government offered tax benefits and floor area bonuses to
developers in return for their investment in public benefits such as plazas and landmark
preservation. Discretionary zoning laws gave rise to privately-owned public plazas and Special
Zoning Districts. By studying the formation of the UDG and unpacking the first Special Zoning
District, the chapter argues that with discretionary zoning laws, design came to be an
administrative apparatus that certainly made developers comply with higher building and design
standards. They also set processes of privatization in motion, that worked through bureaucracies
and regulatory systems in coordination with developers and financiers.
Chapter Two investigates the formation of the Central Park Conservancy in 1980, which
was the first privately-funded nonprofit to manage a public park in New York City. The
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Conservancy was a partnership between the city and a nonprofit volunteer group for the
management of Central Park at a time when it had fallen into a prolonged state of disrepair due
to an underfunded Parks Department. The Conservancy gathered funds from individuals,
businesses, and institutions for the day-to-day maintenance of Central Park on behalf of the New
York City Parks Department. In return, the Conservancy wielded greater influence with permits
and management decisions, while maintaining a Manhattan-centered donor agenda. The
Conservancy institutionalized and corporatized volunteerism by spurring a culture of "giving
back" with New Yorkers. Crucial to the fundraising was a rhetoric of urgency for the
rehabilitation and restoration of Central Park to its "Olmstedian" roots-a picturesque refuge in
the city- that depoliticized the project to aesthetic expression. This rhetoric of rehabilitation and
restoration not only shaped the events and activities that were allowed in the park. They also
defined the ideal public for Central Park through the issuing of permits. The chapter argues that
the formation of a privately-funded Conservancy, specifically for the preservation and
maintenance of one park in the heart of Manhattan in New York City was the capitalization of
the value of Manhattan's real estate to its parkland. By examining the Central Park Conservancy,
the chapter questions the ways by which the privatization of park management has reinterpreted
the idea of a public park.
Chapter Three looks at the public-benefit corporation Urban Development Corporation
(UDC), which was formed by New York State in 1968 to increase mixed-income housing stock.
It was bestowed with an unprecedented set of powers by Governor Nelson Rockefeller to
generate revenue and sustain as a corporation without an overt dependence on federal funds.
UDC achieved this by depending on direct investments from private sources and the sale of
"moral obligation" bonds-bonds where the State is not legally, but only morally obligated to
29
replenish deficiencies in funds-among the general public. UDC's projects were partnerships
between the State and several nonprofit and for-profit private entities such as developers,
industry groups, private civic organizations and the general public. This model allowed the UDC
to acquire a unique institutional identity that brought together the roles of the planner, architect,
developer, financier and manager within a single public-benefit corporation. The chapter centers
on the trajectory of the UDC-from a public-benefit corporation in 1968 to bankruptcy and
eventual reinvention as a technical and tax aid by 1980-and the development of the Roosevelt
Island Development, to argue that the unconventional public-private partnership model of the
UDC for housing was merely a reinterpretation of urban renewal, where the UDC merged social
and economic objectives in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls of 1950s public housing. In the
endeavor, the UDC shifted public housing from its focus on the aesthetically and socially
undesirable tower-in-the-park model to mixed-income developments that were deemed more
economically sustainable.
Chapter Four examines the Fear City (1975) and the I Heart New York (1977) campaigns
to investigate how they mediated crises with images and rhetoric that were designed to provoke,
seduce and disrupt, and which became currencies of exchange for a changing city. Both the Fear
City and I Heart New York campaigns were crisis narratives, which mediated the upheavals of
the moment to counter an existing perception of New York and reinforce a new one. There was a
representational shift in the two campaigns from "Fear City" (a dystopic, negative reading of the
city) to "I Heart New York" (a positive, even utopic presentation of New York) in a short span of
two years, which was demonstrative of the growing importance of city branding and marketing.
By the beginning of the 1980s, New York City was an idea and concept that everyone loved and
aspired to visit-a state of mind much as Billy Joel sang about. This representational shift was in
30
the interest of place-based industries such as real estate, tourism, and finance, that had already
replaced New York's manufacturing industry by the end of the 1970s.
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Chapter One
The Laws of Persuasion: Zoning, Manageability and Manhattan's Special Theater District
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On March 22, 1982, approximately 170 protesters were arrested in the Theater District of
Manhattan, New York City while demonstrating against the impending demolition of the Astor,
Gaiety, Morosco, Bijou and Helen Hayes historic theaters.' (Fig. 1.1, 1.2) The protesters had
erected a temporary stage where famous Broadway performers such as Jose Ferrer, Celeste Holm
and Tammy Grimes read plays and gave speeches imploring mayor Ed Koch to save the theaters.
Producer and director Joseph Papp started the "Save the Theaters" campaign that financially
supported the protests and ran advertisements and articles in newspapers to promote the cause.
Nevertheless, the theaters were demolished later that year, and replaced by the John Portman-
designed Marriott Marquis Hotel. (Fig. 1.3, 1.4, 1.5) The project attracted criticism not only for
its "awkward, gangling and out of touch" design that opaquely towered over the Theater District
and Times Square, but also for its new 1500-seat Marquis Theater that was accessible only from
the hotel's third floor.
The Marriott Marquis was the product of discretionary zoning laws that had been
introduced by the New York City Planning Commission and Department of City Planning under
Mayor John Lindsay's leadership in 1967. With the assistance of the newly-convened Urban
Design Group (UDG) and the newly-minted position of urban designer in city government, the
Planning Commission amended existing rule-based zoning laws, which established standardized
percentages and distributions of both land and air uses and light requirements that were applied
uniformly across the city, to include discretionary zoning laws. This new type of zoning law
, Frank J. Prial, "Court Stay Lifted and Demolition Begins at Two Broadway Theaters," New York
Times, March 23, 1982.; Alan S. Oser, "Act 1 of a Zoning Drama in the Theater District," New York
Times, November 7, 1982.; and Carol Lawson, "Wrecking Halts at the Helen Hayes to Save
Artworks," New York Times, March 27, 1982.
' Paul Goldberger, "Marriott Marquis Hotel: An Edsel in Time Sq.?" New York Times, August 31,
1985.
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could be enforced on a case-by-case basis through negotiations and bargains with individual
developers, allowing the city government to incentivize private sector investments in public
benefits such as plazas, parks and landmark preservation with zoning variances, floor area
bonuses and tax abatements.
The Planning Commission also changed existing zoning practices by creating a number
of Special Zoning Districts, which were areas with unique regulatory environments designed
specifically for economic and land use control. The first of these Special Zoning Districts,
established in 1968, was the Special Theater District in midtown Manhattan, which spanned
between 40th to 57th Street and 8th Avenue to the Avenue of the Americas. This new
designation allowed developers to demolish existing theaters provided that new theaters were
included in the projects to be built in their place. Developers were further incentivized to
incorporate theaters in new construction with a twenty percent floor space bonus. In his plan for
the Marriott Marquis, Portman took advantage of these new regulations and proposed
demolishing five old theaters. Although the project was supported by the mayor, intense protests
led Portman to withdraw the proposal in 1973, though he later revived it in 1980 with the support
of Koch, who had been elected mayor in 1978. The delay of seven years reflected New York
City's changing political landscape, from the urban crisis years of the Lindsay era in the 1960s
when the city was grappling with riots, protests and fiscal deficits, to the Koch years in the 1980s
when the city emerged from near bankruptcy with a "pro-development mayor" who aggressively
pursued all kinds of private investments to stabilize the economy.,
, Jonathan M. Soffer, Ed Koch and the Rebuilding of New York City, (Columbia University Press,
New York,) 2010, 261.
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Zoning is a tool to simultaneously control and change the physical makeup of the city,
through both law and persuasion. With discretionary zoning laws the powers of persuasion took
precedence over the powers of law, with a host of participants coming to the negotiation table.
The new zoning environment allowed the Lindsay administration to focus less on preventing
harm by way of land use control, and more on capturing value through policies that sought a
flexible and conciliatory attitude towards the private sector. Discretionary zoning laws have
influenced the way New York City looks, spatially restructuring parts of the city and
substantially increasing private sector investment in public amenities.- Discretionary zoning laws
have also conditioned the way New York City works, reconfiguring relationships between public
and private sectors by way of partnerships that collapsed power and resources.
This chapter examines a shift in New York City's zoning environment in 1967 that
entailed the exchange of investments for incentives between developers and the city government.
In contrast to developers "wheeling and dealing," as the UDG glibly characterized it with
politicians and lobbyists to build what they want, beginning in 1967, the city government chose
to offer variances in return for benefits that developers would provide for the city. Richard
Weinstein, who was one of the first architects to work at the UDG, aptly described their
, Between 1961 and 2000, New York City built over 16 million additional square feet of floor area
than what would have been allowed without discretionary zoning laws. The additional space was in
return for over 500 plazas, arcades, and other outdoor and indoor spaces constituting 80 acres of
space. By 2007, incentive zoning produced 503 privately owned public spaces at 320 buildings that
were granted additional floor area or related waivers in exchange for providing these spaces. These
include plazas, urban plazas, residential plazas, public plazas, elevated plazas, arcades, through block
arcades, through block gallerias, through block connections, covered pedestrian spaces, sidewalk
widenings, open air concourses, or other privately-owned public spaces specifically defined by New
York City's Zoning Resolution and accompanying legal instruments. Urban planner Jerold Kayden,
along with others, carried out a detailed study of these Privately Owned Public Spaces ("POPS"),
which are shared at: https://apops.mas.org/
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approach to urban development as "public benefits that flowed from variances."5 The Planning
Commission and the UDG considered the 1967 amendments imperative for New York City,
since, in their opinion, the existing zoning laws were too prescriptive for a fast-changing city
with many unique neighborhoods and shifting demographics. In this context, the Commission
presented adaptability as key for New York City's economic development.
Zoning has been studied extensively from a legal and historical point of view. It has also been
studied through comparative case studies.' This chapter offers an alternative perspective on
zoning through an investigation into the bargains and negotiations that underlay the earliest
discretionary zoning laws. Towards this end, the chapter unravels the formation of the Urban
Design Group and the transformation of the Special Theater District in Manhattan from a
deteriorating neighborhood into a tourist destination by the end of the 1970s. This study of
discretionary zoning laws reveals the disciplinary intersections between architecture, urban
5 Sharon Zane, Interview with Richard Weinstein. The Museum of Modern Art Oral History Program,
June 7, 1994, The Museum of Modem Art.
' Some of the useful texts for studying zoning from a historic, legalistic and comparative perspective
are: Melvyn R Durchslag, "Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., Seventy-Five Years Later: This
Is Not Your Father's Zoning Ordinance." Case W. Res. L. Rev. 51 (2000): 645.; Jerold S. Kayden,
Incentive Zoning in New York City: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1978.;
Alan S. Oser, "Act 1 of a Zoning Drama in the Theater District." New York Times, November 7,
1982.; "The Constitutionality of Zoning Laws in New York." Columbia Law Review 25, no. 8
(1925): 1047-52. https://doi.org/10.2307/1114075.; William A Fischel, The Economics of Zoning
Laws: A Property Rights Approach to American Land Use Controls. JHU Press, 1987.; Rosalind
Tough, and Gordon D MacDonald. "The New Zoning and New York City's New Look." Land
Economics 41, no. 1 (1965): 41-48.; Bruce A. Rubin, "Architecture, Aesthetic Zoning, and the First
Amendment." Stanford Law Review 28, no. 1 (1975): 179-201. https://doi.org/10.2307/1228231 .;
Norman Marcus, "New York City Zoning-1961-1991: Turning Back The Clock-But With an Up-to-
the-Minute Social Agenda," Fordham Urb. L 19 (1991): 707.
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design and planning, and their alliances with the political, legal and bureaucratic systems of city
government.
The overhaul of zoning laws in 1967 was part of the Lindsay administration's crisis
management at a time when several cities in the United States saw massive upheavals. In New
York City alone, the Harlem riots of 1964 were followed by a twelve-day transit strike, a
teachers' strike, a sanitation strike, and anti-urban renewal protests. References to the physical
city and its "dismal" environment manifested in Lindsay's speeches and writings during his
election bid in 1965 and after. There was an underlying notion of environmental determinism to
this rhetoric that echoed nineteenth-century social reformers such as Jacob Riis and Charles
Booth who proposed that living conditions shaped behavior and character.' The Lindsay
administration linked the urban crisis to the city's "visual anarchy," and hoped that improving
the city's "physical presence" would in turn improve the ways in which the average New Yorker
reacted to urban problems.-
Lindsay's aesthetic and formal concerns for the city obfuscated an underlying intent to
stem the exodus of corporations from city's office towers that followed the white flight of the
late 1950s and early 1960s.' In the mid-1960s, Fortune 500 firms, law firms, and advertising
Charles Booth, Life and Labour of the People in London, London and New York: Macmillan and
Co., 1892.; and Jacob A. Riis and Luc Sante, How the Other Half Lives: Studies among the
Tenements of New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1997. In the aftermath of the Harlem riots of
1964 and the Watts riots of 1965, this notion was even echoed by the Federal Housing and Urban
Department head Robert Weaver, when he blamed the "deprivations of the environment" as the
primary causes of discontent among the urban poor.
- New York (N.Y.)., Mayor's Task Force on Urban Design., and William S. Paley. The Threatened
City: A Report on the Design of the City of New York. [New York]: [publisher not identified], 1967.
' Several companies left NYC at the time, such as Pepsico, American Can Company and General
Telephone, among others. For more on the corporate exodus refer to: Kim Moody, From Welfare
State to Real Estate: Regime Change in New York City, 1974 to the Present, New York: New Press:
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agencies were leaving the city for suburban office complexes or other cities, citing reasons such
as increasing property and commuter taxes, bad public-school systems, astronomical rents and
excessive crime. The businesses and corporations that chose to remain in the city welcomed the
renewed focus on regulating the physical appearance of the city, which not only increased
property values, tourism, and investments, but also, and most importantly, restored New York's
image as the financial nerve center of the country.-
As art historian Rosalyn Deutsche has articulated, portraying a city's urban problems as
aesthetic in nature allows redevelopment to be introduced as a governmental response to city
needs." Discretionary zoning laws did just that. As laws, they helped encourage certain attributes
of urbanism through regulations that made developers comply with higher building and design
standards. They also set processes of privatization in motion that worked through bureaucracies
and regulatory systems in coordination with developers and financiers. This new cooperation
with the private sector was not universally embraced, however. As early as 1967, Commissioner
Beverly Moss Spatt had openly criticized discretionary zoning laws and Special Zoning Districts
with a dissenting report theatrically titled "Brightlights and Bottlenecks or Will Bonus Conquer
Distributed by W.W. Norton & Co., 2007, 13. For more on New York's transition, Robert Fitch, The
Assassination of New York. Verso (April 17, 1996).
- Image was very important for the business community in New York City even before the 60s. This
is discussed to much detail in chapter 4, where I discuss the relationships between privatization and
image.
-,Rosalyn Deutsche, Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). 55-57
As Deutsche theorized it, notions of beauty and utility furnished the alibi for redevelopment in the
city and are presupposed to lie outside the socio-material conditions of the city. In Evictions, she
connects this focus on urban aesthetics to the construction of image and profile.
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All?",, In the report, she censured the city's case-by-case enforcement of zoning laws, and the
inadequate guidelines for and oversight of the bargains between city and developers, accusing
the government of having opened "a Pandora's box of tax incentives and floor area bonuses." In
Spatt's opinion, discretionary zoning laws further complicated the implementation and
enforcement of zoning laws, while rewarding developers who were already going to reap
financial gains from the projects."
The Urban Crisis and the Cause of the Physical City
The urban crisis was the crucible that catalyzed many of the policy shifts in New York
City in the 1960s. This period saw prolonged urban unrest not just in New York City, but in
Hartford, Baltimore, Washington DC, Newark and Camden, as well as other cities. The unrest
was defined by riots, protests and marches drawing attention to issues such as racial inequity,
civil rights, physical deterioration of cities and the failures of federal policies such as urban
renewal. In New York City, the criticism of urban renewal centered around public official Robert
Moses who had demolished neighborhoods and cherished landmarks, and racially segregated the
city with bifurcating highways and public housing. Urban renewal in the United States was tied
to Title I of the US Housing Act of 1949 that increased federal influence in slum clearance, the
construction of public housing and mortgage insurance.- By the mid-1960's, Title I was a federal
- Beverly Moss Spatt, "Dissenting Report of Commissioner Beverly Moss Spatt: Brightlights and
Bottlenecks or Will Bonus Conquer All?" New York City Planning Commission, November 1, 1967.
- Ibid.
- The term "urban renewal" first became a part of official terminology with the US Housing Act of
1954.
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program that had mostly benefitted city officials, business interests, developers and big planning
and architecture firms." The funds it provided for urban renewal had been utilized more for the
building and expansion of hospitals, universities and cultural centers such as the Lincoln Center,
than the construction of middle and lower income housing in New York. In this era, urban
renewal drew criticism from across the political spectrum. Martin Anderson, a conservative at
the Harvard-MIT Joint Center of Urban Studies, spoke of the policy as "very costly, destructive
of personal liberty, and not capable of achieving the goals put forth by Congress."~ Author and
urbanist Jane Jacobs offered a liberal critique, calling urban renewal a "deleterious product" of
planning and a "wistful myth" that assumed that money could wipe out slums.- Both assessments
unanimously pronounced urban renewal to have had a negative impact on the city.
The crises of the 1960s galvanized two additional responses that had a lasting impact on
New York City politics. On the one end of the spectrum was the notion that the urban crisis was
the product of the racial inequities of urban renewal policies themselves, which in part produced
black ghettoization. This view was shared by president Lyndon Johnson's Kerner Commission
and their "Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders" from 1968 that
blamed housing, social services and the education system for the lack of opportunities among
- SOM for example worked on several Title I projects such as Harlem Lenox Terrace and Corlears
Hook projects with Robert Moses.
- Martin Anderson, The Federal Bulldozer; a Critical Analysis of Urban Renewal, 1949-1962.
Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964. 16. He later became domestic policy adviser to president Ronald
Reagan in the 1980s
a Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 1961.
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black population. The Commission also blamed the mainstream media for looking at the country
and its problems with "white men's eyes and white perspective."--
On the other end was the conservative movement that rose to prominence through
publications such as The Public Interest and Commentary, and individuals such as sociologist
Patrick Moynihan, Nathan Glazer and journalist Irving Kristol who believed the urban crisis was
the product of urban liberalism. In their opinion, while racial inequities did exist, the solution to
urban problems was not an increase in federal and state funding with more Great Society
programs, but rather the adoption of a fiscally conservative approach to urban policies that
favored privatization, decentralization and retrenchment of government."
Lindsay, who became the mayor of New York City in January 1966, was a moderate
Republican who did not, overtly at least, subscribe to these extreme viewpoints on the urban
crisis (although he was a member of the Kerner Commission). He spoke of "managing" the
urban crisis in New York City through an overhaul of the city's planning, programming and
budgeting systems. His administration collaborated with the New York City-Rand Institute,
appointed project management teams from consulting firms such as McKinsey and Company,
United States and National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. The Kerner Report: The 1968
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.
Commentary Magazine was edited by Norman Podhoretz from 1960 to 1995. Podhoretz was a
liberal Democrat who turned neoconservative in the 1970s. The magazine published the very
influential essay by Irving Kristol, "Urban Civilization & Its Discontents" on July 1, 1970. Public
Interest was a neoconservative public policy journal founded by Daniel Bell and Irving Kristol in
1965. Bell left in 1973 as he believed the magazine was leaning too much to the right. Sociologist
Nathan Glazer replaced him. The publication was discontinued in 2005.
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Meridian Engineering and the Vera Institute, and sought members from the private sector to
form volunteer-based task forces and advisory thinktanks.0
Lindsay also worked with groups such as the Economic Development Council (EDC),
which was headed by chairman of Chase Manhattan bank David Rockefeller, and whose
members included the heads of Equitable Life Insurance, Nassau Smelting, Consolidated Edison,
RH Macy and Company among others. The EDC was one of the earliest examples of the private
sector actively influencing city government decisions and policies. Its members met with the
mayor once a month, lent management experts to city hall for accounting and organizing
systems, and headed nonprofits with slum redevelopment and job development goals.- The EDC
also recruited advertising agencies such as Young and Rubicam Inc. to find ways to assert the
"symbolic economy" of New York City and "awaken public pride and confidence."- The
resultant advertising campaign, titled "New York is New York, is there anywhere else?", was
designed to lure and keep industry in New York with ads placed in The Wall Street Journal, The
Report to the Private Sector from Mayor John Lindsay," Box 25, Folder Summer 1968: Private
Programs, John Lindsay Archives, John Vliet Lindsay Papers (MS 592), Manuscripts and Archives,
Yale University Library. Mayor John Lindsay and Henry S. Rowen of the Rand Corporation,
announced the formation of the New York City-Rand Institute in 1969, which was a nonprofit
corporation that was under the oversight of a board of trustees set up jointly by the City and Rand.
The Institute conducted research on city government policy and operations. In all 250 analysts with
business and public administration backgrounds were hired during his time in office. For more on the
Rand-New York Corporation refer to: Peter L. Szanton, "Analysis and Urban Government:
Experience of the New York City-Rand Institute," Policy Sciences 3, no. 2 (1972): 153-61.
- These monthly meetings with the mayor led to the formation of the New York City Public
Development Corporation in 1966 that managed the city's industrial parks and unused land by
leasing public land for 99 years from the city, and then re-leasing the land to New York-based
businesses to help initiate development projects. The Public Development Corporation was a
semipublic agency, which was sanctioned by the city to control city owned land and issue bonds to
finance tax-exempt industrial development projects.
2 Phillip H Dougherty, "Advertising: City in Drive to Lure Industry," New York Times, September 8,
1967, sec. Advertising News. This reappears in Chapter Four.
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New York Times and The News in 1968. While the EDC raised all the money for these ads, the
city government offered research and publication facilities. (Fig. 1.6, 1.7)
Through the urban crisis years, New York City also remained the site for an intense ideological
speculation on the condition of the city. In a 1967 white paper titled "The Threatened City,"
written by Lindasy's newly formed Task Force for Urban Design whose volunteer members
included the architects Philip Johnson, Robert Stem and I.M Pei, New York City was
characterized as a sick organism, whose existence was threatened by pathologies that needed
treatment and intervention. New Yorkers in turn, were declared deadened by the city's physical
environment, which was encumbered by "depressingly blank architecture, arid street scenes,
baleful housing" and "mock biblical municipal disasters",3 The report quoted San Francisco-
based critic Alan Temko who claimed to have moved to the West Coast because New York was
spinning toward "Mumfordian doom and malignant weariness." Temko portrayed the city as
"over grown and over congested, ill managed and ill-kempt, usually sullen, sometimes violent
and scarred by enormous gray areas."4
- Ibid. 9
New York (N.Y.)., Mayor's Task Force on Urban Design., and William S. Paley. The Threatened
City: A Report on the Design of the City of New York. [New York]: [publisher not identified], 1967, 4
The Threatened City report was accompanied by a series of documentaries made by WCBS under
Paley's guidance that were written by writer Gordon Hyatt, Our Vanishing Legacy (1961), A
Question of Values (1964) and A Fantasy of Forgotten Corners (1966) that each belabored the need
for better design and the preservation of the cultural heritage of New York and its aesthetics in the
face of uncontrolled destruction. Our Vanishing Legacy in particular, was solemn and portentous in
tone about the ill effects of renewal, specifically focusing on the destruction of Pennsylvania station
in New York City calling the city "a big stage set put up for the acts of each generation, then struck
from the skyline to make room for the new show."
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Likening the city to an organism that responded to a specific environment harkens back
to some of the theories of the Chicago School of Sociology during the Progressive Era, when
sociologist Robert Park pioneered the idea of urban ecology, wherein cities were theorized as
living organisms that developed organically in "natural patterns" like ecosystems under forces
similar to those of Darwinian evolution, engaged in a constant struggle for resources under
varying factors. Blight, which was a term first used in reference to plant diseases, was transposed
to the city as organism, to characterize decay in urban environments and societies. 2
Speaking of the dismal "physical environment" of the city to the American Institute of
Architects, Lindsay identified design as "a weapon against crises."- Architecture in New York
had been neglected for more pressing issues such as crime, juvenile delinquency, race riots and
slums.- The quality of architecture shaped the physical environment of the city, which as Lindsay
surmised, shaped the human predicament, including the availbility of jobs, friends and recreation
in the city. The notion of "environment" that appears several times in Lindsay's speeches, essays
- For more on their work, refer to: Robert E Park, Ernest W Burgess, and Roderick Duncan
McKenzie, The City (University of Chicago Press, 1984).; Robert E. Park, Human Communities: The
City and Human Ecology, vol. 2 (Free Press, 1952).; and Robert E Park, "The City: Suggestions for
the Investigation of Human Behavior in the City Environment," The American Journal of Sociology
20, no. 5 (1915): 577-612. The Chicago school referred to a group of scholars from the University of
Chicago's sociology department during the 1920s and 30s, who produced a large body of research on
urban environments called "urban sociology." Their work examined how social structures and
environmental factors shaped human behavior over genetic and personal makeup. The group's work
was rigorous with data and data analysis. By placing quantitative and objective data over subjective
theorizing, the Chicago School suggested a paradigm shift in sociology. Robert E. Park came to the
department from a background in philosophy and journalism. Ernest Burgess came from urban
ecology and geography. They brought in multiple perspectives to the study of urban environments.
- John Lindsay, "A Public Servant Looks at Design," Box 53, Folder: American Institute of
Architects (5/17/67), John Lindsay Archives, John Vliet Lindsay Papers (MS 592). Manuscripts and
Archives, Yale University Library.
- John Lindsay, "Remarks by Mayor John Lindsay before the Design-In Conference," May 13, 1967,
Box 70, John Vliet Lindsay Papers (MS 592). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. 2
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and letters, can be understood as a system that was the sum product of physical, natural,
technological and cultural factors, together with the inhabitant.
This idea of the city as an interconnected set of distinctive parts reflected a number of
emerging theories from that time. The ecological thinking of British anthropologist and
cyberneticist Gregory Bateson, who associated the physical environment of the city with the
cultural ideas of the urban public; the work of artist and theorist Gy6rgy Kepes, who reinforced
the notion of the city as "collective form" where design and technology, visual perception and
scientific innovation informed each other; and the Rockefeller Foundation-funded research
between Kepes and architect Kevin Lynch, The Perceptual Form of the City (1956) that
proposed the city as a visual environment that defined a person's perception of place and time.
Disruptions in this environment-pollution, demolition, and noise-disturbed the individual's
"biological rhythm," with senses idling and bodies less used.
By the end of the 1960s, the urban crisis had helped delegitimize the notion that had been
central to the city until that time: that the state can and did work for public good. Instead the
dominant message prompted by the city government was for every individual to exercise a social
responsibility and sentimental pride for his or her own neighborhood and the city. Discretionary
zoning laws shored this rhetoric of participation with the introduction of bargains and incentives
to the zoning process. They made the city's responses to crises palatable to everyone-business
- "Enhancing the visual environment," Kevin Lynch papers, MC 208, box 14, Folder: Environmental
Perception: Research and Public Policy, 1976, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Institute
Archives and Special Collections, Cambridge, Massachusetts.; Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology
of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology (University of
Chicago Press, 1972).; Architect Fumihiko Maki and Masato Ohtaka's essay Some Thoughts on
Collective Form, featured in the Kepes edited Structure in Art and Science, talks of a need for a new
visual and formal language for the city which was not a homogenous whole but rather a "dynamic
field of interrelated forces."
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community, developers, financiers, neighborhood associations and volunteer-led self-help
groups-by bringing them to the negotiation table. The outsourcing of the construction and
management of public facilities that transpired in these bargains, permanently transformed the
public realm of the city.
While discretionary zoning laws were designed to dismantle a centralized, one-size-fits-
all regulatory model, they in fact calibrated a lateral displacement to informal techniques of
government, whereby the localization of the enforcement of zoning laws transferred control from
one set of bureaucrats to another set of experts. Sociologist Thomas Lemke describes such
displacements as the "prolongation of government" as against a dismantling or retreat of
government, as they restructure power relations between the state and civil society actors." The
urban designer in city government was one such new actor who bridged the political and
technical, between mayoral politics, urban policies, regulatory stipulations, contract documents
and citizen demands. Lindsay's Task Force described the role of the urban designer in city
government as "providing a chassis" for private enterprise, while allowing the city government
to be more effective with design decisions and facilitating partnerships with "good design" in
mind."
The Zoning Overhaul of 1967 and the Urban Design Group (UDG)
Convened in 1967 by chairman of the Planning Commission and director of Department of City
Planning Donald Elliott, the UDG began with architects Jacquelin Robertson, Richard Weinstein,
- Thomas Lemke, Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique, Boulder, (Colo.: Paradigm Publishers,
2011), 11. The idea of prolongation is discussed later in this chapter.
-Ibid. 17
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Jonathan Barnett, Myles Weintraub and Giovanni Pasanella. The members of the UDG had
already been part of the Lindsay election campaign in 1965 where they wrote white papers on
architecture, design, and planning under the direction of Elliott. The UDG initially worked out of
a central office within the Planning Commission and functioned much like an architectural
partnership with operational independence.- They developed and commissioned concept designs
for area development and renewal in the city, worked closely with other city agencies, and most
importantly remained the central figures bargained in the field for quality design" on behalf of
the city. (Fig. 1.9) Both Elliott and Barnett have described the UDG as a non-hierarchical group
of newly graduated architects who believed the city needed regulations that involved developers
at an early stage in order to implement complex planning initiatives. When creating the position
of urban designer, Elliott turned to the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BDA) under Ed Logue
as it was the only other planning department in the United States with urban designer positions
already established by 1967. The urban designer position at UDG much like that at BDA, did not
require civil service exams that had otherwise been mandatory for city employees.-
- Jonathan Barnett, Urban design as public policy; practical methods for improving cities,
(Architectural Record Books, New York, 1974), 8.
6 Donald Elliott, Interview with lawyer Donald Elliott, chairman of the New York City Planning
Commission during the Lindsay Administration, Recorded interview in person at Bryant Rabbino
LLC, New York City, July 22, 2016.; Jonathan Barnett, Interview with Jonathan Barnett, Recorded
interview in person at the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, May 23, 2016.
62 The Boston Development Authority (BDA) under Ed Logue had the position of the urban designer
as early as 1965. In my interview with city planner Jonathan Barnett at the University of
Pennsylvania, he spoke about calling up the BDA to ask about the civil service exams when he was
told that they already had a Jr. Urban Designer, Asst. Urban Designer, Urban Designer, or as Barnett
summed it, "a whole banana republic." New York went on to create similar positions in the Planning
Commission. The applicant is still expected to take an internal exam that focuses on the design
portfolio and a technical oral exam.
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Urban design had its disciplinary roots in the Harvard Urban Design Conference
convened by architect and city planner Josd Luis Sert in 1956. It was a product of the 1950s
when cities were receiving generous federal funds and subsidies specifically for urban causes.1
At the conference in 1956, Sert outlined urban design as a collaborative effort between
architecture, planning and landscape architecture, that dealt with the physical form of the city.-
This disciplinary outlook changed by the1960s with growing public suspicion of large-scale
planning. If planning had alienated both the citizens and the business community with its
totalizing and rigid stance towards the city by the 60s, the urban designer in city government was
to arbitrate between these divisions. Barnett characterized the planner as a future-focused figure
who was concerned with the allocation of resources, and the architect as a designer of buildings
who responded to contract documents.The urban designer in comparison designed the city
around the building with three-dimensional capacities that goes beyond "parceling out land for
zoning purposes." Much like the architect, the urban designer interacts with different
- Jose Luis Sert started the first Master of Urban Design degree at Harvard University in 1960 after
the Urban Design Conference in 1956 that argued for greater cooperation between the roles of
architects, planners and landscape architects. The degree was a joint degree for students who already
had professional degrees in architecture, landscape architecture or planning. Through the 60s, private
organizations such as the Rockefeller Foundation sponsored programs for urban design research in
the context of the "urban crisis" that popularized the concept. The foundation funded research
projects with Jane Jacobs, Kevin Lynch, Ian McHarg, Christopher Tunnard, Edmund Bacon,
Christopher Alexander among others. By the 70s and 80s, urban designers were part of city
government all over the country. Please refer to: Jonathan Barnett, An Introduction to Urban Design
(New York: Harper & Row, 1982).; Knud Bastlund, Josi Luis Sert; Architecture, City Planning,
Urban Design. (New York: Praeger, 1967).; and Alex Krieger and William S. Saunders, Urban
Design (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009).
Eric Paul Mumford, Defining Urban Design: CIAM Architects and the Formation of a Discipline,
1937-69, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2009). 45
- Jonathan Barnett, An Introduction to Urban Design, New York: Harper & Row, 1982.
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professionals during the design and construction phase, however, according to Barnett, the scale
is magnified to that of the city.
In 1967, the Planning Commission and the UDG started the process of amending New
York City's zoning laws. In the words of deputy executive director of the New York Planning
Commission Sidney J. Frigand, the city needed "strategies that would be adaptable to continuing
change."- However, how different were the 1967 amendments from what existing until then?
New York City enacted its first citywide zoning law in 1916 which was the first comprehensive
set of laws in the United States. Manhattan's borough president George McAneny and the
chairman of the Heights of Buildings Commission Edward Bassett were the architects of the
1916 zoning laws. The primary objectives of the 1916 laws were the protection of the Fifth
Avenue carriage trade and the regulation of the relatively new building type: the skyscraper.
At the turn of the century, Manhattan saw a speculative building boom owing to a new
subway system and the rapid construction of loft buildings by garment manufacturers.7 The
Arthur Gilman and Edward Kendall designed Equitable Life Building on 120 Broadway in
Manhattan was emblematic for the problems of unregulated skyscraper construction. It was built
in 1870 in Manhattan with a floor area of 1.2 million square feet on an acre plot. The building
created a wall on Broadway that blocked all light and air to the street.
In response to these issues, the 1916 zoning laws centrally focused on regulating density
and the equitable provision of light and air. Restrictions were only imposed on a building's bulk
- "Press Release 119-The New City: Architecture and Urban Renewal" (The Museum of Modem Art,
December 11, 1967). 1
6 David W. Dunlap, "Zoning Arrived 100 Years Ago. It Changed New York City Forever." New
York Times, July 25,2016, sec. NY/ Region.
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and not on the height, as long as the building has setbacks from the street at certain heights.
Architect Hugh Ferriss' drawings famously delineated the resultant tiered skyscrapers in 1922.-
The 1916 zoning laws shaped New York City as continuous street walls, where buildings were
attached to each other with retail storefronts and mixed.uses. The restriction on density made
small plots almost impossible to work with, while large plots engendered an interesting variety
of responses such as Empire State building, RCA building, Central Park West among others.
A slew of zoning ordinances in small and large cities and villages in the United States
and even Canada were modeled on the 1916 New York City zoning laws, in the aftermath of the
United States Supreme Court case Village of Euclid, v. Ambler Realty Co. from 1926. The case
was the first instance of zoning litigated in court. It was also the first time the Court upheld the
state's police power in zoning. Ambler Realty owned substantial land in Euclid, a suburb of
Cleveland. In an attempt to control the expansion of industrial Cleveland into Euclid, the village
of Euclid passed zoning ordinances that effectively changed the land use of the property owned
by Ambler Realty. This prevented Ambler Realty from developing the land exclusively for
industrial use. They sued the village for the unreasonable extension of the village's "police
power" that depreciated the value of their property in Euclid. The supreme court sided with the
Village of Euclid, claiming that zoning ordinances were exercised for the greater "public
welfare" and there was no substantial proof that Ambler realty was in fact suffering any loss, and
that the claim of depreciation came from speculation only. The court's statement justified the
role of police power in zoning by claiming that zoning ordinances were constitutional unless
- Hugh Ferriss, The Metropolis of Tomorrow. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Architectural Press, 1986.
They were commissioned by architect Harvey Wiley Corbett to draw "step-by-step perspectives"
that showed the formal and architectural consequences of the new 1916 zoning laws.
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clearly shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable, and without a "substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare."-
Regulating pure aesthetic goals would be an encroachment upon the constitutional rights
of private citizens. The government can control private development and its aesthetic outcome
only through the police power of zoning laws when it is categorized under the rubrics of
protecting the "health, safety, morals, and public welfare of citizens.", As clarified in another
case Berman v Parker from 1954, the Supreme Court defined the concept of public welfare as
including the spiritual, physical, aesthetic and monetary values of a community., The legislature
could determine if a particular community is both "beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well
as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled," all under the rubrics of public welfare.
The city government extends the police power of zoning as a legal instrument that reflects the
collective values of citizens through the rubric of public welfare.
In 1961, New York City zoning laws were completely rewritten under the leadership of real
estate developer and philanthropist James Felt.,, This iteration responded to the drastic changes
- US Supreme Court, Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Quote from Mary
Spearing's "Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the Tax-Exempt Owner," Fordham Urb. LJ 3
(1974): 123.
7 Jerold S. Kayden, "Understanding the" Code" of Codes." Perspecta, 2004.
- Berman v. Parker (No. 22) 348 US 26, (US Supreme Court 1954). For more legal details refer to:
https://www .law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/348/26.
71 Ibid.
7 James Felt was the commissioner of the New York City Planning Commission before lawyer
Donald Elliott. Felt had already been a part of many governmental and quasi-governmental agencies
such as the City Housing Authority and the Mayor's Committee for Better Housing, when he became
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the city had undergone since the 1930s with deindustrialization and suburbanization. The 1961
zoning laws were strict rule-based codes that had its intellectual origins in the ideals of
modernism and urban renewal-clear distribution of land uses, air, light and public spaces
regulated to standardized numbers and percentages, along with slum and blight removal. At the
center of the 1961 zoning laws was the emblematic image of the Ludwig Mies van der Rohe-
designed Seagram Building in midtown Manhattan with its thin and tall form that is set back
from the street with a public plaza upfront.-
Lawyer Norman Marcus, who was general counsel to the Planning Commission, likened
the city shaped by the 1916 zoning laws to a patchwork quilt and that of the 1961 zoning laws to
a maze. 5 This comparison is intriguing as it reflects the intrinsic differences between the two sets
of zoning laws. The 1916 zoning laws shaped the city from the street with the existing context
almost always defining the nature of the new development. It brought together an assemblage of
different types of buildings that were sewn together in a quilt like fashion by the concept of the
commissioner. Felt's 1961 zoning resolution was in clear opposition to Robert Moses and his urban
renewal in the city. The James Felt Papers are at the Avery Architectural and Fine Arts Library.
The Seagram Building itself has an interesting history with the case, Matter of Seagram Sons v. Tax
Comm, which was a New York Supreme Court case where the owners of Seagram Building, Joseph
E Seagram and Sons, appealed the high property tax levied by the city. Property taxes are determined
based on capitalized rent income and the possible cost of reproducing a similar building. The owners
argued that the construction costs of the Seagram tower were clearly more than its capitalized rental
value, thus appealing the city's property tax assessment. New York state tax commission ruled that
the additional money invested in the building was for prestige and it should be taxed. The ruling
brought out this idea that the additional costs that go into "prestige" had a rental value. Architectural
Forum and New York Times debated this ruling and criticized it for possibly discouraging good
architecture and the hiring of good architects.
- Norman Marcus, "New York City Zoning-1961-1991: Turning Back the Clock-But With an Up-to-
the-Minute Social Agenda," Fordham Urb. L 19 (1991), 707.
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street wall. In comparison, the 1961 zoning laws created a mazelike network of similar looking
stand-alone buildings (think Seagram Building) that allowed streets to puncture through.
The 1961 zoning laws introduced several new concepts, namely Floor Area Ratio (FAR),
Development Rights Transfer (TDR) and plaza bonuses. With FARs, plot area and use quantify
achievable floor space. So, if the FAR for a certain zone was 10 and the plot size was 25,000
square feet, the building area would be 250,000 square feet, which in keeping with standard
building setbacks would shape the shell of the building. While the 1916 codes allowed higher
densities in larger plots, the 1961 codes shaped the city entirely based on FAR zoning values that
divided the city based on uses. A second concept was that of Development Rights Transfer or
TDRs, where the plot in consideration for the FAR calculation was not just restricted to the
project site, but also all other plots owned by the developers within the same block. Unused FAR
could then be transferred between plots. Developers could also lease an adjacent
underused plot and transfer the unbuilt developable area of the leased plot to his or her project
site. The transfer of development rights in 1961 created value to a plot "ahead of labor," or in
other words, value was ascribed to a building even before its construction merely through the
concept of unused floor area.- A third concept was that of plaza bonuses, where an extra twenty
percent floor area could be added to a new building if a public plaza-like in the case of the
Seagram Building- was offered in the plot.-
- Zoning, Politics of Zoning, "Development Rights Transfer in New York City," Economics 158
(1967): 339.
- This incentivized public plaza came in for a lot of criticism as the decade progressed, as there were
no prescriptions in the laws for the quality of plaza space in terms of material and facilities
specifications, or sunlight and direction of the plazas. Manhattan saw a slew of such plazas-almost
500 of them in the next forty years-some of which are unusable and unsafe. According to Jerold
Kayden roughly 40 percent of the plazas in New York by the year 2000 were useless, with "austere
designs, no amenities and little or no direct sunlight." Half of the buildings had spaces that were
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When Elliott and his team at the UDG started amending zoning laws in 1966, they
retained the concepts of FAR, TDR-later also called Air Rights Transfers-and plaza bonuses
as important devices for the case-by-case nature of discretionary zoning laws. With
Discretionary Zoning Laws, each plot and developer could individually approach the Planning
Commission and the Department of Planning for specific negotiations. The city government
followed a multi-stage legal procedure in each of these negotiations by seeking consensus
between the Planning Commission, Department of City Planning and Board of Estimate, along
with multiple public hearings. Negotiations with developers required the presence of Elliott and
were conditional on hearings and public approvals.
The 1967 zoning amendments also signify the first time that landmark preservation of
both public and private property became part of discretionary zoning laws. While preservation
and zoning laws are enacted and enforced separately, they intersected in 1967. The general
counsel to the Planning Commission Norman Marcus, called the integration of zoning with
preservation an arranged "shot-gun marriage" in 1967, where the city government offered
incentives to developers for undertaking landmark preservation of privately owned buildings and
places that represented the city's cultural, social, economic, political, and architectural history.,"
Landmark preservation laws had been unpopular as developers and property owners had to bear
illegally closed or otherwise privatized. For more refer to: Jerold S. Kayden, "Meet Me at the Plaza,"
New York Times, October 19, 2011, sec. The Opinion Pages. Jerold Kayden's book Privately Owned
Public Space: The New York City Experience., is an excellent source for more details of the
proliferation of plazas around New York after 1961.
-The newly appointed Landmark Preservation Commission legislated landmark preservation laws in
1965.
- Mary Spearing, "Landmark Preservation: The Problem of the Tax-Exempt Owner." Fordham Urb.
LJ 3 (1974): 123.
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its costs without any sort of control on the regulation. o However, the UDG and Planning
Commission changed that with discretionary zoning laws, where they incetivized preservation by
way of zoning.
The Special Theater District, Manhattan
In 1968, the Planning Commission and the Department of City Planning designated the area that
spanned between 40th to 57th Street and 8th Avenue to the Avenue of the Americas, as the first
Special Zoning District in New York City. (Fig. 1.8) The Special Zoning District was an area
that maintained a unique regulatory environment for a variety of reasons: to jumpstart urban
redevelopment, attract investments, encourage landmark preservation and shape architecture and
design. The New York City Zoning Resolution describes the purpose of the Special Theater
District as an attempt "to preserve, protect and promote the character of the area as the location
of the world's foremost concentration of legitimate theaters," which helped the City of New
York achieve "pre-eminent status as a cultural showcase, an office headquarters center, and a
cosmopolitan residential community."-
Among other purposes for the district was to "provide an incentive for possible
redevelopment" of the area and provide "freedom of architectural design" so theaters could be
- Losses in market value that come from landmark designation are borne mostly by the private
property owners. The designation is established through a complex process in which the owner
participates, however without enough control. For more refer to "The problem with NYC's
Landmark Preservation," in the Defining ideas journal by the New York Hoover Institution written
by Richard A Epstein (April 20 2015). As part of the landmark preservation laws, the owner of a
landmarked building was entitled to earn an annual return of six percent on the value of the property,
or partial or complete tax exemption and remission of taxes in return for undertaking preservation.-
- New York Zoning Resolution, Art. VIII: Special Purpose Districts, Ch. 1: Special Midtown District,
81-06: Special Theater District, added pursuant to City Planning Report CP-20000 (Nov. 1, 1967).
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accommodated within multiuse structures for the specific purposes of economic development.-
While the legislation included design outlines for ground floor uses of buildings within the
District-illuminated signs, signage and glazing-much of the regulatory language avoids
specific design guidelines with broad subjective ideas such as "preservation of character and
scale."-, The lack of specificity was a part of the intended legislative flexibility where each
project in the District was to be a product of individual bargaining and negotiation.
The zoning resolution placed the theaters-or the Great White Way as it was colloquially
called since the nineteenth Century-as the favorable anchors of the District. The Times Square
area that abutted the Great White Way was quite the opposite. By the late 60s, the area between
42- St and 7- and 8- avenue was declared the "worst block in town" by the New York Times due
to its high crime rates. Writer Marshall Berman considered Times Square in the period as tipped
with every national trend of urban decay, while author James Traub described the area as
descending to a "feral state" at night.-, Cinemas, theaters, and stores in the area had started to
cater to the porn industry by the early 60s. There was undoubtedly an urgent need in the Lindsay
administration to turn around Time Square and its physical deterioration for the economic
wellbeing of the theater industry. More importantly, however, the west side presented yet
U Ibid.
- Ibid.
Marshall Berman, On the Town: One Hundred Years of Spectacle in Times Square (New York:
Random House, 2006). James Traub, The Devil's Playground: A Century of Pleasure and Profit in
Times Square (Random House, 2007), 243. The area between 42- St and 7. and 8- avenue was
declared the "worst block in town" by New York Times on March 14, 1960 with high crime rates.
Movies such as Midnight Cowboy (1969), French Connection (1971), Taxi Driver (1976) and Death
Wish (1974)-which were shot on location in New York and Times Square in the period, reflect the
grimness and desolation of the period. See chapter 4 for more on Times Square.
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underdeveloped land in Manhattan. The rapid building of office towers in the Upper East Side of
New York in the early 60s had to be moved westwards, to prevent further congestion and
overbuilding. Developers such as Seymour Durst of the Durst Organization had already begun
assembling properties at low prices to the west of Sixth Avenue, with the idea that the city
government would eventually clear out the porn industry of Times Square, leading the area into a
property boom. The Theaters of the Great White Way were the economic foundations for this
shift to the west side."
Construction was not discouraged within the District. Developers were instead persuaded
to build and include theaters in their new projects in return for an incentive-a twenty percent
bonus in floor area. With this, the FAR for some buildings in the Theater District jumped from
15 to 21.5, substantially increasing the density of built area. The Planning Commission and the
UDG also amended development right transfers with respect to landmark buildings within the
District where not only plots within the same block but also across the street and intersection,
even with separate owners, could share unused development rights. The District's old landmark
buildings with unused development rights transformed into "battlegrounds" between owners,
developers, and citizens.- The theater incentive in the District would go on to produce Circle in
the Square, American Place, Minskoff and Marquis theaters among several others. (Fig. 1.10) As
was argued by New York Times critic Paul Goldberger in the 80s, most of these newly built
- The Durst Organization, one of New York's oldest real estate company developed the buildings,
114 W 47- St, 1155 Avenue of the Americas, 1133 Ave of the Americas, all in and around Times
Square and the Theater District in the 70s and 80s. For more, see James W. Carrington, "New York
City's Theater Subdistrict and The Challenges of Special District Zoning," (Master of Science in City
and Regional Planning thesis, Pratt Institute, 2010).35
- Paul Goldberger, "Architecture View; Theaters and Churches are the city's new Battleground,"
New York Times, May 30, 1982
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theaters were not architecturally valued or economically viable, having only been constructed for
the purposes of generous floor area incentives for new towers.7
The Marriott Marquis hotel was one of the earliest product of discretionary zoning laws
within the District. Completed in 1985 by architect-developer Portman and Western International
Hotels, the Marriott Marquis is a fifty-story, 2000-room hotel with a thirty-seven-story atrium,
and a theater on its third floor. The project introduced a new multiuse typology in New York
City: the theater within a hotel. The hotel's H-shaped walls rise over Times Square cradling the
theater on its lower floors. With the theater on the third floor, the hotel lobby is pushed up to the
eighth floor of the building. While mayor Koch considered the Marriott Marquis a centerpiece in
his efforts to revitalize the Theater District and Times Square, Portman admitted that the
architecture was about disconnecting from the street, as "there was nothing there to relate to."--
The proposal for Marriott Marquis provoked protests from members of the New York theater
community both in 1973 and in the spring of 1982.
Following the protests of 1982, the Koch administration decided to pull back from its
exclusive focus on incentivizing new theater construction to incentivize the preservation of
existing buildings against redevelopment pressures instead. The Preservation Commission
quickly designated over forty-four theaters and playhouses such as the Barrymore, John Golden
and the Palace theaters as landmark buildings. In order to compensate theater owners for their
restricted use due to landmark status, the city offered an additional twenty percent buildable area
bonus to developers for the rehabilitation of theaters. If a theater was landmarked, any unused
Paul Goldberger, "Theater Zone: Panacea or Problem," New York Times, October 1, 1983
Karrie Jacobs, "Times Square (finally) grows up," Architect Magazine, December 29, 2015
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FAR in the plot could be transferred to a non-contiguous plot where development was possible.
This was called distant transfers.- This move broadening the very definition of contiguity and
adjacency in the case of landmark buildings and Special Zoning Districts, where not only plots
within the same block, but also across the street and intersection, even with separate owners
could share unused development rights.
The Special Theater District did not manage to accelerate the area's redevelopment
through the 70s, despite discretionary zoning. It was the 42nd Street Development Project, which
was floated by the New York State-run public benefit Urban Development Corporation (UDC)
that finally produced the results the city wanted.- The development was a 13-acre site that
included two city blocks along 42nd Street between Broadway and 8th Avenue. The project
proposal included a merchandise mart, office towers, entertainment-related facilities and the
Liberty, Victory, Selwyn, Apollo, Times Square, Lyric and Empire theaters that were all
protected from demolition. Developers were attracted to the area for the sizable tax abatements.
By the end of the 80s, Times Square's porn industry was almost gone. It took along several
historical and local bars, restaurants and small businesses. In 2001, the city government
reconfigured the Special Theater District into the Special Theater Sub-District-which included
the area west of Eighth Avenue from 42nd Street to 45th Street-in an effort to broaden the
development right sharing zone.
- For more on distant transfers refer to: Furman Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy, "Buying
Sky: The Market for Transferable Development Rights," October 2013.
- For more on the UDC and its eventual bankruptcy, refer to Chapter 3, which centers on the public-
private partnerships that went into the development of Roosevelt Island.
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Since 1968, the Planning Commission has designated saw over sixty-four special zoning districts
in New York City. Within these districts, TDRs have become powerful devices to attract private
sector investments. A third of the residential and commercial buildings constructed below
Central Park in the last decade used development rights acquired from other lots." TDRs have
allowed developers to build bigger buildings than what the zoning resolution would permit
before the transfer. Discretionary zoning laws opened doors to the hyper-density of Manhattan in
the years after 1967. In his article "How to Make Midtown Livable" from New York Magazine,
urbanist William Whyte talked of the "canyon-like" and "physically menacing" effects of the
density increase in Manhattan by 1981, where FAR bonuses led to the loss of the most important
amenity available to the public: light and air.2 In the same article, Whyte also recounts the
peculiar "fright plan" that developers used to work around the discretionary zoning system,
where they would deliberately present the worst design for the plot and then negotiate
improvements in return for better incentives.
As for the UDG, they were dispersed to smaller local offices by the mid-70s. Robertson
moved to the newly convened Office of Mid-Town Planning and Development, Weinstein to the
- In 1973, the city even started the practice of "banking" air rights to accelerate development. The
city government first attempted this in the Special South Seaport District in Manhattan. Banked air
rights could be accumulated in bulk by a private entity for later use. A group of banks headed by
Chase Manhattan acquired over a million square feet of development rights in the district as security
against the loans offered to the city for the establishment of South Street Seaport Museum.- The
banks sold about half a million square feet of those rights to developers for specific projects such as
Continental Insurance Building at 180 Maiden Lane, 175 Water Street, and 199 Water Street. This
was an attempt from the city to regulate new development in the District, without depending on
individual developers and the whims of the market. Since the banks owned all air rights in the
district, the value of the rights were effectively controlled. This was not the case with the Theater
District where the value of the rights fluctuated with individual buying and selling patterns.
- Ibid.
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Office of Lower Manhattan Development, Barnett remained at the UDG, Pasanella quit, and
Weintraub went back to his architectural practice. According to Elliott and Barnett, the new
Koch administration perceived the UDG as an overly centralized agency that wielded too much
leverage and control over all of New York City's boroughs." Koch had a general dislike for
Lindsay era policies. While he retained the overhauls to the zoning system, he dismantled the
UDG-a move summarized by Barnett as simply, "Koch hated Lindsay's people."-
"Are our cities manageable?",
The above quote is the title from mayor Lindsay's address to the American Society of
Newspaper Editors on April 20, 1967. In the speech, the mayor who was just a year into his
mayoral duties spoke of a "climate of fear" for the "man on the street," and an impending
ominous "war on crime" by a "humanized city government."- The speech touched on all the
familiar talking points-crime, pollution, housing, police and welfare. However, the question of
manageability with respect to the big city stands out as a central anxiety that seemingly
determined much of the city government's rhetoric, ideology, and policies in the late 60s. The
urban crisis of the 60s brought to light a moment when cities around the United States saw the
gradual ebbing of federal money for urban centers. New York City was experiencing operational
- Jonathan Barnett, Interview with Jonathan Barnett, Recorded interview in person at the University
of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, May 23, 2016.
- Ibid.
- John Lindsay, "Are Big Cities Manageable? Address by John V Lindsay, Mayor of the City of New
York before the American Society of Newspaper Editors," April 20, 1967, Box 70, John Vliet
Lindsay Papers (MS 592). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
-Ibid.
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deficits and frequently maturing short-term debts that would soon to come to a head by 1974
with the international oil embargo and stock market crash which is discussed in Chapter 4. While
these problems had been developing much before Lindsay' time in 1967, they compounded
during his tenure.
Lindsay's aesthetic and formal concerns for the physical city was part of his
administration's crisis management. It was as much about changing the way the city looked, as it
was about adapting and adjusting the way the city worked. In the cause of the physical city were
undoubtedly ideas of a New York City that appeared cleaner, safer and more attractive for
middle-class families and corporations. Fundamentally, however, the city government was
outsourcing the provision and maintenance of public benefits via the mechanism of zoning, in
order to reduce dependence on state and federal funds. As the brainchild of the UDG,
discretionary zoning joined the forces of design, politics, and law to restructure urban
development in New York City by engaging the private sector in ways that had never been done
before.
The UDG's criticism of the rigid and uncompromising nature of the New York City
zoning laws as it was in 1967, staked a claim for a new regulatory environment where, as
Weinstein surmised, they subverted the wheeling and dealing of developers through bargains,
negotiations and the localization of the enforcement of zoning laws. Localization meant the
introduction of a new set of actors to the table-the urban designer, developer, owner, NGOs,
citizen groups and individuals-who redefined entrenched and opaque bureaucratic practices and
relations. The new environment offered channels for the privatization of the public realm by
engaging private sector actors in decisions that were formerly monopolized by the public sector.
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In an effort to preserve and accentuate its disciplinary boundaries and its role within
government and city, urban design has been construed as the art of designing cities without the
design of buildings." This distinction also serves to preserve the distinction between public and
private interests in the urban setting, where the building is clearly identified as private property
against the city, which is in the public domain. By outsourcing public benefits via discretionary
zoning, the Lindsay administration allowed the real estate community in New York to wield
greater influence on the quality, maintenance and use of public facilities and services. This shift
in essence, complicated the notion of public interest as it increasingly came to be entangled with
private rights and private profits. Zoning is a policy mechanism that is designed to protect public
interest. However, with discretionary zoning laws, development that is in the public interest only
exists due to the partnerships between city, developers and financiers. Maintaining economic
activity in the private sector then, becomes an unwieldy part of public interest.
New York City was the first city in the United States to enact a complete set of zoning
laws in 1916, which paved the way for other cities in the United States and around the world.
Discretionary zoning laws had a similar effect. Since the 1970s, several cities in the United
States and other parts of the world, such as Mumbai, Hong Kong and Sao Paolo have enacted
similar zoning laws that operate through negotiations and incentives to demonstrate flexibility
and pragmatism. In each case, they have engendered complex public-private partnerships.
Between the years 1961 to 1975 alone, developers have shown to have gotten over 7.5 million
square feet of additional floor area in incentives in New York City, totaling to an amount of $186
- This was most clearly articulated by Jonathan Bamett in An Introduction to Urban Design, (New
York: Harper & Row, 1982).
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million for spending approximately four million dollars on public benefits.- While the four
million dollars-worth of public benefits can still be argued to be in the public interest, it does
bear the question of the advantages of this form of exchange between the government and
developers. This chapter asserts that in their results at least, discretionary zoning laws were a
form of urban renewal. Urban renewal in the 1950s transformed large portions of the city
through rule-based laws and federal funds. Discretionary zoning laws also managed much of the
same. However, renewal this time was paid for by the local real estate community.
- William H. Whyte, "How to Make Midtown Livable," New York Magazine, March 9, 1981, 26 In
New York City, discretionary laws have resulted in over 82 acres of privately-owned public spaces
since 1967.
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Chapter Two
The Moral Obligations of Debt: The Urban Development Corporation and Roosevelt
Island Development, 1968-1975
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At a press conference in the Red Room of the Capitol in Albany on February 28, 1968, New
York Governor Nelson Rockefeller announced the birth of a "revolutionary multibillion-dollar
plan" to create a "special corporation with drastic powers" which would build low and moderate-
income housing by raising capital from private and public sources.' The special corporation was
the New York State Urban Development Corporation (UDC), which was started by Rockefeller
in 1968 and headed by the planner and lawyer Ed Logue. Rockefeller cited the formation of
UDC as part of "extreme measures before another summer begins" in the wake of countrywide
riots in Birmingham, Chicago, New York, Minneapolis, Newark and Detroit among other cities
in the summer of 1967.2
In the same year, President Lyndon Johnson convened the eleven-member Kerner
Commission headed by Governor Otto Kerner to investigate the reasons for the repeated urban
riots in the United States.- The Commission's report suggested that urban renewal, housing
policies and the lack of opportunities among black population had led to "ghettoization," and that
grievances related to housing were one of the central factors in nearly every disorder in the cities
they surveyed., The report proposed "racial integration" as a remedial measure. The
'Sydney Schanberg, "Governor Offers a $6-Billion Plan to Rebuild Slums," New York Times,
February 28, 1968.
2 The US experienced over 150 race riots in 1967. The media dubbed the year as the long hot
summer with over 11,000 people arrested and over 74 deaths. For more on the riots refer to, Malcolm
McLaughlin, The Long, Hot Summer of 1967: Urban Rebellion in America, 2014.; John S. Adams,
"The Geography of Riots and Civil Disorders in the 1960s," Economic Geography 48, no. 1 (1972):
24-42.
'United States and National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, The Kerner Report: The 1968
Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, (New York: Pantheon Books,
1988).; Angus Campbell et al., Supplemental Studies for the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders. (New York: Praeger, 1968).
' Ibid.
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Commission proposed the construction of over six million new low-and middle-income housing
units with "a thrust in non-ghetto areas.", The report marked an end to the "towers in the park"
model of urban renewal that relied on state funds., Instead, the federal government pushed for
mixed-income smaller-scaled housing that private entities could build and manage in return for
governmental subsidies and tax benefits.
The UDC was the product of this moment in 1968 when New York was experiencing a
severe shortage of housing. The number of renter-occupied low-income housing had dropped by
sixty-six percent between 1950 and 1960 in New York City. Nationally, renter households in the
lowest twenty percent of the income distribution were spending over forty percent of their
incomes on housing.- Some of the primary deterrents to publicly-owned and managed housing
were high cost of constructing and operating housing units, high rates of housing abandonment,
, Ibid.
- The Tower in the Park referred to tall public housing projects that were designed as stand-alone
buildings with open space around them, as against urban slum sprawl that spread horizontally with
little open space. Chapter One discusses the term 'blight.' Owing to its vagueness of meaning,
"blight" became a rhetorical device that allowed renewal advocates in cities to reorganize property
rights and assert the detrimental effects of certain dangerous neighborhoods on the rest of the city.
For more refer to: Robert E. Park, Ernest W Burgess, and Roderick Duncan McKenzie, The City
(University of Chicago Press, 1984).
, Building more mixed-income smaller-scaled housing was not easy in 1968. Since the end of the
Second World War, the federal government had been assisting middle-income families with home
ownership by offering low-interest mortgages and loans. They were the demographic marked to pay
their taxes and help stabilize rent and property values. As a result, a divide had already taken place
along racial lines with suburbs thriving and city centers teeming with public housing. When the
federal government proposed more mixed-income housing in the 1960s, they were aware it would
only be possible with private sector support.
' Committee on Housing Statistics, "Housing Statistics Handbook, Basic Housing Statistics, The
City of New York," November 1967, Box 243, Cities-Housing 1967, Edward Joseph Logue Papers
(MS 959). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
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and racially-charged vociferous voter opposition to funding and accommodating low-income
housing units.' At the time, there were two national urban development and housing programs
that exclusively focused on low-income housing. One was the mammoth urban renewal program
that was attached to Title I of the US Housing Act of 1949 that increased federal influence in
slum clearance and the construction of public housing. The second was President Lyndon
Johnson's Model Cities program that had only been introduced in 1966 as part of the Great
Society set of programs. The program began as a remedial strategy to urban renewal. It provided
federal funding to municipalities and local agencies in support of projects that addressed both the
physical and social needs of "model neighborhoods" in the country.0
Between 1949 and 1967, renewal agencies cleared over two thousand acres for urban
renewal in New York. They rebuilt only two hundred acres with new housing projects. These
projects each took the agencies an average of thirteen years to complete. As of 1968, New York
State had over one hundred and fifty stalled urban renewal projects. Rockefeller put down the
Voters refused to authorize subsidies for public housing in referendums held in 1964 and 65 in
New York State. Upstate New York voters did not want to pay higher taxes or accommodate poorer
families in their communities. Ed Logue mentions the problems of getting voter approval for public
housing several times in his writings.
- Model Cities' goals included comprehensive planning, rebuilding, rehabilitation, social service
delivery, and citizen participation. Model Cities faced much criticism for being too broad and
ambitious, and not nearly as effective. The federal government discontinued the program in 1974. Its
success and failure as a program have been debated, most recently by Susanne Schindler, "Making
Sense of Model Cities," The Architectural League's Urban Omnibus, November 1, 2016. Also refer
to, Bernard J. Frieden and Marshall Kaplan, The Politics of Neglect: Urban Aid from Model Cities to
Revenue Sharing (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977).; and Charles M. Haar, Between the Idea and
the Reality: A Study in the Origin, Fate, and Legacy of the Model Cities Program (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1975).
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slow pace to bureaucratic red tape, petty politics at the local level and a lack of incentives to
attract private developers into urban renewal."
In the hopes of working around these problems, Rockefeller bestowed the UDC with an
unprecedented set of powers. It was one of the earliest organizations of the scale in the United
States that could gather capital resources in the form of funds, loans, grants and subsidies from
both public and private sources, and initiate and partner with the private sector in the design,
construction, and management of projects. It could raise capital by issuing long-terms bonds and
short-term notes.2 It could sell or lease its interest in any project at any time and reinvest the
interest, income or profit towards the payment of outstanding bonds or notes. Most importantly,
the UDC did not need voter approval for any of its functions. In essence, the UDC operated as a
hybrid entity between private firms and public agencies. It brought together the roles of a
planner, architect, developer, financier and manager within a single public-benefit corporation to
acquire and clear land, finance, design, build and manage a project.
Between 1968 and 1975, UDC built low, moderate and market-rate housing along with
commercial, industrial and civic projects. It experimented with new housing typologies that
resulted from mixing income groups, densities and uses. It championed new and established
architects, planners and landscape architects. It partnered with developers, institutions, renewal
agencies and city governments at various stages of the project. Some of their projects include
- Sydney Schanberg, "Governor Offers a $6-Billion Plan to Rebuild Slums." New York Times,
February 28, 1968.
,2A bond is a form of loan where the company that issues the bond borrows money from the public.
The company agrees to repay the bond at a certain time and predetermined interest rate. The issuing
company makes periodic interest payments to its bondholders. It also repays the principal amount at
the end of the bond's term, or maturity date. For a simple description on types of bonds, please refer
to https://investor.gov/introduiction-investing/basics/investmeint-prodicts/bonds.
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Josep Lluis Sert's Eastwood and John Johansen and Ashok Bhavnani's Island House and
Rivercross in Roosevelt Island (developed with Welfare Island Development Corporation and
Turner Construction Company); Giovanni Pasanella's Twin Parks in the Bronx (developed with
Starrett Brothers and Eken Development Corporation); and Kenneth Frampton's Marcus Garvey
Village in Brooklyn (developed with the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies). (Fig. 2.1,
2.2, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10) Outside the city, UDC built housing in Rochester, Ithaca, Syracuse, Niagara
Falls and Buffalo among other cities and towns in New York.
This chapter examines UDC and its most complex housing project-Roosevelt Island
development, to study the corporation's organizational, legal and financial mechanisms that were
conceived and implemented to partner with the private sector for the construction of state-
subsidized housing." The chapter argues that UDC's partnerships with the private sector were
not tools of governmental devolvement from state-subsidized housing. They were in fact, devices
that helped expand the reach and scale of federal housing programs. UDC took on housing and
urban renewal projects that nobody wanted to touch in New York and tried to make them
profitable and "packaged" enough for the private sector to want to participate. As an
organization, the UDC was not very different from urban renewal, in theory. With urban
renewal, the federal government offered grants to local agencies to clear and acquire land. It was
then handed over to private developers with the promise of Federal Housing Administration
-Public housing is housing that is financed, built, owned and managed by the state. Other terms that
appear in this chapter are subsidized housing-housing that is supported by direct subsidies, rent
supplements, below-market interest financing and mortgage insurance; Low-income housing-tied to
area mean income (AMI) that is established locally and differs geographically; Affordable housing-
housing where the mortgage or rent payments are not higher than 30% of the family's pre-tax
income.
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(FHA) backed mortgages and tax subsidies. What was different with the UDC was the way it
maintained a renewal-like vision to housing while also accepting private sector monies,
disregarding local zoning and building laws and entirely circumventing voter approvals. This
allowed UDC to claim self-sufficiency and institutional autonomy in ways urban renewal
agencies could never assert.
It was this claim to self-sufficiency that ultimately led to UDC's bankruptcy in 1975. By
then, UDC had become the nation's largest developer of state-subsidized housing in all its forms
with over one billion dollars' worth of projects halfway completed, one billion dollars in
outstanding bonds and over one million in daily expenses.-- 1975 was the year when New York
City was itself on the verge of bankruptcy. The stock market was in a slump and banks were
refusing to take on UDC's debt, leaving them with no money to pay their ongoing obligations."
Incoming governor Hugh Carey who followed Rockefeller, created the Moreland Commission as
a response to the imminent collapse of UDC, to make a "thorough study of UDC operations,
structure, finances and its relationship to other state agencies."- A central part of this
investigation was moral obligation financing, which according to the report, was at the core of
the State's debt structure and its effect on the State's credit.
- Urban Development Corporation, "New York State Urban Development Corporation Annual
Report." 1971-75
- New York State and Moreland Act Commission on the Urban Development Corporation, Restoring
Credit and Confidence: A Reform Program for New York State and Its Public Authorities: A Report
to the Governor ([Albany, N.Y.J: The Commission, 1976). 90.
1Ibid.
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The State of New York introduced moral obligation bonds for the first time in 1960 as a
way of circumventing voter approval for the building of state-subsidized housing.- While the
UDC issued these bonds, the state was only morally and not legally bound to replenish the
reserve when there was a deficiency of funds. What moral obligation bonds brought about was a
condition of delusion where the State did not account for the bonds in the State debt.,- The
governor always spoke of the State not spending a dime for these projects, often talking about
UDC projects as paying their way. The Report called this a "euphoria" shared by government
and business, "rhetoric of self-sufficiency" that eventually led UDC to take on too many risks.,
Existing research on UDC proposes the agency as indicative of "entrepreneurial
undertaking" on the part of the State and as different from urban renewal, unravels it as a "social
enterprise model" comparable to the Tennessee Valley Authority, and concentrates on its many
housing and urban planning projects.- My chapter sees a gap in the existing research on the
'Bond lawyer John N. Mitchell, who was involved in the Watergate scandal and later became United
States Attorney General, is given credit for creating the moral obligation bond and its legal language.
A moral obligation bond is a bond that permits the issuing government to appropriate funds to make
up for any shortfall or in the service of debt. However, the government is only morally - and not
legally - bound to this security. These bonds have a higher yield than general obligation bonds
because of the risk. Also, interest income from moral obligation bonds is exempt from federal taxes
and state taxes if the investor lives in the state or municipality issuing the debt. After the UDC
debacle, moral obligation bonds got a bad rap.
- New York (State)., and Moreland Act Commission on the Urban Development Corporation and
Other State Financing Agencies. Restoring Credit and Confidence: A Reform Program for New York
State and Its Public Authorities: A Report to the Governor. [Albany, N.Y.]: The Commission, 1976.
4
Ibid.
Yonah Freemark's Master thesis from MIT discusses the UDC as an entrepreneurial state
undertaking. Freemark unpacks the UDC and many of its projects and differentiates the agency from
renewal. Yonah Freemark,"The Entrepreneurial State: New York's Urban Development Corporation,
an Experiment to Take Charge of Affordable Housing Production, 1968-1975" (Masters Thesis,
Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2013).
74
UDC. The public benefit corporation has not been sufficiently analyzed as the product of a
particular historical moment in 1968 before New York's fiscal crisis and the Nixon moratorium
on federal funding for programs in urban centers. It was a big government solution to the
problem of low-income and moderate-income housing that came after the failures of urban
renewal.
The UDC was very similar to a 1950s renewal agency. Lawyer Stephen Lefkowitz who
was special counsel to UDC in 1968, identified the urban renewal components of the 1949
Housing Act as the foundation for the legislative language of the New York State Urban
Development Corporation Act of 1968. Although there were several significant twists. By
claiming autonomy and self-sufficiency, the UDC mimicked a private agency while still holding
the powers of a public bureaucracy. This chapter posits UDC as a vital part of the evolutionary
arc of private sector involvement in state-subsidized housing from urban renewal in the 1950s to
the years after 1975, when housing laws veered from actually building housing units to
rehabbing existing housing, direct cash assistance to low-income tenants, and subsidy and rent
voucher programs to live in privately-owned and managed housing. As for the moral obligation
bonds, the state government discontinued issuing them for funding capital projects in the years
after the UDC debacle.
Eleanor Brilliant's book is another study of what she calls the social enterprise model of UDC. She
compares the UDC to Tennessee Valley Authority in her book, The Urban Development
Corporation: Private Interests and Public Authority. Brilliant wrote the book in 1975, right before the
fall of UDC, which is only mentioned in an addendum to the book. Eleanor L. Brilliant, The Urban
Development Corporation: Private Interests and Public Authority, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books), 1975. Karen Kubey, "Low-Rise, High-Density Housing: A Contemporary View of Marcus
Garvey Park Village," Urban Omnibus, (July 18, 2012), http://urbanomnibus.net/2012/07/low-rise-
high-density-housing-a-contemporary-view-of-marcus-garvey-park-village/.
2 Chapter Four of this dissertation discusses the fiscal crisis to some detail.
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Let There Be Commitment: Logue, Lindsay and Rockefeller
Logue was first invited by Mayor John Lindsay to New York City in 1967 to be the head of a
new task force that studied the problems of housing and urban development. At the time, Logue
was teaching at Boston University. He had previously been Development Administrator for the
Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA) under Mayor John Collins from 1960-67. During
Logue's time at the BRA he oversaw the development of Government Center, Waterfront and
Downtown Boston that accounted for the acquisition, rehabilitation and relocation of land,
buildings, and people on a massive scale. Logue's work at the BRA evoked protests from
Bostonians for its renewal and relocation policies that ultimately resulted in his loss in the
Boston mayoral elections of 1967.2
As part of Lindsay's task force in 1967, Logue published his findings in the report Let
There Be Commitment. In his report, Logue started by declaring past and present housing, city
planning and urban renewal programs as having failed to solve the problems of New York City's
deteriorating neighborhoods and poverty. He instead suggested offsetting inadequate federal
renewal and Model Cities funds with investments from private enterprise by making them aware
of "their stake in the community." 22 He made a case for private investment by demonstrating
how the federal government had only $725 million available for renewal funds in 1966 when
application requests from hundreds of cities exceeded 1.2 billion dollars.According to Logue,
- Richard Schickel, "New York's Mr. Urban Renewal," New York Times, March 1, 1970.
21 Study Group on New York Housing and Neighborhood Improvement, New York (N.Y.)., and
Office of the Mayor, "Let There Be Commitment": A Housing, Planning [and] Development
Program for New York City. ([New York, 1966). ii
76
New York City did not have the public resources from its treasury to finance its programs. Along
with private sector investments, Logue prescribed state intervention over home rule for the city.-
This divide between home rule and state intervention was an important distinction that
goes back to the progressive era of the early 20- century when groups such as the National
Municipal League advocated for local administration over what they considered to be the corrupt
political machines of state politics. Home rule relies upon the distinction of the city as an
independent social and economic entity.2, This divide between state intervention and local
government set the stage for the imminent opposition between governor Rockefeller and mayor
Lindsay with the formation of UDC in the next year. The most intriguing part of the report
however, was Logue's support of urban renewal in New York City as the most "flexible tool to
achieve the goals of planning, housing, and development programs."- This endorsement came at
a time in New York City's history when urban renewal had become the target of criticism from
the media, academics, and citizens.2, He however, distanced himself from Robert Moses' brand
- Ibid. 32
- Municipal home rule started in the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century in the United
States. It involves a home rule charter that is the city's primary governing document over local issues.
State law continues to prevail at the state level. Home rule offers local control and reduced state
intervention in city affairs. For more, refer to "Home Rule and the New York Constitution,"
Columbia Law Review 66, no. 6 (1966): 1145-63 and http://www.nlc.org/local-government-authoritv
26 Study Group on New York Housing and Neighborhood Improvement., New York (N.Y.)., and
Office of the Mayor., "Let There Be Commitment": A Housing, Planning [and] Development
Program for New York City.
v Ibid.
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of urban renewal by stressing on private investments and rehabilitation of existing
neighborhoods over demolition and relocation.-
City planner Robert Moses was urban renewal's most divisive and vilified figure from
the 1950s in New York City. His legacy epitomized the automobile-centered city with public
works as its spectacle.29 During his time, Moses used urban renewal funds for the building and
expansion of hospitals, universities and cultural centers such as the Lincoln Center, over the
construction of low-income housing. To understand Logue's proposal for urban renewal, it is
important to first unpack the intersections between urban renewal, federal funds, and federal
housing policies as they existed before 1967.
Housing Policies and the Private Sector
Federally funded public housing began in the United States as a part of President Franklin
Roosevelt's New Deal policies in 1933. The New Deal tied public housing to public works, with
over forty-nine projects starting in thirty-six cities between 1933-39. The program included slum
clearance and low-rent housing. The federal government did not want to get into competition
with the private housing industry and drive the prices of housing down.,- The first round of
public housing included First Houses in East Village Manhattan (1936), and Harlem River
- David W. Dunlap, "Edward Logue, Visionary City Planner, Is Remembered," New York Times,
April 23, 2000.
- As Robert Stem's book New York 1960 recounts: Robert Moses built over 13 bridges, 416 miles of
parkways, 658 playgrounds, and 150,000 housing units across the City of New York. The term
"Public works as a spectacle" comes from Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The
Experience of Modernity, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). 300
- Christina Rosan and Yuan Huang, "Policy Shift: How the U.S Developed a Hybrid Model of
Affordable Housing Provision" (Wilson Center, December 18, 2014). 11
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Houses in Harlem, Manhattan (1937). The federal government started the FHA or the Federal
Housing Authority that regulated the rate of interest and terms of housing mortgages in 1934. In
1937, the federal government created the United State Housing Administration (USHA), which
offered loans to local authorities for ninety percent of the cost of slum clearance and housing.
Both these agencies were a part of the Housing Act of 1934.
The Housing Act of 1949 was the first time the federal government enunciated its role in
housing through legislation. When passed under president Harry Truman, the 1949 Act spoke of
the government providing "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American
family."" The act proposed 810,000 housing units for low-income families over six years by
offering federal financing in the form of loans and grants for slum clearance to urban
redevelopment agencies. The redevelopment agencies were to acquire and clear blighted land
and then hand it over to the developers to build low- income housing and other improvements on
the land, in accordance with the redevelopment plan. The grant had a matching local fund that
was used to cover the difference of project costs to the local public agency and the amount that
private redevelopers paid for the land. The 1949 Act also allowed United States government
agencies such as the Federal Housing Agency (FHA) to provide mortgage financing to the
private sector in order to expand housing for middle and upper-income families. The period saw
the construction of The Carver Houses in Spanish Harlem, Riis Houses in East Village,
Manhattan, and Melrose Houses in the Bronx (1952). It was only with the Housing Act of 1954
- US Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Housing Act of 1949," Pub. L. No. Public
Law 81-171 (1949).
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that the federal government under president Dwight Eisenhower, used the words "urban renewal
and urban blight" by name in legislation.,,
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 was enacted a year after Let There Be
Commitment. The Act coincided with the formation of UDC. The 1968 Act was the first time
when the government articulated how it could solicit partnerships not just from nonprofits and
cooperative entities, but also for-profit companies.- The bill was designed by senators Robert
Kennedy (D-NY) and Charles Percy (R-IL) to make the process of building and managing public
housing attractive for private enterprise. Called the "Magna Carta to liberate our cities" by
President Lyndon B. Johnson, the Act addressed the urban crisis and housing shortages in US
cities., In his Special Message to the Congress on Housing and Community Development in
January 1964, President Johnson spoke of the country's requirement for more housing and
orderly community development for a growing population. He proposed a national housing
policy that along with low-income families, minorities and elders needed to encourage "more
effective cooperation between government and industry for the joint benefit of homeowners,
tenants, and the industry itself."
- US Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Housing Act of 1954," Pub. L. No. Public
Law 83-560 (1954).; John M. Clapp, "The Formation of Housing Policy in New York City, 1960-
1970," Policy Sciences 7, no. 1 (1976), 77-91.
- Alexander Von Hoffman, "Calling upon the Genius of Private Enterprise: The Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968 and the Liberal Turn to Public-Private Partnerships," Studies in American
Political Development, 27(2), 165-194. 166
- US Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968," Pub. L. No. Public Law 90-448 (1968).
- Lyndon B. Johnson, "Special Message to the Congress on Housing and Community
Development.," January 27, 1964. Available online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The
American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26035.
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President Johnson's comments alluded to this notion that was shared by President John F.
Kennedy before him, which was to include the private sector with policies that encouraged the
"private industry to build and finance more housing in the lower price ranges to meet the unfilled
demands of moderate-income families."- The 1968 Act proposed policies that would increase
the supply of low and moderate-income housing by "1000 percent" with the promise that the
public and private sectors have the capabilities necessary to the full realization of the national
goal of "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family.",
President Johnson called for 300,000 new housing units for low and middle-income
families in the next year and 26 million new units in the next decade. Organizations such as
National League of Cities, National Housing Conference, US Conference of Mayors, and
architects and planners supported the bill. Conservative organizations such as Mortgage Bankers
Association of America and National Association of Real Estate Boards that usually resisted any
form of state-sponsored housing policies also supported the bill. As a part of the Act, the federal
government focused on offering interest-free loans for pre-construction expenses, technical
assistance to nonprofit agencies, and guarantees for loans taken by private developers for the
development of new communities.- In the same year, Rockefeller invited Logue to be part of a
larger state-supported agency for urban development that could generate jobs through the
- Ibid.
- US Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Housing and Urban Development Act of
1968," Pub. L. No. Public Law 90-448 (1968).
- There were two new programs: Section 236 and 235. With the Section 236 program, the
government provided an interest rate reduction payment to developers when they secured loans from
private lenders for the building of low and moderate-income housing. Section 235 was focused on
home ownership for middle-income families by offering government insured mortgages with no
money down. It also subsidized interest payment to these mortgage loans to one percent.
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construction of low and moderate-income housing in areas where it was not financially feasible
for the private sector to do it alone.
Housing policy in the United States had included forms of industry and government
collaboration before 1968. Guarantees for loans and mortgages, and tax concessions and
abatements were offered to developers with the New Deal in the 1930s and the Mitchell Lama
programs in the 1950s. In the years after 1968 and before 1975, UDC took these collaborations
several steps further. It identified projects and potential associates such as private developers,
development authorities, housing agencies, civic associations and community groups. It then
brought the interested entities together to sign an agreement, form a community advisory
committee and share responsibilities and costs. It then acquired land through purchase,
condemnation or transfer from municipalities or urban renewal agencies. It got private
developers to provide equity funds, oversee construction, and participate in the ownership and
management of the project. In return, UDC arranged for subsidies from federal and state
programs for the developers and charged a fee for costs and risks in the development of the
project.
The Urban Development Corporation
"You must be reasonable, by that I don't mean agreeable.""
The above quote is from an article in Life Magazine, "Bold Boston Gladiator-Ed Logue" from
1965, which was part of a special double issue on the American City. The article spreads over
- Henry Grossman and Ted Polumbaum, "Bold Boston Gladiator-Ed Logue, "Life Magazine, no.
Special Double Issue: The US City, Its Greatness is at Stake (December 24, 1965). 127.
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several pages with pictures of Logue-then still a part of the BRA -as the brash and fast-paced
administrator who was getting things done while being "passionately devoted to fitness, family,
football, Yale and the city."- A few years later in 1970 when Logue had already become the
CEO of UDC, another article in the New York Times titled "New York's Mr. Urban Renewal"
painted a similar picture. In the article acquaintances and colleagues describe Logue as smooth
and glib, autocratic enough to have "paper arrangements with paper tigers that could legitimize
whatever he feels like doing," and supportive of urban renewal a whole decade after Jane Jacobs'
powerful critique of 1950s urban planning policies.-
Nevertheless, as the article surmises Logue was the best choice for UDC as he could get
things done on the fast track and because his work in New Haven and Boston had managed to
attract more federal rebuilding funds than any other city in the United States.- After his report
Let There be Commitment, Lindsay wanted Logue to head a housing and renewal agency in New
York City in 1967. Logue refused the position as he did not think it offered him enough power to
circumnavigate the regulatory and bureaucratic hurdles of New York's public housing.- When
governor Rockefeller presented Logue the idea of UDC as the "agency with drastic powers over
localities," Logue accepted it.
Ibid. 134
Richard Schickel, "New York's Mr. Urban Renewal," New York Times, March 1, 1970.
Ibid.
Logue wanted to create a development administration that would control the City Planning
Commission, which Lindsay apparently refused. For more refer to on the Lindsay-Logue relationship
please refer to, "Bridging the Gap from Rhetoric to Reality: The New York State Urban
Development Corporation." Architectural Forum, no. 131 (November 1969): 70-73. 71
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The Urban Development Corporation Act 174/68 was legislated on April 10, 1968. It
describes UDC as a corporate governmental agency of the state that constitutes a public-benefit
corporation.- As a public-benefit corporation, UDC was designed to "promote the safety, health,
morals, and welfare of the people of the state of New York" by cultivating a vigorous economy
that created new job opportunities, reduced unemployment and the level of public assistance,
increased revenues and established diversified local economies. Much like urban renewal, UDC
was to invigorate the economy by correcting "blight and deterioration" through "clearance, re-
planning, reconstruction, redevelopment, rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation" of areas
through "public and private improvement programs."- To this end, UDC could provide or gather
capital resources from the public and private sector for low and moderate-income housing, and
industrial, manufacturing, commercial, educational, recreational and cultural facilities.
Organization
UDC was territorially decentralized in administration. Decisions were centrally controlled and
authorized by Logue and Rockefeller, but action was decentralized. UDC created a subsidiary for
each project, which would have its own set of directors and members to communicate with local
officials, communities and developers.- The subsidiaries were formed on a project-to-project
basis in accordance with private finance law to allow for quick financing of construction loans,
- New York State, "New York State Urban Development Corporation Act," Pub. L. No. Chapter 174
of the Laws of 1968, 174/68.
- Ibid. 2.
- For more on subsidiaries refer to, New York State, "New York State Urban Development
Corporation Act," Pub. L. No. Chapter 174 of the Laws of 1968, 174/68. 12
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mortgages, and tax exemptions. Real Estate lawyer Stephen Lefkowitz describes UDC
subsidiaries as more than just field offices, as they had all the legal privileges of the Parent
Corporation.- UDC had nine central directors overall. Seven of these directors were appointed
directly by the governor with the consent of the Senate. The directors each served a term of four
years unless specified otherwise.- The governor appointed the president and CEO of the
corporation with the consent of the Senate (the first CEO was Ed Logue).
UDC also had business advisory and community advisory committees. The former
consisted of twenty-five members that were representative of commerce, finance and the
construction and housing industries. The council advised and made recommendations to the
corporation with respect to private sector participation. The latter consisted of members who
advised the Corporation on the local issues with respect to an area or project. The staff expanded
from 6 to 60 within a year in their office located two blocks south of W 55- St off 5th Avenue.
The main office had divisions for Program Development, Project Development, Design and
Analysis, Financial Analysis, Construction, Processing, and Review.
Process
While Rockefeller gave UDC powers to supersede home rule, fear of opposition from mayors
and local officials led the governor to write to sixty-two mayors around New York State asking
for possible projects that could benefit with UDC's participation. In the first year, UDC
examined stalled renewal projects in the state and launched several studies and reports for the
- Mr. Stephen Lefkowitz, Interview between Mr. Stephen Lefkowitz and Deepa Ramaswamy, New
York City, June 8, 2017.
- New York State, "New York State Urban Development Corporation Act," Pub. L. No. Chapter 174
of the Laws of 1968, 174/68. 4.
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same. After some of the mayors sent requests for assistance, UDC started negotiations with
potential associates-municipal governments, renewal agencies, community groups, housing
foundations-and outlined the terms of negotiation. The outlines include sharing of costs and
responsibilities. Then a community advisory committee was formed with local groups and
officials. UDC chose a planner/architect and commissioned architectural, engineering and
planning studies. It then acquired land from the municipal or urban renewal agency. At this
stage, UDC formed a subsidiary, arranged financing and sought developers to provide funds,
start and oversee construction, and participate in ownership and management. Each project had
representatives from the general contractor, architects from the owners, supervisors from UDC
and construction inspectors from the lending institution. If the UDC was self- designing, building
and managing the project, none of this was required.
UDC also charged private developers and housing companies for payroll and overhead
fees for packaging the development. These fees, which were a part of the agency's earnings and
marked the difference between UDC and a renewal agency, were generally expected a few
months after commencement of construction from developers. They were described as charges
for services performed, risks borne and value contributed by UDC. As of 1971, these fees were
2.15% of project construction costs, and after 1971 the fees rose to 4% of estimated project
costs.- In the years after 1975 when the UDCs bankruptcy was beginning to be investigated by
the new governor, it was these fees that a lot of developers complained at length about as they
thought it seemed steep for a governmental agency.
- New York State, "New York State Urban Development Corporation Act," Pub. L. No. Chapter 174
of the Laws of 1968, 174/68.
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Despite all its powers and selling itself as the "investor-developer-owner-operator
agency," Logue knew early on that UDC should not get into construction or property
management as it would tie up their capital in long-term investments. Moreover, local
governments would not be able to collect any taxes from these projects as they were all tax
exempt. UDC's unique powers allowed speed and kept construction costs low. These projects
would not have been affordable if the agency continued its relationships to projects after
construction. History with public housing had already established by 1968 that problems arose
with management and maintenance of state-subsidized housing and UDC was wary of getting
involved long-term. Getting developers interested was not easy for the UDC. Many of its
projects, especially in New York City, were stalled renewal projects. To make it attractive for
developers, corporates, and individuals who chose to become partners, UDC offered deductions
and tax benefits that in the words of UDC "often exceeded their investments in the project.",-
UDC started the development of Welfare Island (later renamed Roosevelt Island) in 1969. (Fig
3.3) The Island was a narrow piece of land in the middle of East River that had remained
untouched and physically disconnected from Manhattan for decades-the subway became active
only in 1989. As an urban development project with a primary component of low and moderate-
income housing in 1969, Roosevelt Island came to be one of UDC's most complex, risky and
visible projects. The history of the development of Roosevelt Island from 1969 to 1975 by UDC
reveals the intersections between quasi-governmental agencies and housing policies in the late
- "Frank Kristof to Ed Logue October 28, 1970," Edward Joseph Logue Papers (MS 959), series
VII, Box 239, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
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1960s, that were both legislated and enacted with the singular intention of soliciting participation
from the private sector in low-income housing.
Roosevelt Island was what UDC called a "new-town-in-town" development-a term that
was conceived by Harvey Perloff, the dean of the School of Architecture and Planning at
UCLA." UDC preferred new town developments that proffered a "community scale" to the
single function redevelopment projects of urban renewal. Town-in-town developments claimed
to work with the existing fabric of the city and stressed on revitalization and mixed-use
development with revenue producing uses and recreation, instead of slum and blight removal,
demolition and relocation ." One of the central themes to the new-town-in-town concept was the
longer commitment of public and private sectors to projects, as they could extend from eight to
twelve years.
Additionally, revenue from luxury apartments could be used to offset costs of low and
moderate-income housing. New town developments were receiving federal funds under Title
VII, Urban Growth and the Community Development Act passed by Congress in 1970. The Act
provided federal support to private developers for new town developments through the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. The program produced fourteen new towns
including Roosevelt Island, Gananda, and Riverton in New York, and Flowermound and
- Harvey S. Perloff, "New Towns in Town," Journal of the American Institute of Planners 32, no. 3
(May 1, 1966): 155-61.
- Also refer to, Harvey S. Perloff, "New Towns in Town," Journal of the American Institute of
Planners 32, no. 3 (May 1, 1966): 155-61; Ivan D. Steen, "New Town in the City: Edward J. Logue
and His Vision for Roosevelt Island, New York," Journal of Planning History 9, no. 3 (May 12,
2010), 183-97.
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Woodlands in Texas, before the federal government scrapped it in 1976 with the Nixon
moratorium. Roosevelt Island received over $2.5 million in federal grants under Title VII.'
Roosevelt Island was Logue's vanity project, and he chased it from the time he joined
UDC. In return for the Island, Lindsay asked Logue to work on eight stalled urban renewal
projects, or "goat sites" as Logue characterized them, around New York City.- Roosevelt Island,
unfortunately did not entirely turn out the way Logue envisioned it. It was stalled in 1976 due to
a lack of funds after UDC went bankrupt and restarted in the 1980s when the F Line to Roosevelt
Island subway station finally opened. While government-subsidized low-interest mortgages, tax
abatements and sale of bonds helped build the mix of low-income, moderate-income and market
rate housing on the island in the 1970s, the housing built since the 1980s are market-rate middle
and upper-income housing built by private developers. As of 2017, the Cornell-Tech campus
involving architects SOM, James Corner and Thom Mayne is set to open on the Island. UDC
housing on the island in the early 1970s were a
From Welfare Island to Roosevelt Island
In 1968, Mayor Lindsay convened a committee to come up with proposals for the development
of Welfare Island. The island went by many names-Minnehanonck by the Lenape tribe,
Blackwell Island, Welfare Island and then in 1971, Roosevelt island. The island spans the length
between East 46- and 85- St on Manhattan with a width of 800 feet and length of two miles,
- New York State, "New York State Urban Development Corporation Act," Pub. L. No. Chapter 174
of the Laws of 1968, 174/68 (1968)
- Frank Kristof, "New York Urban Development Corp.: Build Now and Sign the Papers Later,"
National Real Estate Investor, January 1972, 107-8.
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measuring a total area of one hundred and fifty acres. As a piece of land that was visually
connected and physically disconnected from Manhattan, the Island held particular interest for
New Yorkers. The city has exploited this disconnect since the nineteethcentury. The island
remained land relegated for societal outcasts: the sick, dying, mentally unstable and criminal."
Through the nineteethcentury the island had a penitentiary, asylum, workhouse, and hospital.
Even though the Queensboro Bridge opened in 1909, it merely went over the island. The city
government deliberately preserved the Island as a secluded outpost right until 1955 when the
Welfare Island Bridge first opened from Queens.
The island's history is marked with Dickensian gloom and mystery. Charles Dickens
himself visited the asylum and wrote about it in his American Notes in 1842 as a place of "naked
ugliness and horror."6 The island also saw its first expose by journalist Elizabeth Cochrane
under the pen name Nelly Bly who pretended to be a Cuban lunatic to spend ten days in the
asylum. She recounted the horrors of the asylum-which had more women than men-with the
term "human rat trap."" By the 1950s, the island was home to City Hospital and Gothic Nursing
Home that were both in need of repair, and the Coler and Goldwater hospitals that had about
3200 long-term chronically ill patients. Other than the hospitals, the island was a training ground
for the fire department.
- William Wallace Sanger, The History of Prostitution: Its Extent, Causes and Effects throughout the
World (New York: AMS Press, 1974).
- Charles Dickens, American Notes. (Gloucester, Mass.: P. Smith, 1968).
- Nelly Bly, Ten Days in a Mad-House. [Charleston, S.C.] [CreateSpace], 2016
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John Lindsay's Welfare Island Planning and Development Committee in 1967 had
eighteen private citizens including architects Philip Johnson and John Burgee, investment banker
Benno Schmidt, head of Planning Commission Donald Elliott, Jason Nathan from Housing and
Development and August Heckscher from the Parks Department, among others.,- They came up
with a 141-page self-funded report that proposed the idea of a town-in-town development for the
Island with a special purpose development corporation managing the entire development., The
central recommendations included retaining the two functioning hospitals in the island,
demolishing all other buildings, adding four thousand new housing units with "higher aspirations
in housing design," and adding a new subway station.-
A Masterplan
"I saw it as an opportunity to showcase urban design; I saw it as an opportunity
to showcase economically and racially integrated living, because the great thing
about a new town is the rules are set before you get there. There's nobody to
displease because there's nobody there. And if they don't like our mix, well don't
bother to come.""
The above quote demonstrated Logue's ambition for Roosevelt Island when UDC began work on
site in 1969. The project represented the bold and broad stroke Logue liked to make with urban
"Anthony Bailey, "Manhattan's Other Island," New York Times, December 1, 1974.; "The Island
Nobody Knows" (Welfare Island Planning and Development Committee, January 1968),
Introduction.
"Ibid. 11
'Ibid.
Ivan D Steen, "New Town in the City: Edward J. Logue and His Vision for Roosevelt Island, New
York." Journal of Planning History 9, no. 3 (May 12, 2010), 183-97.
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development. As mentioned earlier, Lindsay's relationship with Logue and Rockefeller had
soured in the years after 1967, not just because Logue chose to work with the governor over him,
but also because UDC's powers superseded that of the city government. UDC could disregard
New York City zoning laws and building codes. Nevertheless, Lindsay agreed to UDC's
incursion into Welfare Island in return for their involvement in eight stalled renewal projects.
The City of New York and Ed Logue of UDC signed a 99-year lease on December 23, 1969.
UDC created a new subsidiary called the Roosevelt Island Development Corporation (RIDC ) to
acquire land, provide initial capital for plans and studies, manage deals between private
developers, offer subsidy money, choose architects, planners and construction companies, and
become active partners in the housing partnership if needed.
UDC asked architects Philip Johnson and John Burgee to create a master plan for the
island in 1969. It became part of the MoMA exhibition titled "The Island Nobody Knows" that
was exhibited in the museum for three weeks in October that year. (Fig. 2.3, 2.4, 2.5) The New
York Times, Architectural Record and Progressive Architecture favorably reviewed the
exhibition and design that year.62 The master plan envisioned an automobile-free island with
mixed-income housing, shared public facilities, a 2000 car garage and a free electrically powered
internal mini- transit system. The plan depicted a continuous promenade through the island, a
central Main street as the "spine of the island," two town centers facing the water, five sets of
parks and four sets of buildings. (Fig. 2.6, 2.7) Islanders had to park cars in a parking structure
- New York State Urban Development Corporation. The Island Nobody Knows. [New York], 1969.
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called the Motorgate at the north end of town. The Main Street had no cross streets but
pedestrian walkways.
The plan also called for housing for 20,000 people, a "multimix community" which was
part middle-income, part low-income, with apartments, townhouses and housing for the single
and elderly. The original development plan included 20% housing for federally assisted public
housing, 20% for eligible members of section 236 of the National Housing Act, 35% for limited
profit housing and 25% market-rate units. Islanders shared public facilities such as a school,
daycare, shops, two indoor pools, 100,000 square feet of shopping facilities, 200,000 square feet
of office space, 300 room hotel, fire station, police station and utility plants. The master plan also
called for the preservation of some of the existing buildings on the island to "tie the future of the
island to its past and present" and make the island into a community and not just a "housing
project.",
The plan depicted apartment buildings as U-shaped buildings facing the water that were
terraced up on the lower four floors. Burgee and Johnson called the stepping, the Ghat of
Beneras. They deliberately left the architecture of the buildings vague in order to offer flexibility
so that the buildings could accept "any architectural expression."- Johnson later pronounced
Roosevelt Island master plan as his "Jane Jacobs phase," where buildings were "decent" not
"grandiose monuments."6 The renderings by Ronald Love shows both an inward-looking view
into the Island with a self-sufficient main street, people and urban accouterments such as book
6 New York State Urban Development Corporation, The Island Nobody Knows, (New York, 1969), 9
- Ibid.
- Anthony Bailey, "Manhattan's Other Island." New York Times, December 1, 1974.
93
stores and benches, and an outward one that faces the waterfront view showing the outline of
Manhattan and the bridge coming into the island.
The UDC started with first developing the northern part of the Island called Northtown.
Architects John M. Johansen and Ashok Bhavnani designed Island House (1975) and Rivercross
(1976). (Fig. 2.8) Island House and Rivercross were designed for middle-income housing with
410 and 365 units respectively. Both Island House and Rivercross are massive buildings
constructed with the new material Corspan where panels clipped together without scaffolding,
which according to Bhavnani was a cost-saving measure. Both buildings had arcades at the street
level and stepped down towards the water. While Johnson-Burgee plan recommended only ten
maximum floors for all buildings, both Island House and Rivercross were 20 floors each, with a
variety of floor plans and internal courtyards facing the water. The Mitchell Lama Program was
responsible for both these buildings. The Michell Lama Program from 1955 was part of the an
early experiment in federal partnerships with the private sector for middle-income housing.
Named after Senator MacNeil Mitchell and Assemblyman Alfred Lama, the Mitchel Lama
Program appointed local agencies to acquire land under eminent domain. The federal
government then handed over the land to developers to build rental and ownership housing for
middle-income families. In return, developers received tax abatements and low-interest
mortgages subsidized by the federal and state governments.- There was one crucial detail to the
program. Developers who prepaid their mortgages could get out of the subsidy program and
become cooperatives in time. Rivercross eventually became a private co-op building.
-Qualifying projects received low interest mortgages for ninety percent of total cost plus long-term
local tax abatements. For more on the Mitchell Lama program:
http://www.nyshcr.org/Programs/Mitchell-Lama/
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Eastwood and Westview were both designed by Sert. (Fig. 2.9, 2.10) Eastwood has 1003
units for low and moderate-income families with 283 subsidized rental units for the elderly and
physically challenged. Sert's design for Eastwood has four twenty-two story buildings that step
towards the water that are connected by seven-story tall bar buildings that house internal
courtyards. The tile decorated concrete buildings have skip-stop elevators that open every third
floor, similar to Sert's design for Peabody Terrace in Cambridge. The main street front of these
buildings has an arcade with shops, community facilities, and lobbies. The buildings
accommodated a variety of families and floor plans in subsidized apartments: low-income,
moderate income, disabled and elderly. Westview on the other hand has 400 units for middle-
income families with a U-shaped building stepping towards the water with a central courtyard.
The building was also a part of the Mitchell Lama program.
The Island also has the brutalist Kallmann and McKinnell designed Motorgate, a 1000
car garage that is in operation since 1974. (Fig. 2.11, 2.12) By 1976, in the absence of a subway
station, a new tram service opened in the Island that connected it to the upper-east side of
Manhattan. The James Renwick's Small Pox Hospital from 1856, the chapel from 1889 and the
asylum tower from 1839 were all preserved on the island. While the basic ideas of the Johnson-
Burgee plan were carried out, the details changed. Logue permitted higher density and taller
buildings. Logue and his team scrapped the idea of opening courtyards to the water with the
Ghats of Benares. they swapped it for internal courtyards with buildings facing the water. Even
as early as 1971, Adam Yarmolinsky, the CEO for the Island and consultant Joan Davidson both
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quit UDC subsidiary citing the changes to the Johnson Burgee master plan as one of the main
reasons; Davidson called the project an "ill-conceived hodgepodge."-
The Bankruptcy
In 1971 UDC had sixty-three projects under construction, with eight commercial and industrial
projects and 11, 304 units of housing all over New York State.- By the end of 1974, the number
of housing units had dropped to a mere 761, with just 305 units in New York City.- This drastic
drop in housing units was a part of UDC's realization that building low-income and moderate-
income housing was tough in New York State. Firstly, developers did not want to get involved in
renewal and stalled housing projects. Secondly, UDC could not write down land costs for low-
income housing. Renewal agencies could acquire land, clear it and sell it to private developers at
low costs. The difference between the sale price of the land and the cost of its original
acquisition would be the land cost write down that was paid for by the federal government. UDC
did not have this benefit. This meant that it had to depend on local renewal agencies to buy and
clear land for low-income housing or find empty land. They had to then take on the role of the
developer in these projects, as private entities did not seem keen on getting involved.- UDC
proposed the idea of mixing incomes and age groups that came together in the 70-20-10 formula
for housing, with 70 for middle and moderate income, 20 for low-income and 10 for the elderly.
- Ivan D. Steen, "New Town in the City: Edward J. Logue and His Vision for Roosevelt Island, New
York." Journal of Planning History 9, no. 3 (May 12, 2010): 183-97, 100
- Urban Development Corporation, "New York State Urban Development Corporation Annual
Report," 1971. 12
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
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Mixed-income housing was getting difficult to pitch to developers and buyers in New York City
and almost impossible in the suburbs.
By 1975, UDC was facing financial breakdown. Even as early as 1973 governor
Rockefeller had already signed laws that limited UDC's extraordinary powers and also granted it
additional bonding capacity. Later in the same year, Moody's lowered UDC bond rating from A
to Baa 1. Shortly after, Governor Rockefeller resigned. Logue could only hold on until Feb 25,
1975. The incoming governor Hugh Carey created the Moreland Act Commission to study
UDC's failures. The Report studied UDC's accountability as a public agency, its use of federal
subsidies and its accomplishments in providing low and moderate-income housing, industrial
facilities and community improvements. Lawyer Orville H. Schell Jr., the chairman of the
Moreland Commission Act Report, oversaw the analysis of over half a million documents, public
hearings of over 100 witnesses including Rockefeller and Wilson, and the leaders of the
commercial and investment banking community who were involved in the distribution of UDC
securities. The commission members also visited several UDC projects in NYC and the rest of
the state. Moral Obligation bonds were found to be the culprit, for they allowed the State to
accumulate risk without accounting for it. The bankers and investment community assumed that
the state would not let the bonds go into default. So eventually when in 1975 UDC came to a
state of collapse, this idea of selling moral obligation bonds to fund capital projects had to come
to an end as well.
However, the Report did not only find faults with moral obligation bonds. In 1968, UDC
declared the delays on capital projects as one of the central reasons for the housing shortage in
New York State. In the following years, Logue started projects in rapid succession, which put
UDC and the State in a condition where they had collected way more risk and commitments that
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were provided for, with little attention paid to project feasibility and lender scrutiny., As the
commission summarized, lender and developer functions should not be in the same agency. If
they do come together, such an agency should not be taking on public financing of projects.2 At
the end of 1975, it was announced by the Moreland Commission Act Report that UDC should
focus on private borrowings instead of a public issue of bonds to continue the projects it had
already begun. UDC defaulted on its notes but got enough financing to finish its projects that had
already begun.-
By March 1975 Rockefeller and Logue had both left the Corporation. UDC received
$140 million loans from state insurance funds to finish the projects it had already begun.-
Businessman Richard Ravitch took over from Logue with the aims of completing 11,000 of
UDC's 33,000 units. Their bonds had started trading at half the original value. While the Island
had 2000 units completed in 1975, only 200 families were living in the Island by early 1976.
There was no commercial activity on the Island, no tramway or subway, with cable cars only just
beginning to get installed. The only way in and out of the island was the bridge link with Long
Island in Queens. At this point in 1976,rett the project came to a standstill.
The project restarted only in 1981. The day-to-day operation of Roosevelt Island changed
several hands. In May 1981, pursuant to a memorandum of understanding between UDC and the
- Urban Development Corporation, "New York State Urban Development Corporation Annual
Report," 1971. 10
- Ibid.14
- Ibid. 130; Paul Montgomery, "Wilson Unit Asks Halt in New Financing by UDC," New York
Times, December 27, 1974.
- Linda Greenhouse, "After 5 Months, the Crisis Mood at UDC Gives Way to a Steady Salvage
Operation," New York Times, July 24, 1975.
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New York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal (DHCR), responsibility for
Roosevelt Island was assigned to DHCR. DHCR then assigned all of its rights and
responsibilities to Safe Affordable Housing for Everyone, Inc. (SAHE), a corporation under the
direct control of the Commissioner of DHCR who became responsible for the day-to-day
operation of Roosevelt Island. With the north end of the Island already built in the 70s, work
started on the rest of the Island. By 1989 Northtown II had 880 units at market rate with 223
units as part of Section 8 housing developed by real estate firm Starrett Corporation and designed
by Gruzett Sampton. Southtown also called Riverwalk, is a nine-building project developed by
Hudson and The Related Companies with 2000 rental and ownership units. Of the 2000 units
built just 800 were affordable housing, where the rent does not exceed thirty percent of the
family income per year.,, On April 1, 1985, Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation (RIOC)
took over the responsibilities for the operation, development, and security of Roosevelt Island.
The state government organized RIOC as a public-benefit corporation and a political subdivision
of the State of New York.71
The RIOC took over from UDC, but it was not liable for UDC's debts. Its organizational
structure consisted of nine directors that took on the powers of the Corporation. There were also
elected public officials for the Island that were attending all meetings along with the directors.
The chairperson of the board was the Commission of Housing and Community Renewal. The
mission of the RIOC was to plan, design, develop, operate, maintain and manage Roosevelt
Island. The agency was to provide public services, develop strategic partnerships and govern
7, Ginia Bellafante, "Affordable Island in the Sun: Roosevelt Island Maintains Its Mix," New York
Times, June 20, 2014.
7 New York State, "By-Laws of Roosevelt Island Operating Corporation" (1984).
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through legislation, bylaws, contractual obligations and local laws on the Island. Unlike UDC,
the RIOC could not sell bonds. It could collect rents on ground leases, subsidies from the
government and other private grants and loans. Like UDC however, the RIOC was tax exempt
from city and state.- Market rate developments have continued in Roosevelt Island since the
1980s. Most notably, the old Octagon-which was a part of the old Metropolitan Hospital on
Roosevelt Island-was converted into luxury rentals by developers Becker + Becker Associates
in 2007. A new applied science campus Cornell Tech that has attracted a bevy of architectural
practices such as Morphosis and Skidmore Owings and Merrill required the demolition of the
Coler-Goldwater Specialty Hospital.
As for the UDC, in the years after the near bankruptcy and rescue, it shifted focus to commercial
and civic endeavors. Its primary objective shifted from housing to promoting economic
development. The state government consolidated UDC with another public-benefit corporation,
the Department of Economic Development (DED) to become the economic development arm of
New York State.
Goodbye, Slum Razing; Hello, Grand Hyatt
The State government created UDC with the primary goal of resolving the housing shortage in
New York. Pure public housing that was designed, built and managed by the government had
already reached a point of unsustainability by the late 60s. Federal, state and municipal
governments agreed that the private sector needed to be included and compensated for
- Roosevelt Island Development Corporation, "The Roosevelt Island Development Corporation
Public Authority Annual Report," July 1, 1985.
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participating in the housing industry. To this end, the New York state government created a
public-benefit corporation such as the UDC in 1968 that reinterpreted urban renewal through the
mechanisms of profit-making corporations. UDC took on dozens of stalled and unfinished urban
renewal projects.
They availed of renewal, Mitchell Lama and Model Cities funds like renewal agencies.
UDC's legislative language that identified sites suitable for projects was the same as 1950's
urban renewal: "slum, blighted, substandard, unsanitary, deteriorated or deteriorating."- The
differences were that it did not exclusively focus on these kinds of sites. They also earned profits
and sold bonds, built housing that mixed-incomes, uses and densities within town and city
centers, and operated through project-based subsidiaries that brought together the roles of the
architect, planner, developer and manager in one agency. Urban renewal agencies could never
have kept pace with UDC's housing projects. The UDC was an experiment in partnerships
between the public and private sector that maintaining governmental influence intact.
The near bankruptcy of UDC in 1975 was indicative of a bullish agency that took on way too
many projects without enough support for their completion, and issued bonds that were not
legally bound by the state's financial support. There was a certain Moses-like swagger and
bluster to Logue in the way he pursued projects and single-mindedly focused on starting work on
site, at all costs. UDC was in fact politically centralized while claiming administrative
decentralization, where decisions were eventually in the hands of Logue and Rockefeller despite
- New York State, "New York State Urban Development Corporation Act," Pub. L. No. Chapter 174
of the Laws of 1968, 174/68, 1968
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subsidiary offices. Although the UDC solicited community groups and local citizens for its
meetings, citizens carried absolutely no veto power. Citizen participation was made blunt by the
UDC. The UDC was ultimately an agency that was supported by a powerful governor who
conferred Logue with powers to take on these projects. When Rockefeller resigned, UDC lost its
most important champion.
In other words, a public-benefit corporation such as UDC worked in the public interest
like a governmental agency while simultaneously hoping to make profit like a private
corporation with a board of directors that were appointed and not elected. However, what does
"working in the public interest" really mean? Public interest is defined as the "aggregate of
individual interests," or "an effort to identify particular interests with general interests while
camouflaging self-interested advocacy," or even "what the majority of Congress and president
says it is."- For the purposes of this chapter, I would distill these definitions into a broad concept
that a public-benefit corporation is legislated to work for the greater good of its shareholders-a
group that in the case of UDC included residents, developers, investors, employees of the
corporation and city government. As a hybrid entity between a private firm and a public agency
that did not have elected officials, jurisdiction or voters, the UDC's shareholders were also a
hybrid group of individuals, groups and entities with varying expectations from their returns that
could not all be satisfied.
By 1975 housing policy has taken a turn away from active government involvement in
direct development subsidies to rent subsidies, where production of state-subsidized housing was
- Carol W. Lewis, "In Pursuit of the Public Interest," Public Administration Review 66, no. 5 (2006),
694-701.; Frank Bealey, "Public Interest," Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science (Oxford, UK:
Blackwell, 1999).; Frederickson H. George and David Hart, "The Public Service and the Patriotism
of Benevolence," Public Administration Review 45, no. 5 (1985), 547-53.
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handed over to the private sector with programs such as Section 8 and Hope VI. The Housing
and Community Development Act of 1974 introduced the Section 8 program. The program
allowed low-income families to choose housing from the market. The government would only
step in to pay the difference between market rent rates and the prefixed percentage of tenant
income that was required to qualify for subsidized housing.-- With Hope VI program that began
in the 90s, the federal government offered grants to developers to "revitalize" existing public
housing units into mixed-income developments." In sheer numbers, between 1963 and 1978 the
number of publicly owned housing units fell from 32000 to 3000 units.-, Even middle-income
Mitchell Lama buildings have been slowly privatizing into cooperatives in New York City since
the 1970s. As of 2016 only 95,000 units built under the Mitchell Lama program are still a part of
the program.-,
The gradual devolvement of government in state-subsidized housing in the United States
since 1975 eliminated the need for large public-benefit corporations dedicated to housing such as
the UDC. UDC's shift away from its central objective of increasing low and moderate-income
housing stock in New York in the years after its near bankruptcy was characterized by Joseph P.
Fried of the New York Times in 1979 as a "reversal from the enthusiastic social activism of the
- Richard Plunz, A History of Housing in New York City: Dwelling Type and Social Change in the
American Metropolis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
"When Hope Falls Short: HOPE VI, Accountability, and the Privatization of Public Housing,"
Harvard Law Review 116, no. 5 (2003): 1477-98.
- George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes, America's Housing: Prospects and Problems (New
Brunswick, N.J.: Center for Urban Policy Research, Rutgers University, 1980).
The Mitchell Lama program and its problems have been well explained in:
h -: -it-i--sg2-603/01/the02 hseven-won es-f-nrries- w- i-krkci tm sm--iitchel1-ana-tenants/
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1960s to the sober economic realities of the 1970s."- For Fried, UDC's "earlier enthusiasms
proved to be haunting" as it was their low and moderate-income housing projects that were most
hit by its financial woes. The UDC of 1979 was "a cautiously run real estate enterprise" where
projects were developer-centered mechanisms of economic development.
In most cases, UDC participation was as technical and tax aids. The article quotes UDC
president Richard Kahan explaining their projects as those the "private sector can almost do
without government participation, but we provide the last step to make it possible." This
characterization of UDC involvement in projects was a sea change from the time of Logue and
Rockefeller when UDC was front and center of "socially desirable" but financially risky housing
projects. UDC's transition from a public-benefit corporation with sweeping powers of the 1960s
to a cautiously run real estate enterprise of the 1980s is best encapsulated in the title of the same
article: "Goodbye, Slum razing; Hello, Grand Hyatt."-,
-Joseph P. Fried, "Roosevelt I. Real Estate Agent Replaced," New York Times, March 15, 1976.
-Ibid.
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Chapter Three
Cops and Flowers: How Central Park became a Self-Financing Enterprise
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Between 1856 and 1873, landscape designers Frederick Law Olmsted and his partner Calvert
Vaux tracked the value of the property immediately adjacent to Central Park in Manhattan. The
study was their attempt to justify the public expenditure of thirteen million dollars that had been
spent by the City of New York to buy and construct a park on the 840-acre land spanning 59- and
106- Streets in Manhattan. The land cost the city five million dollars, with local taxpayers having
raised three million of this amount. The additional eight million dollars had been spent on the
construction and development of Central Park itself.' The project had many early critics.
Landowners and developers around Central Park were worried they would be paying taxes for a
park that would become a "place for the working class and destitute" and a "great big beer
garden for the lower denizens of the city," ultimately leading to deteriorating proximate
neighborhoods.2 This concern was echoed by political journals such as Harper's Weekly that
wondered if the park and its vicinity would attract "evil communication, fights and illicit
rencontres." The Herald considered having public parks in the United States a folly for "Sam
will air himself in it, talk and sing and fill his share of the benches, and flirt with the nursery
maids...what chance does someone like business magnate William B. Astor or politician Edward
Everett have against this type of "fellow-citizen?", There was also disapproval from those who
' The Board of Commissioners of the Department of Public Parks, Third General Report (New York:
William C Bryant and Co., 1873), 15-17. Olmsted and Vaux conducted this empirical research as a
comparison between tax revenue from the properties around Central Park and the interest the city
was paying for land costs and improvements in Central Park.
' As quoted in Frederick Law Olmsted and Robert C. Twombly, "Public Parks and the Enlargement
of Towns," Frederick Law Olmsted: Essential Texts (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010). The quote
was initially part of a speech given in Boston in 1870 to the American Social Science Association
and later published in the Journal of Social Science in 1871.
, "The Central Park and Other City Improvements," New York Herald, September 6, 1857. Olmsted
quoted the speech in Boston in 1870. The Harper's Weekly article from September 1857 was quoted
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did not live around Central Park, but felt the park would be a tax burden and exist solely as an
amenity used by "the upper few who ride in carriages.", At its core, the debate around Central
Park was built around questions of use and users: was Central Park a pastoral and picturesque
refuge for recreation from the city as Olmsted designed it, or a pleasure garden that would allow
all sorts of people to gather and celebrate?
While the development of Central Park was a civic-minded exercise that demonstrated
America's democratic values, it was also a profitable investment that the city hoped would
encourage real estate development, especially in the blocks along the seven miles of its edges.
According to Olmsted and Vaux's study, the three wards around Central Park increased in value
from twenty-six million in 1856 to 236 million in 1873, generating income of over five million
per year for the city. Olmsted credited the income to the increase in property taxes that was
achieved without an increase in tax rate, collected over seventeen years from the neighborhoods
around Central Park. Olmsted and Vaux's report corroborated the "proximity principle" in real
estate that hypothesized that parklands get capitalized into the value of proximate properties, as
people always desire to live close to parks in urban centers. The proximity principle had its
in "Parks As Investments," (Metropolitan Conference of City and State Park Authorities, February
1926), 239. This was a report written in support of the Program of City Park and Parkway extension.
, Ibid.
, John L. Crompton, "The Genesis of the Proximate Principle in the Development of Urban Parks in
England." Annals of Leisure Research 9, no. 3-4 (January 1, 2006): 214.
, Having a private residence facing the park was highly desirable for the English upper class. Even as
reports such as the "Select Committee of Public Walks" by the House of Commons in 1833 proposed
and encouraged the building of public parks in cities, they did not openly recommend government
spending for such endeavors. The proximity principle became important in this scenario to justify
public expenditure as a profitable investment. Regents Park in London became the model for this
argument as this was land owned by the crown that was converted into a real estate investment. The
park was not open to the public for the first few years. However, with London's population
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origins in nineteenth century Britain when the movement for municipal parks emerged in
England in the 1820s and 1830s. It was first endorsed and validated with the success of
Reagent's Park in London. Olmsted and Vaux brought the proximity principle to the United
States and applied it to Central Park. Through the study, Olmstead and Vaux extrapolated that
Central Park would not be a tax burden to anyone, but instead a self-financing enterprise that was
also a public institution and a much-needed antidote to the ills of industrialization. Not only did
the city recover the costs incurred to buy land, construct and maintain the park, according to the
report, it also made a profit. (Fig. 3.1) In response, the city's bankers, businesspeople and well-
known families such as the Astors, Belmonts, and Livingstons among others, wrote an open
letter to the city claiming Central Park to be a financial success that could well be a precedent for
other parks in the city and country.,
Almost a century later, when Central Park was at its apex of decline in the early 1970s,
the questions around the park's use and users resurfaced in New York City. The park was
decrepit and dangerous due to rampant vandalism, crime, litter and the ongoing neglect of its
lawns and trees, earning the once-glorious park the title, the "20--century ruin that nobody
wanted."8 The New York Times had declared Central Park the "terra incognita of Manhattan's
explosion, there was considerable pressure to open the park to the public. Olmsted brought the
proximity principle to the United States. Olmsted presented his empirical research to the developers
of Riverside, Chicago in 1863 to justify the value of land around parks. Olmsted and Vaux conducted
similar research for parks in Chicago, Boston, San Francisco, Madison, and Hartford. For more on
the proximity principle, see: John L. Crompton and National Recreation and Park Association and
National Recreation Foundation, The Impact of Parks and Open Space on Property Values and the
Property Tax Base (Ashburn, Va.: Division of Professional Services, National Recreation & Park
Association, 2000); Bernadette Corbett, "Urban Parks: A Study on Park Inequity and
EcoGentrification in New York City," (Fordham University), May 13, 2016
"Zero for Central Park," New York Times, January 22, 1975.
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dark hours" in 1972, owing to a flurry of muggings, rapes, robberies, murders, and celebrity
crime victims such as John F. Kennedy Jr. and Manhattan borough president Andrew Stein." The
debates around Central Park in the 1970s began with preservationists, such as architectural
historian Henry Hope Reed who thought too much money was spent on happenings, events and
rallies in the park, and too little was being allocated to the park's maintenance, preservation,
horticulture, and landscape. (Fig. 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5) Reed, and his supporters, placed blame
squarely on the shoulders of the New York City parks commissioners Thomas P. Hoving and
Andrew Heckscher and their policy of "peopling the park" between 1966 to 1972. Peopling the
park followed the rationale that by relaxing regulations and increasing the number of people in
the park, the park would become a safer space, as people are less frightened with other people
around.
Essayist and social critic Marya Mennen described the practice of "peopling" as an abuse
of the "marvelous refuge designed by Olmsted and Vaux," that along with litter, scum, bottles
and wrappers, was now also plagued by the "tribal banging and whanging of The People's
bands."-- Mennen was referring to the kinds of people who were flocking to Central Park at the
height of the hippie movement in the late 60s and early 70s. What was once a curious diversion,
according to Mennen, had become a haven for "The People ... the safe-in-the-asylum of make-
believe and exhibitionism, that is called the Counter Culture." With the lack of resources for
maintenance or police and the absence of rules or regulations on the part of the Parks
John Darnton, "A Summer Nights Dream: The Arts in Central Park," New York Times, August 9,
1972. Other celebrity mugging victims included UN delegates from Nepal, Cyprus, the Soviet Union,
and France.
- Marya Mennen, "Up in Central Park-Ugh!," New York Times, April 22, 1971.
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Department, Mennen asked this charged question: What is the park for and how can it be saved
from The People? "
With a looming bankruptcy and fiscal crisis in New York City, the city government
slashed the Parks Department's budget. In response, the early 1970s saw a rise in volunteerism to
support the park, with the formation of advocacy groups such as the Central Park Community
Fund, Central Park Task Force and Friends of Central Park. These groups were mainly
comprised of the city's elite who solicited funds from private sources to supplement the Parks
Department's budget, hoping to rescue New York City's "front lawn."" The Central Park
Community Fund was supported by billionaire investors George Soros and Richard Gilder who
commissioned a study on the future of Central Park from E.S Savas, a professor of management
at Columbia University. The resultant report, "A Study of Central Park" from 1976 made a
forceful case for a managerial overhaul of the park. Blaming many of Central Park's problems on
the management skills, financial stringency and organizational structure of the Parks
Department, the report recommended restoring the park to its "original concepts of design and
usage" -following Olmsted's original design.
Savas and his team claimed to have conducted telephone interviews with New Yorkers
about the changes they wanted for Central Park with regards to safety. The responses from New
Yorkers, according to Savas, was, put simply, "more cops and flowers." Specifically, New
Yorkers desired uniformed police officers for safety and flower gardens for beauty with the
"Marya Mennen, "Up in Central Park-Ugh!," New York Times, April 22, 1971.
2 New York City's Parks Recreational and Cultural Affairs Administrator Richard M. Clurman called
Central Park New York City's "front lawn." He was quoted in Elizabeth Barlow, "Whatever
Happened to Central Park?," New York Times, April 26, 1972, 154
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potential for "lesser [fewer?] political rallies."" The report also suggested the formation of a
single organization dedicated to the park with a citizen-based board to formulate policy and
monitor performance. In 1980, on the heels of the Savas report, the Central Park Conservancy
was formed with the support of Mayor Ed Koch. It was the first not-for-profit, privately-run and
funded organization in New York City that managed the conservation, preservation, design, and
maintenance of a public park on behalf of the city.
This chapter examines the formation of the Central Park Conservancy and assesses the
nature of the partnership between the city government and this privately-funded nonprofit
agency, formed for the management of a public amenity. Most parks in New York City were
suffering from neglect due to a lack of funds and management inefficiencies in the late 60s and
70s; however, Central Park received the lion's share of media attention for several reasons.-
First, the Park was the cynosure of tourism and the prototypical ideal for urban parks around the
country. Second, its deterioration affected some of the country's wealthiest families who lived
and owned properties within walking distance of the park." Further, and most importantly, the
- Columbia University, Center for Government Studies, Emanuel S. Savas and John Benson, A Study
of Central Park (New York: The Center, 1976), 4i.
- There were many articles on Central Park and its decline at the time: Elizabeth Barlow, "32 Ways
Your Time or Money Can Rescue Central Park," New York Magazine, June 14, 1976; Edward
Hudson, "Central Park Condition Decried," New York Times, June 8, 1973; "Reviving Central Park,"
New York Times, December 6, 1973; "Myths of the Metropolis: Fear in the Park," New York Times,
October 25, 1987. For more on park inequity, Bernadette Corbett, "Urban Parks: A Study on Park
Inequity and EcoGentrification in New York City," (Fordham University), May 13, 2016; Thomas
Honan, "These Parks Are Our Parks: An Examination of the Privatization of Public Parks in New
York City and the Public Trust Doctrine's Protections," CUNY L. REV. F. 107,2015.
- Some of the wealthiest people of the United States live and own property around Central Park.
Business moguls, including the Kochs, Rockefellers, Bloombergs, Astors, Murdochs, and Gilders
lived in the vicinity. Major publishing houses, media houses, and businesses also have their offices
and studios in the area.
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formation of the Conservancy in 1980 re-confirmed the proximity principle, the same principle
Olmsted had used over a century earlier to defend the city's expenditure in building Central Park
by showing how parklands are capitalized in the value of proximate real estate. This chapter
argues that in 1980, the proximity principle was reflexive and worked in both directions to
regulate the capital values of parkland and real estate equally. New York City has seventeen
hundred parks. The formation of a privately-funded Conservancy specifically for the
preservation and maintenance of just one park in the heart of Manhattan in 1980, demonstrated
the capitalization of real estate to parkland. Central Park and the proximate real estate regulate
each other's values.
The Central Park Conservancy
The Conservancy, which is still in operation today, does not own Central Park; it maintains the
park as part of its partnership with the New York City Parks Department and the City of New
York.', Described as an entity that fills the gaps left by public park agencies, the Conservancy
managed to move the park's budget out of the limited funding of annual budget cycles.,
Although it receives funds from the city, the bulk of its money-almost seventy-five percent by
2013-is raised solely from private sources through drives, fundraisers, donations, contributions,
- There was no formal agreement between the city government and the conservancy until 1993 when
the two parties signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that defined the roles between the
two parties. In 1998, the MOU became a formal contract. In 2006 the partnership was renewed for
six more years.
- Tax revenues, special tax assessments, and bond issues funded everyday maintenance and capital
improvements in Central Park and all parks in New York City until the formation of the Conservancy
in 1980. All New York City parks were, and most still are, dependent upon the annual budget cycles
and the amount of funds that were allocated to the Parks Department.
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and interests from investments. Formed under Section 501(c)(3) of the internal revenue code, the
Conservancy enjoys federal tax exemption as a nonprofit organization, similar to public charities
and private foundations.-- Lawyer and retired chairman of Sperry and Hutchinson company
William S. Beinecke, who had extensive ties to New York's philanthropic communities, was the
first chairman of the Conservancy. Mayor Koch and Parks Commissioner Gordon Davis
appointed Olmsted scholar Elizabeth Barlow Rogers as the park's first administrator-a peculiar
position that demonstrated the Conservancy's allegiance to both the public and private sector.
Barlow was appointed by the mayor, paid by the Conservancy, and reported to the Parks
Commissioner. The Conservancy's board of directors included Beinecke, Barlow, Koch, Davis
and volunteer members who occupied prominent positions in the media, real estate, corporate
and political worlds.
The Conservancy's public-private partnership relies on notions of volunteerism,
philanthropy and civic engagement from New Yorkers. Since its founding (?), the Parks
Commission and Mayor conceptualized the Conservancy as a horizontally-developed
organization from a third sector, an alternative to market logic and governmental bureaucracies,
a model of spontaneous participation that bridged the citizen and government to influence policy.
However, the Conservancy was, in fact, established and fostered by the state in negotiation with
the city's business and cultural leaders. In the time of its formation, it was a medium of resource
- Section 501(c)(3) commonly refers to charitable organizations. These organizations are eligible to
receive tax-deductible contributions in accordance with Code section 170. Section 501(c)(3) restricts
organizations in how much political and legislative (lobbying) activities they may conduct. While
501(c)(3)s are discussed later in the chapter, for more information refer to Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). "Exemption Requirements - 501(c)(3) Organizations." www.irs.gov (website), 2017.
https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/charitable-organizations/exemption-requirements-section-
501c3-organizations.
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privatization and a supplement to a waning welfare state that promised to offer services the city
could no longer provide.
As exemplified through the case of the Conservancy, citizen-led groups only emerge
when citizens have the resources to organize and solicit funds. The volunteer-led board of
directors in the Conservancy wielded a Bourdieu-esque "social capital," that institutionalized
relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition-in this case, shared proximity to the park
and shared ownership of the most expensive real estate in the world." By institutionalizing and
corporatizing volunteerism, the Conservancy spurred a culture of "giving back" with donations,
charities and personal time, but only from the park's elite and self-interested supporters. While
the Conservancy insisted all decisions on Central Park ultimately rested with the commissioner,
the board captured the powers of the Parks Department through fundraising that served a
Manhattan-centered donor agenda.
Critical to the formation of the Conservancy was the revival of Olmstedian ideals, which
offered a cause for the Conservancy's philanthropic activities and drives-"a shopping list" that
hinged on the implied urgency of "rehabilitation."- The mid-70s saw the rise of what urban
- Political scientist Robert Putnam, urban theorist Jane Jacobs and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu have
each discussed the term "social capital." Both Jacobs and Putnam used it positively, as the collective
"value" of social networks and the "irreplaceable" aspect of self-government and neighborhood
networks, respectively. Bourdieu on the other hand discussed social capital as the "deliberate
construction of sociability for the purpose of creating this resource," that works across generations,
like an old boy's network. Accumulated social capital helps to maintain advantages and produces
inequality. Pierre Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital (Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1986); Robert D.
Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 2000).
-Elizabeth Barlow Rogers, John Berendt, New York (N.Y.)., Department of Parks and Recreation,
and N.Y.) Central Park Conservancy (New York), Rebuilding Central Park: A Management and
Restoration Plan (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 14.
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historian Albert Fein called the "renaissance of Olmsted.",, Barlow wrote two new books on
Olmsted even before she became a part of the Conservancy. "Frederick Law Olmsted's New
York" and "Rebuilding Central Park."2 The books were accompanied by two major exhibitions
that opened in New York's Whitney Museum and the National Gallery in Washington, with the
latter calling Olmsted one of "America's most prescient and sensitive artists."-
The preservation movement that peaked in New York City in the years after the
demolition of Pennsylvania Station in 1961, complemented this revival of Olmsted. Central Park
was designated a National Historic Landmark in 1963. It was placed on the National Register of
Historic Places in 1966 and designated a New York City Scenic Landmark by 1974. With the
formation of the Conservancy, the century-old divide between Central Park as a quiet pastoral
retreat and inclusive pleasure garden came was finally settled. With the park rehabilitated to its
picturesque nineteenth-century roots, it now demanded a particular type of preferred visitor-the
apolitical, recreation-seeking New Yorker. Thus, Central Park was both a pastoral retreat and a
pleasure garden, but hardly inclusive of all New Yorkers.
-Albert Fein, Frederick Law Olmsted and the American Environmental Tradition, New York:
George Braziller, 1972.
22 Rogers, Elizabeth Barlow, John Berendt, New York (N.Y.)., Department of Parks and Recreation.,
and N.Y.) Central Park Conservancy (New York). Rebuilding Central Park: A Management and
Restoration Plan. (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987); Elizabeth Barlow Rogers, Alex William
and Whitney Museum of American Art, "Frederick Law Olmsted's New York," (New York: Praeger
in association with the Whitney Museum of American Art, 1972).
- The exhibitions are: Elizabeth Barlow Rogers, Alex William, and Whitney Museum of American
Art. Frederick Law Olmsted's New York. (New York: Praeger, in association with the Whitney
Museum of American Art), 1972.; and "Frederick Law Olmsted: USA," Brochure and exhibition,
National Gallery of Art, Washington DC, October 21 192-January 7, 1973, William Alex, Designer.
New York Times architecture critic Ada Louis Huxtable wrote a piece on the Whitney exhibition
titled "The Original Designs for Central Park," New York Times, November 16, 1980.
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The formation of the Conservancy and its mission were symptomatic of a moment when
focus on the city shifted from the decay and deterioration of the physical city (recall the Moses-
Jane Jacobs debate of the 1960s, as discussed in chapter 1?) to social issues tied to notions of
nostalgia, fear and a dystopian future in the 1970s . By examining the Conservancy, relationships
between land speculation, the rhetoric of park management and rehabilitation, and mechanics
of volunteerism and philanthropy that have collectively shaped the ideal public for Central Park
since the 1970s come to the fore. Following a decade defined by its openness and relaxed,
unguarded attitude towards the kinds of activities and events permitted in Central Park, the 1980s
signaled significant changes to park staff, tasks, management hierarchies and techniques of
mechanization and horticulture. New preservation and conservation laws, park permit
requirements and increased private security introduced new regulations and conditions for the
use of Central Park. While the Parks Department still issued the park permits, the Conservancy
board had an influential voice in shaping the kinds of activities and events that were held in the
park. Some large events were permitted on the lawn, and some were not-the James Taylor and
Paul Simon concerts were acceptable in 1979 and 1981, but political protests were deemed too
disruptive.
In the decades after the formation of the Conservancy for Central Park, there have been
similar park conservancies formed in Atlanta, Memphis, and St. Louis among several other cities
in the United States. Each of these conservancies proffer the privatization mantra that private
agencies increase competition and effectively manage public amenities better than financially
restrained governments. As of 2015, private entities-conservancies, friends of park groups, and
business improvement districts--manage over half of the seventeen hundred parks in New York
City. Each one of them signifies a unique partnership between the city and private sector actors
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and bears the more important question: what happens to the parks that are still dependent upon
the Parks Department budget and management?- Most of these parks are in neighborhoods that
can neither muster influential board members to form conservancies or donate large amounts of
money for park maintenance. How does a city accommodate the differences in the quality of
services between parks in the city? Undergirding these differences was the same question that
emerged with the proximity principle in the 1870s: What is a public park and how is its "ideal
public" constituted?
The "Park Scene" before 1972
When Gordon J. Davis became Parks Commissioner in 1978, he blamed the policies of his
predecessors for the dismal state of the park. Davis was specifically talking about parks
commissioner Thomas P. Hoving, who started the drive to people the park in 1966 and marked a
decisive shift in park policy for Central Park. Hoving started the "happenings" in the park with a
"Central Park au go-go" dance concert, a gay nineties party, kite flying, Halloween parties, love-
ins, gay-ins and be-ins, all of which were popular. On March 26, 1966, twenty thousand people
marched on 5 h Avenue to protest the Vietnam War. Political and social events of this scale had
not been allowed in Central Park since the 1914 suffragette meeting.,
For example, Bryant Park is part of a Business Improvement District (BID) where the government
leased the space to a private corporation. The BID raises funds through surtax assessment in the
district. For more on the different types of partnerships: Peter Harnik and Abby Martin, Public
Spaces/Private Money: The Triumphs and Pitfalls of Urban Park Conservancies, (The Trust for
Public Land, February 2015).
- On October 23, 1915, approximately 25,000 women marched up Fifth Avenue in New York City
for women's suffrage. After that, on October 27, 1945, about 50,000 gathered in the park but were
seated in orderly rows (as Moses liked it) for President Harry S. Truman's foreign policy address.
After that, there was no sizeable political rally or gathering in Central Park until 1966.
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Before Hoving, both commissioners Robert Moses (1934-1959) and Newbold Morris
(1960-1965) were rigid about the kinds of people and activities that were allowed in New York
City parks. Central Park was in a bad condition in 1934, but still perceived, maintained and used
as Olmsted's recreational pastoral garden. Moses had different plans. His tenure saw more
building in the park with private money than ever before. He installed nineteen perimeter
playgrounds, a new zoo, a new skating rink (Wollman Rink), restaurants (Tavern On The Green),
handball courts and baseball diamonds. He raised funds from New Yorkers for facilities in the
park in return for naming rights. Wollman skating rink, Friedsam Carousel, Loeb and Kerbs
boathouse, Levy and Osbourne playgrounds, and Lasker swimming pool and ice-skating rink all
bear the mark of Moses' efforts. Moses uprooted lawns and trees without counsel. He also
arbitrarily denied permits for political, religious and cultural events, while permitting certain
musical events like barbershop quartet competitions, performances by the New York City
Philharmonic Symphony, and patriotic events such as the America First Rally on May 23, 1941,
that drew 22,000 people.-
The issue of park use reached a media-driven crescendo when Moses had a dispute with
the theater producer and director Joseph Papp, who had been running Shakespeare in the Park
since 1954. Papp's theater series was extremely popular and free to the public. Moses wanted
Papp to charge entry fees with ten percent of the proceeds going to the city for the upkeep of the
16 Robert Moses, "Gifts to Central Park," American City 69 (April 1954), 94-95; and Robert A Caro,
The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (Random House, 2015).
- Moses allowed a "patriotic rally" (not deemed political by Moses) on Sheep's Meadow on May 17,
1941, with 22,000 people gathering for Mayor LaGuardia, comedian Eddie Cantor, and violinist
Albert Spaulding. He also permitted an America First Rally, despite its blatant political nature, to
protest Roosevelt's foreign policy in Central Park, urging him to keep America out of the war.
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grass, which in his opinion, was getting damaged during the performances. Papp took Moses to
court. Papp described Shakespeare in the Park as akin to the public library, saying "the only
practical means of ensuring the permanence of our theater is to tie it in with civic
responsibility."2 Moses won in the lower court but lost his case in the Appellate court with the
ruling that charging people for an event that had already been held several times did not serve a
useful park purpose. Soon after, Moses retired from his position as commissioner. The court case
from 1958 not only helped Papp raise money from private sources for his plays, it also marked
an end to the Moses era and the beginning of the 1960s. His successor, Morris largely continued
with Moses' "keep off the grass" attitude to Central Park until 1965.
Hoving, an art historian from Princeton who had been the curator of the Cloisters at
MoMA, was appointed parks commissioner in 1966 when John Lindsay was elected mayor.
Hoving appointed Henry Hope Reed, a historian of classical architecture and an ardent advocate
of Olmsted and Vaux, as the first curator of the park. Working against Morris and Moses before
him, Hoving went out of his way to break the rules and reset the way New Yorkers used Central
Park. While preservationists criticized his "happenings" for causing maintenance issues, the
media appreciated Hoving for closing the roads in Central Park to cars on summer Sundays and
making the park accessible to everyone for the first time.- His successor, August Heckscher,
- Todd London, An Ideal Theater: Founding Visions for a New American Art, (New York: Theatre
Communications Group, 2013), 428. For more on Papp: Helen Epstein, Joe Papp: An American Life
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1994).
- Randy Kennedy, "Thomas Hoving, Remaker of the Met, Dies at 78," New York Times, December
10, 2009; Ralph Blumenthal, "Remembering Hoving's Service as Parks Commissioner," New York
Times, December 11, 2009.
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followed in his footsteps and relaxed rules for permits during his tenure. People could go
shirtless, and artists could sketch or put on a show without a permit, anywhere in the park.
The permit, as Heckscher described it, was a kind of declaration from the permittee to the
nature of the event, kind of audience, scale, scope and time. However, as he rationalized, these
kinds of answers could not be expected from the young, "if they chose to sing, stage a dance, or
otherwise express their varied gifts, they did it as the spirit moved them."- Loosening the rigidity
of permits was in Heckscher's opinion "adding to the gaiety and ease of the park scene," besides
as Heckscher clarified, "grass can be replanted.",, In 1967, 100,000 demonstrators marched with
Martin Luther King in one of the country's most massive anti-war protests. Both Hoving and
Heckscher's tenures as park commissioners were symbolic of the 1960s, and a culture that
questioned conventions, rules, customs and traditions. Moses openly disapproved of both Hoving
and Heckscher, calling them "promoters" and "recreational leftists.",, Similarly, although Reed
had been appointed by Hoving, he openly criticized Hoving's happenings as "travesties" that left
him ashamed and abashed.
Yet, by the time Heckscher left office in 1972, the open and relaxed vibe of the 1960s
was slowly disappearing. All of New York City was operating under the pall of fear. An article
- August Heckscher, Alive in the City: Memoir of an Ex-Commissioner, (New York: Scribner, 1974),
248.
- Ibid., 253.
- Ibid., 156.
- Michael Oreskes, "Is Central Park for Solitude or for Celebration of the City?," New York Times,
September 19, 1981.
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titled "Fear soars with rate of crime" in the New York Times best encapsulates the New Yorker's
state of mind,
"Besieged by an army of muggers and thieves, they are changing their habits and
styles of life, refusing to go out after dark, peering anxiously through peep holes,
before opening their doors, sidestepping strangers on the street, riding the
elevators only in the company of trusted neighborhoods or friends and spending
large sums to secure their homes with locks, bolts, alarms and gates." 3
A large portion of the city saw an increase in crime, muggings, and vandalism with the city
having a fifty-three percent increase in robberies in 1972 over 1971, with 1,691 reported
murders. The city had lost 400,000 manufacturing jobs since 1958." The stock market was in a
slump by the early 70s with over a million middle-income-tax-paying families moving out of the
city by 1970. Banks started unloading New York City municipal debt-debt securities issued by
the city to fund day to day obligations and capital projects-by 1974.6 One of the chief
attractions with buying debt was that banks were exempt from federal income tax.
By 1974, however, international markets had opened up, and suddenly municipal debt
and its exemption were no longer attractive for banks. Besides, banks were nervous that as New
- Michael Stern, "Fear Soars with Rate of Crime," New York Times, December 11, 1968.
1 Jason Epstein, "The Last Days of New York," The New York Review of Books, February 19, 1976.
- Municipal bonds are securities issued by governmental entities to fund day-to-day obligations and
capital projects (schools and highways for example). When one buys municipal bonds, one lends
money to the bond issuer in exchange for interest payments and the return on the original investment
or "principal." Short-term bonds mature in one to three years, while long-term bonds will not mature
for more than a decade. For more: https://www.investor.gov/introduction-
investing/basics/investment-products/municipal-bonds
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York City approached bankruptcy, the city government would choose to support the public
sector over paying back its debt. As Walter Wriston of First National City Bank and David
Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank described it, the choice ahead for New York City was
between either providing social services for everyone or making the city attractive for businesses
and corporations.- Mayor Abraham Beame, on the other hand, thought it was the duty of the
banks to provide loans and stand by the city. Thus, the year 1975 became a pivotal moment for
New York City as its extensive social service network-public housing, hospitals, daycares,
schools and subsidized college education, and public transport-was fundamentally restructured
to include private sector involvement in terms of funds, management and ownership.
With the city flailing in debt, the city government severely cut the parks budget. The
capital budget of New York City had no funds allotted to the Parks Department in 1975.-
Procuring funds for Central Park had become a divisive issue in city government as explained by
the Parks Recreational and Cultural Affairs Administrator Richard M. Clurman, who stated that
any call for funds risked attracting accusations of "Manhattan orientation and limousine
liberalism.",, While many parks in New York City such as Bryant Park, Prospect Park, Tompkins
Square Park and Van Cortlandt Park among others had become "no-go" zones due to the
prostitution, drug use, and vandalism occurring on their grounds, crime in Central Park was
accentuated and equated to the problems of the city.- Barlow spoke of the situation in Central
7 Kim Phillips-Fein, Fear City: New York's Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity Politics, (New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2017). 76
"Zero for Central Park." New York Times, January 22, 1975.
Max Seigel, "Plan Announced for Central Park," New York Times, September 9, 1973.
Newspapers like New York Times, magazines such as New Yorker and New York Magazine, and
late-night TV, especially Johnny Carson, routinely reported about the problems of Central Park and
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Park as "horrifying," describing the park's many parcels of recreational use as "baseball
diamonds of bald dirt, Disneyesque barnyards for children, parking lots of gray asphalt, and
grounds of weed-choked waste.",,
Billionaire Intervention and Olmstedianism
In 1975, the billionaire investors Richard Gilder and George Soros who both owned property in
the upper east side of Manhattan came together over their shared concern for Central Park and
formed the Central Park Community Fund. When speaking of the origin story for the Fund,
Gilder goes back to 1969, which was the year he moved his offices from downtown Wall Street
to midtown Manhattan. In an article for Philanthropy Roundtable from 2010, Gilder reminisced
how only when he started walking to work through Central Park did he realize how drastically
his "idyllic childhood playground" had been ruined by "a few years of bad government." Gilder,
who had spent his entire childhood around the upper east side, was a conservative and a
Republican, did not approve of Mayor Lindsay's "fun city" policies.2 He spoke of smashed
gave it so much play that crime in Central Park came to be equated with all of New York City. In
reality, between 1971-73, eight reported murders occurred in the park. There were eighty-one
reported cases of rapes along with robbery and grand larceny that includes mugging. For more on
New York City crime figures, please visit: http://www.disastercenter.com/crime/nvcrime.htm
Elizabeth Barlow Rogers, "Whatever Happened to Central Park?," New York Times, April 26, 1972.
"Fun City" was part of a quip that Mayor John Lindsay gave the press in 1966, after the transit
strike. When asked if he is happy to be the newly elected mayor that faced a 12-day strike, he called
New York the "fun city." The phrase stuck to him for the rest of his tenure and got attached to all his
policies. Other Republican politicians saw him as weak and indecisive. His policies, most of which
while being well-intentioned, were also credited with taking New York City further into its debt
crisis. By 1973 his popularity had waned, and fun city became a derisive label for the Lindsay era.
For more on Lindsay's tenure: Mariana Mogilevich, "Space and Politics in Lindsay's New York."
(Harvard University, 2012);
Joseph P. Viteritti, Summer in the City: John Lindsay, New York, and the American Dream, ( JHU
Press, 2014).
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streetlights, shattered benches, drug dealing thugs, trash choked weeds with heroin needles and
spaced out bums. In Gilder's opinion, by ignoring years of victimless crimes such as vandalism,
graffiti, drug dealing, public urination and drunkenness, the city had handed over the park to the
"deinstitutionalized madmen of Central Park."-' The campaign to save and rehabilitate Central
Park was for Gilder about "us" against "them," where us meant those who shared the vision of
Central Park from his "idyllic" childhood and who could not stand for the "daily insults to its
dignity," and the "them" were those who in his opinion, had made the park unsightly and
unsafe. -
The Community Fund commissioned E.S Savas, a professor of management at Columbia
University to produce a study for Central Park and its future in 1975. Savas had been part of
urban systems at IBM between 1959-1967 and served as Deputy City Administrator from 1970-
72 under mayor Lindsay before joining Columbia University.- Students from Columbia
University's Graduate School of Business and School of Architecture and Urban Planning
participated in the study along with support from the New York City Parks Department and the
New York Police Department. The report, titled "A Study for Central Park," was a blueprint for
the Conservancy and was intended to be the vehicle that advocated for a citizen-led board of
"informed elite" dedicated to "saving Central Park."- In order to restore beauty, cleanliness, and
Myron Magnet, "The Growth Investor: Richard Gilder Went Long on New York City and
American History. The Payoff? Enormous," Philanthropy Magazine, Summer 2010.
Ibid.
-After teaching several years in Columbia, Savas went on to become the Assistant Secretary for the
US Department of Housing and Urban Development during the Ronald Reagan administration.
-Columbia University, Center for Government Studies, Emanuel S. Savas and John Benson, A Study
of Central Park, (New York: The Center, 1976).
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safety, the report zeroed in on regulating the use and user through increased controls on park
events and educational activities meant to inculcate "proper social behavior.",, These increased
controls were supported by a collection of statistical information, along with proposed
management, policing, greening and rehabilitation plans.
Starting with a history of Central Park and Olmsted, Savas and his team opened the report
by claiming Central Park to be the world's most famous park that had become a "dust bowl," and
had deteriorated to the point that citizens found unacceptable.- Chief among the problems that
evoked public concern was the park's physical decline due to extensive soil erosion, impacting
both the view of the landscape and its structural conditions. Savas undertook preliminary
investigations with engineering surveyors who revealed that the park lost over eight inches of
original topsoil, exposing tree roots to the environment, clogging up lakes and streams with silt,
and destroying walkways, plazas and playgrounds. In addition to erosion, were the acts of
vandalism that had left inoperable water fountains, broken lampposts, benches and playground
equipment, and defaced monuments. Savas also blamed the physical decline of the park on "too
many major events, such as rallies and concerts"-the happenings-that had exacted a toll on the
park.-
The report discussed how in 1973 only nine permanently assigned men were available for
patrol in the park. Their recommendations called for a permanent supplementary force along
AIbid.
- Ibid.
- Ibid. (1-6).
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with greater enforcement of policies against smaller crimes to educate the public on how to use a
public amenity.- The report's opening homage to Olmsted declared Central Park to be an object
of rural beauty and a botanic garden created to gratify the eyes of the casual visitor. This
description was the exact opposite of Central Park in the late 60s and early 70s, which had come
to be the nucleus of New York City's social and political activity and expression. The report's
reverence for Olmsted was part of what historians Roy Rosenzweig and Elizabeth Blackmar
called "Olmstedianism," where Olmsted's landscape projects, writings, political beliefs, and
ideals were nostalgically showcased in publications, monographs, articles and exhibitions
through the 60s and 70s."
Along with Barlow's publications and the exhibitions, the Frederick Law Olmsted Papers
Project, with support from the Library of Congress, started to archive all of Olmsted's writings,
drawings and other works in 1971. In her review of the Olmsted exhibition at the Whitney,
architectural historian Ada Louise Huxtable stressed the fact that too many unsavory changes
had happened in Central Park that needed to stop, and then emphatically declared on seeing
Central Park's landscape drawings that "this is the way it was, and this is the way it was meant to
be."2 The revivalist rhetoric around rehabilitation to Olmstedian ideals was, as this chapter
argues, central to the Conservancy's donor agenda for Central Park's future. It was an effective
strategy that allowed the Conservancy to define the way the park came to be used-less as a site
of political rallies and concerts and more in the interest of preserving the grass. However, how
Ibid.
Roy Rosenzweig and Elizabeth Blackmar, The Park and the People: A History of Central Park
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
- Ada Louise Huxtable, "2 Shows Celebrate Olmsted's Talent," New York Times, October 19, 1972.
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did the 1970s descriptions of the park's Olmstedian traits compare to the way Olmsted and Vaux
actually described their project?
Olmsted's essays and speeches speak as much about landscape design, horticulture, and
environmental conservation, as they do about the democratic ideals and political beliefs that
undergirded the need for public parks in American cities after the industrial revolution." Parks
were large recreational areas that were essential for air, sunlight and open space in cities to help
mitigate the crime and disease that was part of urban living. Olmsted observed that people were
moving out of small towns and rural areas and into cities. They needed large centrally located
parks that offered both athletic and passive recreation, which included sitting, walking, bicycling
and running. In his speech given at the American Social Science Association in Boston in 1870,
Olmsted pronounced parks to be an essential part of a civilization that had broken into two
societies, one that was at the service of commerce and the other that had to relive the strain of the
first. For Olmsted, the public park in the United States was much more than an elite amenity and
different from the "commons," "yards" or "greens" that dot European cities. The park, according
to Olmsted, was "a self-preserving instinct of civilization" in the face of urbanism."
- While Olmsted and Vaux completed many projects together, Vaux is often only cursorily
mentioned. Olmsted produced most of the reports on parks, gave speeches and was a prolific
essayist. Vaux on the other hand, was an architect from London who struggled with work through the
latter part of the nineteenth century, while Olmsted's loyal patrons helped to keep him afloat. In her
book, Park Maker: A Life of Frederick Law Olmsted, Mary Stevenson talks of how Vaux suffered
from not getting enough credit for his joint works with Olmsted. In that vein, while the chapter will
discuss Olmstedian values and ideals, I am aware of the difficulties that come with tracing authorship
to Vaux.
- Frederic Law Olmsted, Speech given at the American Social Science Association in Boston in
1870, Frederick Law Olmsted and Robert C. Twombly, Frederick Law Olmsted: Essential Texts
(New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 202.
- Frederick Law Olmsted and Library of Congress, The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Photo Duplication Service, 1975), 284
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As an abolitionist and an outspoken critic of slavery, Olmsted also characterized parks as
economic equalizers. Parks attracted the poor who could not afford to visit the country, as well as
the rich who did not need to go to the country in the face of a picturesque refuge accessible
within the city-. Parks were to act as a public trust that brought people of all walks of life
together for "receptive" recreation.- Receptive recreation according to Olmsted, happened among
people who knew each other in pastoral settings or among strangers who promenade along
similar paths. This form of recreation involved a mingling of classes and religions, where each
individual by his mere presence adds to the pleasure of others. This kind of mingling was for
Olmstead, a way to "increase mutual understanding among classes" and offered "moral and
physical improvement to the underprivileged."-
The revival of all these ideas were perfectly suitable for New York City in the 1970s, as
the consensus from Barlow and the park friends' group was that the Parks Department had lost
sight of the picturesque and pastoral qualities of Central Park. With Central Park already
designated as a National Historic Landmark, New York City Scenic Landmark, and was listed
and on the National Register of Historic Places, a reiteration of Olmsted and Vaux's
conservation ideas offered new avenues for controls on the maintenance of the park and its
horticulture-which eventually made protecting the grass and plants one of the central reasons
- Frederick Law Olmsted, "A Consideration of the Justifying value of a Park," Frederick Law
Olmsted and Library of Congress., The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted (Washington, D.C.:
Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, 1975).
- Frederic Law Olmsted, Speech given at the American Social Science Association in Boston in
1870, Frederick Law Olmsted and Library of Congress., The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted.
(Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress Photoduplication Service, 1975).
- Ibid.
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for the bulk of park permit denials since the 1980s.5, Redefining Central Park as the recreational
lung of New York City, rather than being a center of political activity and uprising, helped
regulate the influx of people and activities, especially those from the counter-culture movement.
Olmsted's democratic ideals and political beliefs were also appropriate for the civil strife of the
1970s. Presenting Central Park as the unifying, recreational and picturesque refuge for New
York City was a reiteration of both the park's historic and contemporary significance, and the
desperate plea for its rehabilitation.
In a chapter of Savas' report titled "Managing Central Park," Savas and his team make a
case for a managerial overhaul of Central Park by summarizing the two ways by which the
conditions in the park could be improved. The first one was to spend more money in
conventional ways by hiring more workers, gardeners, foresters and police officers. Considering
New York's dismal fiscal situation, this route was, in Savas' opinion, impossible. The second
was the "effective" utilization of existing resources-with effective being shorthand for changing
management techniques.- Savas' premise echoed the managerialism of the 60s and 70s, where
productivity and outcomes were considered best enhanced through managerial expertise,
accountability, organizational maneuvering and technocratic processes that are assumed to be
devoid of bias. Managerialism was an organizational solution that migrated out of corporate
environments into governments, with the formation of a managerial elite. It worked through a
notional depoliticization of decision-making by a system of managers. Political theorist James
- Permits are discussed in detail later in this chapter. One of the most frequent reasons for the denial
of permits since 1980 has been the preservation of grass.
- Columbia University et al., A Study of Central Park (New York: The Center, 1976).
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Burnham and sociologist C. Wright Mills each critiqued the managerial elite that pervaded
political and economic systems, public and private sectors in the United States in the years after
the New Deal .6, This was part of an increasing dependence from the public sector on private
sector management for service delivery with a municipal privatization discourse that relied on
promoting new managerial and competitive processes. According to Savas, private sector
involvement through partnerships increased choices for citizens, offered new procedures to
maintain fiduciary control and improved reporting and record-keeping practices.2
The mayoral agency of the New York City Parks Department managed all New York
City parks before the formation of the Conservancy. The Parks Department was broad in its
scope, as it managed seventeen hundred parks and also playgrounds, basketball courts,
swimming pools, monuments, golf courses, nature centers, beaches, and street trees in the city.
Tax revenues, special tax assessments and bond issues paid for the department's day to day
activities. These funds were available in two parts: an expense budget that included total
expenses of the department and the salaries, and a capital budget that was allocated for new
- C. Wri ght Mill s, Power, Politics, and People: The Collected Essays of C. Wright Mills (publisher
information: 1963). James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution; What Is Happening in the World,
(New York: John Day Co., 1941).
- Conservative economist Milton Friedman was a significant influence on Savas. Friedman spoke of
governments only getting involved when necessary for the survival of the country, clarifying that the
best of a country's abilities came from its free markets while its failures came from government
intervention. Savas echoed these theories in several articles and books he wrote on the privatization
of government. Emanuel S. Savas, Privatizing the Public Sector: How to Shrink Government
(Chatham, NJ.: Chatham House Publishers, 1982); E.S. Savas, "A Positive Urban Policy for the
Future," Urban Affairs Quarterly, June 1983, 18 (4): 447-453.; E.S. Savas, "Alternative Institutional
Models for the Delivery of Public Services," Public Budgeting and Finance, Winter 1981, 1 (4): 12-
20, reprinted in Crisis and Constraints in Municipal Finance, J.H. Carr, ed. (New Brunswick, N.J.
Center for Urban Policy Research, 1984).
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construction.- In the 1970s, the organizational structure for the Parks Recreation and Cultural
Affairs Administration was centralized. The chain of command had the Department of Parks and
Commissioner at the top, followed by several directors, then park managers, foremen and finally
the crews.- (Fig. 3.6) For Savas, this structure was inappropriate for the operation of large parks
where responsibility had been fragmented and diffused around New York City parks to such an
extent that no one below the level of commissioner had an identifiable prescribed task.
Savas and his team advocated for a change in park management from a city-wide or even
borough-wide focus to concentrating on individual parks as single organizational units. He
suggested the creation of a new position of Park Executive for each park?, which would be
occupied by a qualified person from outside the civil service. The Executive responsible for
Central Park would oversee staff assistants and five managers and their teams who handled five
aspects of park management: community services, horticultural services, engineering services,
custodial services and the zoo.,, (Fig. 3.7) A new citizen-based board for Central Park was to
formulate policy and monitor performance along with the Parks Department. Savas called them
the "board of guardians" who were the antidote to the "ad-hoc manner" of the everyday
management of the park as it existed in the mid-1970s.- Here again, Savas and his team take
recourse in Olmstead by clarifying that Central Park came into being in the middle of the
The Parks Department's beginning can be traced to 1686 when wasteland around the city was put in
the hands of the municipality with Bowling Green Park in Lower Manhattan as the city's public park.
In 1934, all independent borough Parks Departments were merged by Mayor Fiorello La Guardia
into one massive Parks Department with Moses as its first commissioner.
- Columbia University et al., A Study of Central Park (New York: The Center, 1976), 3-2
- Ibid., 3-30
- Ibid., 3-45
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nineteenth century as a result of a massive civic effort. A "comparable effort" was needed in the
1970s through civic engagement and private sector participation if Central Park is to survive into
the twenty-first century as one of the world's great urban parks.-7 Upon Savas' advice and the
convincing data in the report, in 1980, the Koch administration formed the Central Park
Conservancy.
The Organization
The Conservancy is a private, nonprofit organization under 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
code, formed by a self-described group of "concerned citizens determined to improve Central
Park."- 501(c)(3) organizations are specifically for religious, scientific, charitable, literary or
educational purposes. They can receive unlimited contributions from individuals, corporations
and even unions.- In its Certificate of Incorporation (under section 402 of the Not-For-Profit
Corporation law) the chief purposes of the Conservancy were to promote and assist in the
"restoration, maintenance and management" of Central Park, provide an "independent
organization with both public and private participation," "advise and assist" the Department of
Parks and Recreation, "promote and assist" the activities of private persons and organizations
concerned with Central Park, increase public awareness about the park, provide education and
- Ibid., 3-46
- State of New York, "Certificate of Incorporation of Central Park Conservancy, Inc. Under Section
402 of the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law," (November 14, 1979). 3
66 For more on 501(c)(3) organizations: https://www.irs.gov/charities-nonprofits/charitable-
organizations/exemption-requirements-section-50 1 c3-organizations; Philip A Moffat, "Charitable
501(c)(3) Tax-Exempt Status for Environmental Organizations: Issues and Requirements."
University of Florida Conservation Clinic, Fredric G. Levin College of Law, 20.
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information to visitors in Central Park, and to "solicit, invest and hold funds" for the
Conservancy.-0 (See Fig. 3.9)
The Conservancy does not own Central Park. It manages the park on behalf of the city
with funds sourced from individuals, foundations and corporations through fundraisers,
donations, and profits from investments and dividends. The Conservancy also gets a share of
concession revenue and a grant from the city. It receives federal tax exemption as a nonprofit
organization, similar to public charities and private foundations. A 501(c)(3) organization such
as the Conservancy has to be exclusively at the service of a public purpose and prove that net
benefits are not benefitting any shareholder or individual. The 501(c)(3) also has to maintain its
status as exclusively dedicated to the public purpose it had been established for and cannot
intervene in political campaigns or influence legislation.
For its first tasks, the Conservancy started with experimental, pilot projects hiring soil
scientists and interns to learn more about horticulture and preservation of the park. The city paid
these interns, but asked the Conservancy to pay for their training and material. Some of the
Conservancy's immediate activities as listed in the bye-laws in 1980 were developing a master
plan for the park, remodeling the Loeb memorial boathouse, starting a troop of mountain rangers,
preparing the first accurate budget for Central Park and developing a management plan for
maintenance and operations. The Conservancy also began with corporate campaigns for
donations through a committee of executives that came from various sectors of the city's
economy: banking, finance, retail, and consumer products, among others.
- State of New York, "Certificate of Incorporation of Central Park Conservancy, Inc. Under Section
402 of the Not-for-Profit Corporation Law," November 14, 1979, 4-6.
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For the first decade, the Parks Department provided most of the employees. That changed
quickly when the Conservancy started depending on volunteer, seasonal and specialized workers
exclusively. (Fig. 3.8) This gave rise to two types of workers in the park. The public sector
employees had collective bargaining abilities. The other type of worker was those that were not
from the public sector-fulltime employees, welfare to work trainees, volunteers, summer youth
workers, workers from private not-for-profit conservancies, contract company workers and
people sentenced to community service.- The shift from public sector employees to this more
motley assortment was both was gradual and preplanned. In addition to the staff of the
Conservancy and the Parks Department, other city agencies such as the New York City Police
Department, Department of EPA, Con Edison, and volunteer groups such as a community
council for security and a volunteer ambulance core also worked in the parkz
"All in all, we created a board made of people who had leaderships positions in
the city of one kind or another and knew that the health of Central Park was some
kind of barometer for the health of New York City."
The above quote is from Barlow, wherein she refers to the "distinguished individuals" and
private citizens in "leadership positions" that comprised the board that oversaw the Conservancy.
- "Central Park Volunteers," New York Times, March 29, 1984.
- Angelina Horn, "Lessons from the Masters: The City of New York and Central Park Conservancy's
Park Partnership." City Parks Blog (blog), January 14, 2013.
https://citvparksblo2.org/2013/01/14/lessons-from-the-rnasters-the-citv-of-new-york-a nd-central.-
park-Conservancys-park-partnership/.
John Krinsky and Maud Simonet, Who Cleans the Park?: Public Work and Urban Governance in
New York City, (Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press, 2017), 139
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Barlow draws a sort of equivalency between Central Park-which is surrounded by some of the
most expensive real estate in the country-and all of New York City. The quote is reminiscent of
the Savas report, which similarly associated the future of Central Park with the future of New
York City. In both cases, maintaining Central Park becomes essential for the symbolic
preservation of the whole city. Outside of the Manhattan-centrism of this supposition in a city
with near-innumerable parks, the quote also speaks to the kind of people that came to form the
board of the Conservancy.
The board of directors or "trustees" started with twenty-two members in 1980 and
ballooned to fifty-five members as of 2017. The chairman of the Conservancy, Beinecke,
administrator Barlow, Mayor Koch, Commissioner Davis and the borough president Stein were
trustee members at inception. Koch then appointed five trustees with advice from Davis. Three
members from Central Park Community Fund and Central Park Task Force were invited by
Beinecke to join the Conservancy board. The rest of the trustees, which includes two community
representatives who spoke for the interests of the communities surrounding Central Park, were
elected (hand-selected?) following the bye-laws by the commissioner, chairman, and
administrator. Each trustee had three-year terms. None of these elected members could be
employees of the Conservancy or hold office in the City of New York, outside the mayor and
commissioner. The board voted on all decisions for the Conservancy. The Conservancy also took
in memberships from the general public for tax-deductible amounts ranging from fifty dollars to
two hundred and fifty dollars annually in return for benefits such as exclusive access to private
tours and events, but the members carried no votes.-
- State of New York, "Central Park Conservancy Inc. By-Laws," November 14, 1979.
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Nonprofits and Volunteerism
The primary mode of interaction between the city and the Conservancy was through the
framework of a public-private partnership and the apparatus of the Nonprofit Organization
(NPO). Undergirding a nonprofit is the notion that as governments support median voters, there
is always residual demand for a public good, which is then satisfied through citizen engagement
and nonprofits.- A nonprofit, much like a foundation, is a part of the third sector. Unlike for a
foundation, the government regulates nonprofits on the kinds of charities they accept towards
their cause. They can either be member-serving like trade unions, or community-serving such as
the Central Park Conservancy. The question then arises: Why do we need a nonprofit agency in
the middle? Why is money not directly given to the government for the public amenity? The
answer comes from the many advantages to being a nonprofit-outside of the tax-exempt status
of its donations for the donors. Nonprofits offer the promise of a centralized third sector
organization, a sole agency with a cause that supports public interests as against a sprawling
governmental bureaucracy. When nonprofits generate profits or surplus, they have to put that
money towards the preservation of the organization and not towards an individual. This makes
donors feel like their money is accounted for and can be easily monitored.
- For more on nonprofits and their role in public parks refer to Elisabeth Stephanie Clemens and
Doug Guthrie, Politics and Partnerships: The Role of Voluntary Associations in America's Political
Past and Present (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2010); and Charles Brecher and
Oliver Wise, "Looking a Gift Horse in the Mouth: Challenges in Managing Philanthropic Support for
Public Services," Public Administration Review 68 (2008): S 146-61.
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The third sector is associated with civil society, the arena of "uncoerced collective
action."- It includes characteristics such as participation, volunteerism and negotiation between
citizens, state and the market, along with the pursuit of public interest. Its organizational forms
include charities, non-governmental organizations, community groups, faith-based organizations
and friends groups. Civil society in its Tocquevillian conception is a voluntary, non-political,
social organization of citizens that is intended to strengthen democracy, unite individuals,
prevent fragmentation and correct the defects of democracy and isolation. Tocqueville had
pointed out the extraordinary proclivity among Americans to participate in voluntary groups,
what he called the "knowledge of how to combine."- In this conception of civil society, wherein
active citizenship and community engagement counterbalance the state, common and shared
goals can influence social and political affairs. The Gramscian notion of civil society, on the
other hand, was removed from economic decisions and to the realm of culture and ideology,
wherein civil society became the arena where the elite could manufacture consent for the rest of
society by exercising hegemony.-
In both these theoretical formulations, civil society was identified distinctly from the
state. In the practical case of the Conservancy, distinctions between state, market, nonprofit and
- Elisabeth Stephanie Clemens and Doug Guthrie, Politics and Partnerships: The Role of Voluntary
Associations in America's Political Past and Present (Chicago; London: University of Chicago
Press, 2010).; Oliver Cooke, "A Class Approach to Municipal Privatization: The Privatization of
New York City's Central Park," International Labor and Working-Class History, no. 71 (2007):
112-32.
- Alexis de Tocqueville and Arthur Goldhammer, Democracy in America (New York: Library of
America: Distributed to the trade in the U.S. by Penguin Putnam, 2004).
-Antonio Gramsci, Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, Selections from the Prison
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York: International Publishers, 1971).
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citizen were fuzzier. While the Conservancy downplayed the influence of government in civil
society to reinforce its independence, it also reiterated a shared responsibility with the Parks
Department for Central Park. It was important for conservancies to convey to their donors that
their donated money is merely supplementary and not "crowding out" public funds and
contributions. This made it important that the city government retain control on the land and
provide annual funds, even if the amounts were negligible in comparison to the money raised by
the Conservancy.- The Conservancy emerged due to the leadership and counsel of the New York
City government, while at the same, through its capacity for fundraising, it also captured the
powers of the New York City Parks Department. These conflicting relationships draw from the
very nature of the public-private partnership that formed the Conservancy.
The idea of volunteer-led change was at the core of Conservancy and its institutional
model. In their report, Savas and his team contemplated the dire future of the island of
Manhattan and its residents by the year 2000 if the park were to continue its decline. Safety in
the park was not only about cops and flowers, but about an increase in the citizen's role in park
planning, policy formation and performance monitoring as a unified "institutional body."-
Barlow also appealed to the "dedication and sense of proprietorship" of New Yorkers to make
volunteerism work, as the "survival of New York City parks" depended on how much people
care for them.s
- Arthur C. Brooks, "Do Government Subsidies To Nonprofits Crowd Out Donations or Donors?,"
Public Finance Review 31, no. 2 (March 1, 2003): 166-79.; and Cary Deck and Erik 0 Kimbrough,
"Do Market Incentives Crowd Out Charitable Giving?," The Journal of Socio-Economics 47
(December 2013).
Ibid. 3-45
8 Elizabeth Barlow Rogers "32 Ways Your Time or Money Can Rescue Central Park." New York
Magazine, June 14, 1976.
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However, it was not just about survival and rehabilitation. The Conservancy and its
mission were dependent on advocacy for continuous maintenance and upkeep supported by a
regular supply of donations and volunteers. Raising money and attracting volunteers requires a
cause and a narrative of legitimacy. Barlow often referred to fundraising as "development,"
because fundraising first requires the development of a cause, which the Conservancy? can then
support through public relations.- Causes had to have clear ends and organization goals that were
supported by favorable television programming, media representations, and newspaper stories.
Barlow promoted the park as more than just a "municipal service," but rather as "rich as a library
in opportunities for instruction, as well-endowed as a museum in visual beauty, as emotionally
uplifting as a symphony orchestra, and as entertaining as a theater."" By re-interpreting Central
Park as a bearer of cultural values, the Conservancy not only helped the development of its
cause, it also helped justify the need for the formation of a public-private partnership as a symbol
of civic engagement.
Volunteer groups that existed before the Conservancy-Central Park Task Force which
was funded by the Astor Foundation and Friends of Central Park headed by Reed-organized
very specific volunteer tasks such as the Adopt a Rock Program, the Shakespeare Gardeners,
high school gardening programs and youth employment programs. Reed collected funds and
volunteers to rehabilitate parts of the park such as the Bow Bridge and other rustic shelters. The
Conservancy followed this model of developing very explicit goals that included capital
-2 Krinsky and Simonet, Who Cleans the Park?: Public Work and Urban Governance in New York
City.
- Elizabeth Barlow Rogers, John Berendt, New York (N.Y.)., Department of Parks and Recreation.,
and N.Y.) Central Park Conservancy (New York. Rebuilding Central Park: A Management and
Restoration Plan (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 153.
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improvements, preservation, conservation, horticulture, marketing and education. In the early
years, the Conservancy also sponsored several use and management studies that were designed
for fundraising and educating the public. New image-centered slogans such as "you gotta have
park" were released in the early 80s by way of a design contest with local graphic design
students.-
By 1987, the Conservancy completed restorations in Bethesda Terrace, Conservatory
Garden, Loeb Boathouse and Belvedere Castle. The Conservancy started training programs for
other parks, a woodlands initiative and watercourse restoration, several community programs and
events, and a new Institute for Urban Parks. By the 1990s, the Conservancy had all private staff,
but the city still provided a security team with a police department precinct, light and power to
the zoo, and partnered in policy and planning decisions and visitor programming. In 1998 the
Conservancy signed a long-term contract, an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) with the
city to manage the park.-, This was not a legally binding document, but it did, however, signify a
mutual agreement of official partnership.
Permits
Along with the introduction of private security, using walkie-talkies and phones, Central Park
saw a re-evaluation of park permits as part of the Conservancy's new regulatory measures.
Before 1980, the Parks Department issued permits, but decisions depended upon the whims of
the Parks Commissioner. Moses and Morris had a strict keep-of-the-grass stance for activities in
Ibid.
For an overview of the Memorandum of Understanding, please visit:
http://www.centralparknyc.org/about/govemance-overview.html
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the park, especially concerning politically-charged gatherings. Hoving and Heckscher on the
other hand, exercised more relaxed rules and regulations for permits, transforming Central Park
into New York's nexus of political activism.
There are several types of permits for parks in New York City-athletic field permits,
special events permits, filming and photography permits, tennis permits, tree-work permits,
construction permits, local police precinct permits, sound permits, and temporary use
authorizations for vendors.- Most divisive among them was the special events permit. As
discussed prior, Joseph Papp sued parks commissioner Robert Moses for refusing a permit for
the free Shakespeare festival in Central Park in 1959. Papp eventually won the case and is often
credited with accelerating Moses' downfall in the 60s.-, In 1977, the Hare Krishna religious
organization ISKON was refused a permit for a cultural festival in Washington Square Park. This
ruling was later overturned by the courts claiming discrimination on the part of the Parks
Department for permit refusal since the Parks Department had previously permitted similar and
larger events in the park.-- In 1984, the city granted permits for a nativity scene and menorahs in
Central Park, acknowledging that these permits could be denied the next year depending on the
litigated case in the United States Supreme Court regarding the legality of a nativity scene on
public property in Scarsdale, N.Y.- The James Taylor and Paul Simon concert were both
- For more on park permits: New York Department of Parks and Recreation. "Park Permits," n.d.
https://nyceventpermits.nyc.gov/Parks/.
Shakespeare Workshop v Moses, No. NYS 683 (8 App. Div. 2d 343, 187, 1959).
ISKON v Lang, 91 Misc. 2d 421 (1977)
Board of Trustees of Scarsdale v. McCreary, 471 U.S 83 (1985)
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permitted in 1979 and 1981, but the Diana Ross concert was deemed too disruptive for the grass
in 1983.-
One of the most publicized disputes on permits was the Park Commissioner's (?)
rejection of artists Christo Javacheff and Jeanne-Claude's project Gates in February 1981,
immediately after the formation of the Conservancy. While much is written on Gates and the
artist duo, this chapter exclusively examines the project's permit rejection, especially in light of
the fact that the Bloomberg administration and the Conservancy approved of the very same
project several decades later in 2005. What was a problematic project in 1981 for the city and the
Conservancy, became an asset for the same entities in 2005. Herein is a trajectory of how the
Conservancy and the city government continuously shaped public perceptions and legitimated
certain activities and groups as suitable for Central Park over others.
The Park Department and the Conservancy presented a formal response to the artist duo
in a wordy report titled "Report and determination in the matter of Christo, the Gates" in 1983.
The report formalized the rejection by explaining why the Department of Parks and Recreation
could not allow the Gates project in Central Park.- Artists Christo and Jeanne-Claude proposed
Gates in the late 70s. It was comprised of 7503 steel gates that were fifteen feet high with a
width ranging from nine to twenty-eight feet, that created a series of portals for Central Park.
Attached to the crosspiece at the top of each steel gate was a fabric that would come down five
-After mayor Koch announced that the Diana Ross concert caused damage, Ross personally handed
the Parks Department a check for 250,000 dollars
- New York (N.Y.). and Department of Parks and Recreation., Report and Determination in the
Matter of Christo, the Gates ([New York, N.Y.]: [The Dept.], 1981). The report was put together
with the assistance of Elizabeth Barlow and Joseph Bresnan among others.
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feet, stopping six inches from the ground. The gates would be at nine feet intervals. In their
description of the project, they described the project as simply a work of art, "a golden river
appearing and disappearing through the bare branches of the trees and highlighting the shape of
the meandering footpaths."2 Their idea was to use all of Central Park for these portals, which in
their words would make Gates a true "public work of art."-
Christo and Jeanne-Claude applied for a permit for the installation and scheduled it for
two weeks in the fall of 1982 or 1983. In his permit application, Christo claimed that the project
would generate enough revenue to cover construction costs, expenses, profits, and fees. The
artists did not want any funds from the city or private entities and pledged to pay for the repair of
any damages to the park. They also commissioned two independent environmental impact
studies, a human impact study, in addition to offering a cash donation to the city for an
unspecified sum at the end of the project.- Despite all this, the Parks Department rejected their
permit.
The 214 pages-long rejection report had commissioner Davis grapple with several
fundamental questions such as, on what basis should the question of the Gates installation in
Central Park be determined? How should public spaces be used and by whom and for what
purposes? How should the decisions be reached and who should be involved?- The report does
Christo and Jeanne-Claude's project description is from the website:
http://christojeanneclaude.net/projects/the-gates
- New York (N.Y.). and Department of Parks and Recreation., Report and Determination in the
Matter of Christo, the Gates ([New York, N.Y.]: [The Dept.], 1981), 9.
- Ibid.
- Ibid. 44.
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not quite answer these questions. It simply raises them and argues that every permitted event in
the park becomes a precedent for the future. Approving Christo's project in 1981, in Davis'
opinion, would "impact future events in the park" and open doors for future judicial reviews of
administrative denials by the Parks Department.- One of the central concerns was what they
thought to be Christo's ways of blurring the boundaries between art, promotion and commerce
by encouraging comment, controversy and support while leaving the city government, Parks
Department and the Conservancy out of the discussion.
The rejection report discusses the details of Christo's proposal, the park's department's
history of temporary sculpture displays, Central Park's design and management policies, and
lastly, the legal precedents and administrative procedures of the use, management and alteration
of Central Park. Davis reviews the extensive physical and technical undertaking that would be
required for a project of this scale, which would include installation, display and dismantling.
While Christo estimated the construction costs as 5.2 million, Davis thought the number did not
include the "thousands of hours" of related city police and employee costs that would be required
to guard the artwork. Acknowledging that Christo was not a novice with a project of the scale,
having already demonstrated technical skill and financial capability in other projects with similar
outdoor settings with "minimal alteration or damage" to the location, Davis did not think these
factors were enough to accept or reject the project.-
- Ibid. 89.
- New York (N.Y.). and Department of Parks and Recreation., Report and Determination in the
Matter of Christo, the Gates, 15.
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Christo's human impact study claimed that works of modern sculpture were always
placed in mid-town, Park Avenue or the commercial and financial districts of Manhattan, while
the Parks Department routinely ignored the northern portions of the parks that were frequented
by blacks and Latinos. The city objected to the racial tinge in this commentary, calling Gates
"artistic and cultural affirmative action."- Davis thought Christo simplified the reasons for the
discrepancy to reveal a lack of knowledge of the park and the city, claiming that Blacks and
Latinos did frequent the mid-town area and that there was no site in the northern part of the park
to hold large events." Quoting another event involving punk rock promoters in the southern
district of New York, who wanted to put up an event in a park and then changed the event's
premise (from an offshoot of the movement to legalize marijuana to a rally protesting
discrimination against blacks without any substantiated connection to civil rights groups), Davis
commented that the city was getting wary of becoming a mere spectator to self-promotional
activities.-
However, decades later during the Bloomberg administration, the Parks Department and
Conservancy approved of Gates in 2005 for Central Park. (Fig. 3.10) The project received
incredible amounts of publicity and press. Four million people visited Gates, restaurants and bars
around Central Park reported a business increase of 200 percent, and the project itself is credited
to have pumped 240 million dollars into New York City's economy in its mere sixteen-day run.""
- Ibid. 17.
- New York (N.Y.). and Department of Parks and Recreation. 19.
- Ibid. 94.
.. Carolyn Curiel, "At Last, the Gates Wave in Central Park," New York Times, February 12, 2005;
Randy Kennedy, "The Gates' Unfurling to High Hopes," New York Times, February 12,2005.
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It was hailed as a great work of art with by Bloomberg, who was also a trustee of the
Conservancy and a self-professed promoter of public art, personally acquiring drawings of the
project for 500,000 dollars. What had changed since the first proposal of the artwork? Why did
the city no longer have a problem with being a "spectator" to the artists' "self-promotion"? How
was Christo and Jean Claude's apolitical claims for their project as "not a message or a symbol,
but only a work of art," acceptable, bearing in mind the fact that Christo and Jean Claude
donated three million dollars to the Conservancy in 2005?
The project did receive criticism for being less public art and more of a tourist trap for
New York City in the post-9/11 era. The permit for the project as "public art" stood out,
especially considering that the city rejected permits for other events such as the proposed Anti-
War Demonstration of August 29, 2004, by the organization, United for Peace and Justice.~"
Parks Commissioner Adrian Benepe called the project a part of the "great outdoor museum" that
is Central Park in 2005, while Davis, the commissioner who had rejected the project in 1981,
approved the project as coming to the "right park in the right city at the right time." Was this
turnaround part of the incorporation of "public art" into the apparatus of urban redevelopment
and capitalism, as in the words of art historian Rosalyn Deutsche, or was the project a part of
New York City Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC), "Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg
Announces $254 Million Economic Impact of the Gates on New York City," Press Releases (blog),
March 3, 2005. https://www.nycedc.com/press-release/mayor-michael-r-bloomberg-announces-254-
million-economic-impact-gates-new-york-city.
- Mike McIntire, "Enough About 'Gates' as Art; Let's Talk About That Price Tag," New York Times,
March 5,2005.; and "Christo's Controversial Art: A Timeline of Irritating People with Fabric," The
Week Staff, (September 14, 2010).
- The antiwar demonstration of August 29, 2004 was denied a permit in Central Park by the
Conservancy and city government. However, 25,000 people did show up that day in the Great Lawn.
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Sharon Zukin's symbolic economy, where depoliticizing the project to aesthetic expression
concealed a private sector bid-in this case, the Conservancy-for control of public space?--
It may well have been both. Both in the time of its rejection in 1981 and its acceptance in
2005, Gates made visible the inflection point for the public-private partnership and Central Park.
In 1981, the fledgling Conservancy had just taken over and a lot needed to be done with respect
to the physical condition of the park in a city that was recovering from a fiscal crisis. By 2005,
the Conservancy was raising more than seventy-five percent of the park's budget, had a fifty-
five-member volunteer-led board of directors made up of developers, CEOs, and businesspeople.
Central Park had been completely restored to its nineteenth-century image, in a city that was
economically booming.
In April 2015, the Parks Department released new outlines for permits for events and
gatherings in the park. The new rules further limited gatherings to 50,000 people, and allowed
only six such events in the year, blocking four of those for the New York Philharmonic and
Metropolitan Opera and barring all events between August and September. This shift was best
encapsulated by the New York Times when it clarified the city's differentiation of "passive
users...those who sit, drink wine and listen" and "active users...dance, march or stand on the
grass," later stating that the days of the mega event is over in Central Park.
"Generous philanthropists, committed volunteers and city largess - you put the
Sharon Zukin, The Cultures of Cities (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1995); Rosalyn Deutsche,
Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics (Chicago, Ill.; Cambridge, Mass.: Graham Foundation for
Advanced Studies in the Fine Arts; MIT Press, 1996).
'Timothy Williams, "Keeping Great Crowds Off Central Park's Great Lawn," New York Times,
April 25, 2005.
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three of those together and it becomes this very creative laboratory."-
Central Park is the biggest draw in New York City real estate. The data offered by the
Conservancy in its literature, website and reports persistently presents this notion. As of 2015,
one-third of Manhattan's residents live within 10-minute walking distance of Central Park. Some
of the most ambitious residential and commercial architecture happens around Central Park.
Hotels around Central Park make up thirty-seven percent of all rooms in New York City.- As
this chapter argues, Central Park and proximate neighborhoods regulate each other's values as
the proximity principle works both ways. The value of the real estate around Central Park has
made the Conservancy one of the wealthiest nonprofits managing a public park in the world
since 1980. Its board boasts of CEOs, developers and bankers such as Adrian Benepe (Pinnacle
Management Group), Richard Gilder (Gilder Gagnon Howe & Co. LLC), Robert Hurtz
(Crestview Partners), and James Wigley (Hess Corporation), among others. Since 1980, the
Conservancy has amassed over 950 million dollars. It attracted 100 million dollars from
billionaire hedge fund manager John Paulson in 2012 and 110 million dollars as part of its
public-private arrangement from the city in 2015.
The Conservancy is symptomatic of the particular quandary that privately managed
public parks present-which was echoed by Davis in his rejection report in 1983-who gets to
decide how the park is used? How does the involvement of the private sector in the management
of public amenities alter the "public" in public parks? This chapter demonstrates that the answers
-Quote about the Conservancy from Adrian Benepe, New York Parks Commissioner under Mayor
Bloomberg. Lisa Foderaro and Winnie Hu, "His Domain Transformed, Parks Chief Is Leaving," New
York Times, June 18, 2012.
. The Conservancy's website lists these figures: Http://Www.Centralparknyc.Org/About/.
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to these questions are not static. While the Conservancy initially championed nineteenth-century
ideas of a passive, apolitical, recreation-seeking public for Central Park, the notion of the ideal
use and the user has been reconceptualized several times since 1980. These changes were also
echoed in the shifting balance of the public-private partnership between the city and the
nonprofit.
The Conservancy also represents the disparities between public parks in New York City,
between those that are still dependent on the Parks Department and those that have alternative
funding sources. The Conservancy has received criticism for not sharing its resources with other
parks in the city that could use extra support. To this the Conservancy has claimed that it does
share volunteers and educational activities, and by depending less on city funds it has reduced
the overall burden on the Parks Department. This statement is not entirely true, however, as the
Parks Department gives more money to the Conservancy as part of its partnership agreement
than to any other park in the city. In essence, by dint of the partnership, the city is making an
already wealthy nonprofit even wealthier. Complaints from Harlem community leaders who
accused the park and its leadership of neglecting the northern Harlem end of the park were faced
with city officials claiming that restoration takes the money and "people with money don't live
here."-
Since 1980, thirteen conservancies have emerged for other public parks in New York
City, including Friends of Hudson River Park, Friends of the High Line, Madison Square Park
Conservancy, Prospect Park Alliance, Randall's Island Park Alliance and the Battery Park
-Thomas Honan, "These Parks Are Our Parks: An Examination of the Privatization of Public Parks
in New York City and the Public Trust Doctrine's Protections." CUNY L. REV. F. 107,2015.
http://www.cunvl awreview.ore/article-these-Darks-are-our-Darks/ I httos://nerna.ccUWC7-4S LB 1.
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Conservancy. While these arrangements are the product of unique partnerships with specific
terms and conditions, the public sector assumes risk in most cases, as it loses income in taxes for
these parks. In cases such as the Central Park Conservancy, the city also has to be ready to
perform for "challenge grants," where philanthropists donate money under the condition that the
city matches the amount-Gilder donated seventeen million dollars to the Conservancy in 1993
as a challenge grant.
The Conservancy has become a symbol of civic engagement and was an authentic
grassroots movement started by concerned New Yorkers for the state of the city's most beloved
nineteenth-century landmark. However, it is also a private nonprofit organization started with the
support of the city government and mayor Koch, in dialogue with some of the most powerful and
influential New Yorkers and New York-based businesses. The conservancy is characteristic of
both the privatization of a public service and the publicization of the private sector in the form of
an entity from the third sector, a nonprofit. The construct of the nonprofit presents a peculiar
condition for the Conservancy that claims equal allegiance to both the public and private sector,
while heavily depending on the success of private fundraising for its continued survival. Without
the donors and volunteers, the Conservancy would simply not survive, irrespective of city
support.
At its core, the Central Park Conservancy and its success with "rehabilitating" a public
park into its Olmstedian, pastoral image with private funds, reveals the intersections between real
estate value, park maintenance, land speculation and philanthropy in New York City. The
proximity principle is still as relevant for New York City in 2017 as it was in 1870. Real estate
around parks do sell at a premium, however, only around those parks that are well maintained,
historically preserved, with ample "cops and flowers." This maintenance has come to depend
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upon organized citizen-led groups and the ability of these groups to precipitate a culture of
giving back, ultimately spawning a disparity between the value of a park in Manhattan and one
in Harlem. While both are public parks, only one among them can be called a "self-financing
enterprise."
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Chapter Four
From Fear City to I Heart New York: Image, Crisis and the Intentions of Economic
Development
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New York City experienced a citywide blackout on July 13, 1977. The blackout was the product
of three consecutive lightning strikes. The first two struck substation Buchanan South on the
Hudson River. Sometime later, a third lightning struck at Sprainbrook substation in Yonkers that
took down several critical transmission lines. In about an hour, three major lines that supplied
power to the city were overloaded and the biggest generator in the city Ravenswood 3, shut
down.- In its aftermath, the Con Ed power system completely shut down, plunging the city into
darkness. Power was not restored in the city until the next day. This was not the first blackout for
the city. The city had seen a similar blackout in 1965, that has been commemorated in the Doris
Day, Patrick O'Neal comedy, "Where were you when the lights were out?" a story of actress
Day skipping her Broadway play due to the blackout and going home, only to see her husband
O'Neal flirt with journalist, Lola Albright."
The 1965 blackout was tame in comparison to the one in 1977 when New York City
nosedived into looting and arson that left whole neighborhoods in Brooklyn burning until the
next day. On the night of the blackout, people ran out in droves, breaking locks and gates, and
crashing windows and doors. (Fig. 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4) There were over a thousand fires blazing in
the city by the morning, especially in the Crown Heights and Bushwick neighborhoods in
Brooklyn. A Bronx dealership lost fifty Pontiacs to looting. An interesting correlation has also
been drawn between the 1977 blackout and the looting of high-end DJ equipment that allowed
- Martin Gottlieb and James Glanz, "The Blackout of 2003: The Past; The Blackouts of '65 and '77
Became Defining Moments in the City's History," New York Times, August 15, 2003; and David
Frum, How We Got Here: The 70's, the Decade That Brought You Modern Life (for Better or
Worse), New York, NY: Basic Books, 2000.
- Hy Averback, Where Were You When the Lights Were Out, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 1968.
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hip-hop to be introduced to the rest of the city, outside the immensely successful DJ parties in the
projects. "' Since there was no power citywide, little was done that night in terms of law
enforcement. The next day, TV and press reporting on the blackout unfolded with strong racial
undertones after over 3500 arrests were made of mostly Black and Hispanic youth."
Later in the same year, Union Carbide, which was the third largest chemical company in
the United States that had their offices in the imposing black building 270 Park Avenue,
announced that they would be moving to Danbury, Connecticut to a new Kevin Roche and John
Dinkeloo designed 1.3 million square feet facility on a 674-acre property."3 Carbide's move
meant the loss of 3500 jobs for New York. Companies such as Pepsi Cola, Nabisco, Shell Oil,
Avon, Western Union and General Electric had already left the city for headquarters in the
suburbs. Carbide's reasons for leaving were that they could not get executives from elsewhere-
"middle management people from Buffalo or North Carolina or San Diego"-to come and work
in New York City because of housing costs and "other things you associate with the big city."",
The city's reputation as the financial capital of the country had indeed suffered since the "fiscal
crisis" of 1975."- The summer of 1976 saw David Berkowitz or the Son of Sam, go on a killing
.. In the Netflix documentary "Hip Hop Evolution," Grandmaster Caz or Curtis Fisher who was part
of the first DJ crews Mighty Force acknowledged this interesting bit of hip-hop history. Also features
in 99% Invisible and Delaney Hall, "Was the 1977 New York City Blackout a Catalyst for Hip-
Hop's Growth?" Slate (blog), October 16,2014.
", Jonathan Mahler, Ladies and Gentlemen, the Bronx Is Burning: 1977, Baseball, Politics, and the
Battle for the Soul of a City, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
Jack Egan, "Union Carbide's high cost of leaving," New York Magazine, October 19, 1981.
Ibid.
The fiscal crisis will be discussed later in this chapter. For more on the fiscal crisis in terms of
political and policy details, please refer to: Kim Phillips-Fein, Fear City: New York's Fiscal Crisis
and the Rise of Austerity Politics, (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2017); Steven Weisman, "Fiscal
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spree in the city. Along with a mayhem-filled blackout, New York City saw an increase in
subway fares, scarcity of housing, twenty-six million square feet of vacant office space with over
five hundred buildings in Manhattan already in foreclosure, and over 7000 fires in the South
Bronx due to the closing down of fire stations.
William S. Doyle, the Deputy Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Commerce, spoke of this moment as particularly significant as it was one of the most significant
corporate departures from the city that capped several years of corporate exodus. In a New York
Magazine piece from 1987, Doyle reminisced how he approached the commissioner John Dyson
and told him that New York City's redemption lies in a rebranding exercise that markets the city
as a business and tourist-friendly destination. The popular perception that the city offered no
work-life balance, and that having an office or residence in New York was expensive and unsafe,
had to change. Considering the city had already lost sixteen billion dollars in tourism revenue
between 1967 and 1976, as Doyle reiterates in the article, getting people to visit the city became
the most crucial aspect in New York City's revival.- In response to Doyle, the Department
diverted its entire tourism spending towards financing a market research program, which was
then used to persuade state legislators about the same.
In the same year, the state increased its tourism budget from 400,000 to 4.3 million, all of
which was used by Doyle and Dyson to hire the young advertisement firm, Wells Rich and
Crisis at a Glance," New York Times, May 30, 1975; Robert W. Bailey, The Crisis Regime: The
MAC, the EFCB, and the Political Impact of the New York City Financial Crisis, (Albany: State
University of New York Press), 1984.
- "On Madison Avenue, Nothing but the Best." New York Magazine, July 27, 1987. Interestingly,
Doyle went on later to form the advertising agency, Doyle Graf Mabley, based in New York City.
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Greene."- They came up with the slogan I Heart New York which was accompanied by ajingle
and several television commercials. (Fig. 4.5, 4.6) The catchy phrase "I Heart New York" also
became the now iconic logo designed by art director Milton Glaser. Decades later, an 81-year-
old Glaser recounted how he made no money off the "scrappy little logo" as the project was pro
bono."" The logo was not even copyrighted for the first decade as the agency deliberately wanted
it copied, commodified and part of New York culture.
The I Heart New York campaign was, and remains one of the most successful
advertisement campaigns for the city, which put New York back on the tourist map. It generated
tourism expenditure of 14.4 billion dollars in 1985 and over 650,000 jobs, which was up from
5.5 billion in 1976."- By 1987, New York State became the leading tourist destination on the east
coast, over New England. The Department of Commerce launched the campaign with the simple
intent of purging all negative associations with the city and instilling confidence in the business
community. The narrative as set by the campaign was of New York City as the consumable and
timeless given that was on the mend for economic development.
The narrative shift was significant as just two years ago, the city was going to default on
its loans and file bankruptcy. The fiscal crisis of 1975 as it came to be called, was the sum
product of many factors, including an accumulated debt from the earlier decade, shrinking tax
base, growing demands for municipal services, onset of a recession, oil crisis of 1973, stock
Mary Wells Lawrence., A Big Life in Advertising, (Paperback: Touchstone, 2003).
Alastair Sooke, "Milton Glaser: His Heart Was in the Right Place," The Telegraph, February 7,
2011.
From Miriam Greenberg, Branding New York: How a City in Crisis Was Sold to the World,
(Routledge, 2009). 215. Between 1976-1980, revenue from tourism in New York City increased by
1.7 billion, increasing by 340 percent. Hotel occupation reached 80 percent.
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market crash of 1973-74, that each exacerbated the situation. In June 1975, a few months before
the imminent bankruptcy, New York City was the subject of another campaign that was worlds
apart from the I Heart New York advertisements. The campaign was called, "Welcome to Fear
City," and it was designed and conceived by New York City's unions in coordination with a
public relations firm, with the primary purpose of frightening visitors from coming to the city.-
The campaign was a brutal response to the city government's austerity measures, which
were part of Mayor Abraham Beame's "modified crisis municipal budget" that included laying
off over 31, 315 employees from the public sector.- Centered around a pamphlet called "Fear
City," the campaign was envisioned as a bargaining chip with the city in the hopes the
government would rethink its austerity measures. The pamphlet painted a grim picture of New
York City's physical deterioration and its moral and social decay, by accentuating the fear that
the city engendered among citizens on a daily basis and then prognosticating how bad the
situation would be when the proposed austerity measures really transpired. (Fig. 4.7) The unions
handed out the pamphlets to tourists, visitors and locals at airports, ports and the subway. The
unions accompanied the pamphlets with strikes, protests, press conferences, and a full-page
advertisement in the New York Times stating, "How much is your life worth?"- When the
campaign received national and international attention, the city requested that the State Supreme
- I have not been able to locate the name of the public relations firm. There are no archives for the
Fear City pamphlet as yet. It is an ongoing search.
- Maurice Caroll, "Beame Would Cut City's Budget Gap by $276.9 Million," New York Times, April
30, 1975.
- The Advertisement appeared in the New York Times on June 10, 1975.
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Court put a restraining order on the unions against distributing these pamphlets around the city,
on the grounds that they "spread fear, panic and trepidation among everyone." 123
Nevertheless, the unions distributed the pamphlets. The layoffs went through as well.
New York's bankruptcy would have gone through too, had it not been for the teachers retirement
pension funds that decided to buy the city's debt and avert the crisis. However the image of a
bleak city in constant fear, that was wracked by riots, strikes, and protests, stuck. The fear was
not just about New Yorkers and their life within a city ridden with crime and neglect embodied
in popular films such as Taxi Driver (1976) and Death Wish (1974) that were shot on location."'
Fear here also spoke of the anxiety and dismay that hung over the city for the gradual erosion of
big metropolitan city life that had defined New York for centuries.
This last and final chapter examines the Fear City and the I Heart New York campaigns to
investigate how they mediated crises with images and rhetoric that were designed to provoke,
seduce and disrupt, and which became currencies of exchange for a changing city. Crisis has
been a constant in this dissertation. Previous chapters have examined the notion of crisis, the
overuse, and vagueness of the term, and the powers of crisis narratives to shape policy and the
- Kim Phillips-Fein, Fear City: New York's Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity Politics, New
York: Metropolitan Books, 2017), 130
- Landmark films from the 1960s and 1970s were shot on location in New York City due to Mayor
John Lindsay's pioneering efforts to change the process of acquiring filming permits. He reduced red
tape and bureaucracy by bringing approval forms down to one. For more on the changes: McLain
Clutter, Imaginary Apparatus: Film Production and Urban Planning in New York City, 1966-1975,
2009.
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political and economic futures and histories of New York City. While crisis gets associated with
facts, they do exist only through narratives.-
Both the Fear City and I Heart New York campaigns were crisis narratives that mediated
the upheavals of the moment to counter an existing perception of New York and reinforce a new
one. The Fear City pamphlet was a protest statement in 1975 that did not work, however, the
campaign and its message represented the final years of the militant strength of New York City's
public unions. The I Heart New York campaign, on the other hand, spelled the moment when the
state government actively worked at getting rid of the perception of New York City as a
unionized city and started tying economic development to tourism and branding. These images
were part of the city's transformation from a blue-collar manufacturing hub to a white-collar
corporate economy, from the urban crisis years of the late 1960s to the beginning of the Reagan
era in the late 70s.
As I argue early on in this dissertation, these transformations did not happen suddenly
around the fiscal crisis of 1975. They had been brewing since the 1960s. Privatization, I argue,
was at the center of this decade-long shift. Since the 1960s, New York City had been steadily
losing both its tax base and federal support for public services and programs. What started as
gentle nudges for private sector participation and engagement in urban development from the
Lindsay administration in 1966 with the formation of task forces and the production of white
papers, transitioned in the aftermath of the fiscal crisis, into a complete surrender of city
autonomy with the establishment of the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), a governor-
.This has been articulated in Timothy Hyde, "Architecture, Modernity, Crisis," Journal of
Architectural Education Journal of Architectural Education 69, no. 1 (2015): 2-3.
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supported public-private partnership that comprised of investment bankers and CEOs, who
monitored all of New York City's budgets, spending and borrowing decisions after 1975.-,
The Fear City and the I Heart New York campaigns certainly bookended this period of
economic upheaval for the city. The abrupt narrative shift between the two campaigns indicated
the growing importance of branding New York City in the interest of real estate, tourism and
finance, that were replacing New York's declining manufacturing industry. Place marketing
valorized certain parts of the city-The Theater District and Broadway for example, that thanks
to the I Heart New York ads, wielded cultural capital that shaped urban development and the
public realm in New York City in the decades after 1977.7
How did the two campaigns mediate crisis? The Fear City pamphlet and the I Heart New
York campaign were two very different readings of New York City. However, it is not the
differences, but the inherent similarities between the campaigns that are significant for the
purposes of this chapter. They were spectacles, in that, they restructured New York's imaginaries
2 The MAC is discussed later in this chapter. The MAC was established through State legislation on
June 10, 1975, in order to engage with the New York City government's fiscal crisis. The
Corporation was the product of an advisory panel (Simon H. Rifkind, Felix G. Rohatyn, Richard M.
Shinn and Donald B. Smiley among others) to Governor Hugh L. Carey. MAC had a Board of
Directors consisting of nine private citizens and was endowed with the authority to borrow billions
backed by State revenue and to exercise specific policing powers over city fiscal practices. David
Harvey discusses the MAC in his essay "Neoliberalism and the City," Studies in Social Justice
Volume 1, Number 1 (Winter 2007). MAC is also discussed in Kim Moody's From Welfare State to
Real State, and Kim Phillips-Fein's Fear City. "The Constitutionality of the New York Municipal
Wage Freeze and Debt Moratorium: Resurrection of the Contract Clause." University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 125, no. 1 (1976): 167-214.; and Robert W. Bailey, The Crisis Regime:
The MAC, the EFCB, and the Political Impact of the New York City Financial Crisis. Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1984.
- The I Heart New York campaigns had a series of television spots that focused on Broadway with
vacation packages that were available on toll-free numbers on the screen. Broadway actors from the
Chorus Line, opera singer Beverly Sills and Angela Lansbury sing their love for New York. The ad
ends with Frank Langella as Dracula saying he loves New York "especially in the evening
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and social relations with specific images that spoke through notions of collectives and social
solidarities.- In this endeavor, they successfully shifted focus from the inherent complexities and
risks of New York's recent upheavals-racial, social and economic inequities, lack of federal
and state funds, fiscal irresponsibilities and the failures of urban and economic policies. The
campaigns also shared modes of dissemination. This was a period of media optimism in the
United States with Marshall McLuhan's writings on media theory, which had wielded influence
on politics and the counterculture.- The two campaigns made specific choices for the
dissemination of their message: dramatic press conferences, upbeat television advertisements,
snarky print ads and pamphlets, and long-running strikes and protests. They worked with
advertising firms and public relations specialists and participated in a level of political theatre
that was designed to send a message across with a particular intensity and expectation of
audience involvement.
- By imaginary, the chapter means social imaginary, the historical constructs that allow a given
people imagine their collective social life, and legitimize their processes and practices. Cornelius
Castoriadis and Durkheim's notion of social imaginaries have informed this understanding. The two
texts that have informed my understanding of imaginaries: Cornelius Castoriadis and David Ames
Curtis. Cornelius Castoriadis, Political and Social Writings. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1988; and John F. Rundell, Imaginaries of Modernity: Politics, Cultures, Tensions, 2017.
- McLuhan's book The Medium is the Message was hugely influential in the period. McLuhan
defined media and technologies as extensions of the physical, psychological, and social function of
humans. His theory of the world moving towards global consciousness, the "global village," was
significantly appropriated by the counterculture. His somewhat confusing categorizations of hot and
cold media made television an important part of branding. Marshall McLuhan, Quentin Fiore, and
Jerome Agel, The Medium Is the Massage: An Inventory of Effects, (San Francisco, CA: HardWired),
1996.; Marshall McLuhan, and W. Terrence Gordon. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man.
(Corte Madera, CA: Gingko Press), 2003.
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Any discussion on image and New York City operates in a crowded field of markers and
references. There are landmark films from the 1960s and 1970s that have etched the image of
grit in relation to New York City-Midnight Cowboy(1968), Taxi Driver (1976), The Panic in
Needle Park (1971), The French Connection (1971) Serpico (1973), Godfather (1972), Mean
Streets (1973), Death Wish (1974), Annie Hall (1977) and Manhattan (1978) among so many
others. Books and articles from the period characterized New York as the Ungovernable City, the
Unheavenly City, and Exodusfrom Fun City among other vivid monikers."- Midtown New York-
based national TV networks documented the daily rise of crime and ongoing strikes in the city-
what Robert Beauregard referred to as the rise of the "nightly dramaturgy"-making New York
the paradigm for the ill effects of the modernizing environment.'3
Recently, McClain Clutter's book "Imaginary Apparatus" discusses how mediated
images from films shot in New York City in the 1960s and 70s influenced the broader
imagination of planners and policy writers at the time."- Mariam Greenberg's book "Branding
New York" discusses how branding exercises in the aftermath of the I Heart New York
campaign shaped the neoliberal city of Mayor Bloomberg."3 In this field, what this chapter offers
- Vincent Cannato, The Ungovernable City, Basic Books, 2009.; Jon Soder and Edward Banfield,
"The Unheavenly City," 1972; "Exodus from Fun City," Time Magazine, February 24, 1967.; Jon
Soder, and Edward Banfield, "The Unheavenly City," 1972; "Exodus from Fun City," Time
Magazine, February 24, 1967.
- Robert A. Beauregard, Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of US Cities, (Oxford, UK;
Cambridge, Mass., USA: B. Blackwell), 1993.
.2 McLain Clutter, "Imaginary Apparatus: Film Production and Urban Planning in New York City,
1966-1975." Grey Room, no. 35 (2009): 58-89.
- Miriam Greenberg, Branding New York: How a City in Crisis Was Sold to the World. Routledge,
2009.
163
is a new framework to understand the intersections between the powers of image construction
and crisis narratives that merge advertising and editorial content in their support of image
sensitive and "place" driven industries such as real estate and tourism for the New York of the
1980s.
I-Welcome to Fear City Campaign
On June 1- 1975, Mayor Abraham Beame called for new austerity measures in New York City
with the layoff of 31, 315 city employees at the start of the new fiscal year.- This included over
5000 policeofficers, 2000 firefighters, 3000 sanitation workers and other public-sector
employees such as correctional officers, park employees, and employees of the Human
Resources Administration. Beame, who was an accountant and ran for mayor on the platform
"He Knows the Buck" in 1974, entered office with a fiscal deficit of over 600 million dollars."'
His "modified crisis municipal budget" of 11.9 billion dollars, had cuts that included shrinking
New York's massive public sector.6 He announced the budget on prime-time television-a move
characterized by the New York Times as "political theatrics." Beame made the announcement in
order to garner support for more state funds by repeatedly calling attention to the difference
between an austerity budget and a crisis budget, which in his opinion, could be averted."
- Lawrence Van Gelder, "Layoffs of 40,000 Ordered as City Ends Fiscal Year," New York Times.
June 1, 1975
,, "Political Theatrics," New York Times, June 1, 1975.
11 Ronald Smothers, "20, 575 Win Job Reprieve As Beame Seeks Funds," New York Times, June 13,
1975.
- Maurice Caroll, "Beame Would Cut City's Budget Gap by $276.9- Million," New York Times,
April 30, 1975.
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Eight days later, on Jun 9th, 1975, 80,000 members from twenty-four police and fire
unions in New York City formed the Committee for Public Safety to protest the mayor's
austerity measures and recommend that the crisis be resolved through attrition instead." In
reaction to the layoffs, the union members started the "Welcome to Fear City" campaign. They
announced the campaign in a press conference in the company of a Public Relations consultant."
The campaign had a pamphlet titled, "Welcome to Fear City, A Survival Guide for Visitors to
the City of New York" that was handed out to tourists, visitors and locals at airports, ports and
the subway. This pamphlet was accompanied by a full-page advertisement in the New York
Times that asked, "How much is your life worth?" The advertisement implored New Yorkers to
attend a rally at City Hall to protest the layoffs. Union members drove around the city in trucks
with flags, giving people warnings about safety. The four-page pamphlet carried the classic
image of hazard and danger: a hooded skull, on its cover.
On the foldout under the title, "Welcome to Fear City," the pamphlet listed statistics of
New York's crime and violence, namely robberies, aggravated assault, larceny and burglary,
which as the pamphlet clarified were, "shockingly high and getting worse every day."- By
reducing the number of public safety personnel available to protect resident and visitors, the
pamphlet asserted that the city had made the situation worse. In this scenario, the unions
- Peter Kihss, "Police Leaders Decry Leaflets," New York Times, June 13, 1975.
- Council of Public Safety, "Fear City Pamphlet." Council of Public Safety, 1975. For more on the
austerity politics, please refer to Kim Phillips-Fein, Fear City: New York's Fiscal Crisis and the Rise
of Austerity Politics, 2017; and Kevin Baker, "Welcome to Fear City - the inside Story of New
York's Civil War, 40 Years On," The Guardian, May 18, 2015, Cities Edition, Supported by the
Rockefeller Foundation edition.
- Council of Public Safety, "Fear City Pamphlet," Council of Public Safety, 1975.
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recommended that it was best for everyone to stay away from New York City if possible, even
though some New Yorkers "do manage to survive.""' The Committee then listed a set of ten
guidelines to "help visitors enjoy their visit to New York in comfort and safety," and added
"good luck" next to another image of the hooded skull. -
The Fear City campaign was an astute and marketing-savvy response to New York City's
austerity measures. The pamphlet, along with strikes, protests, and press conferences were part
of the political theatrics that was necessary to present a bleak and apocalyptic city in fear; an
image that was the union's bargaining chip with the government. Although the austerity
measures and public-sector layoffs did eventually go through, the Fear City campaign itself
represented the final days of New York's notoriously powerful unions. It also marked a
conservative shift in city politics in response to these very labor unions, that according to groups
such as the ABNY, had been dictating public policy in New York City for too long.
At the time, the New York Times even ran an article, "18 Urban Experts Advise,
Castigate and Console the City on its Problems."" The article had economist Milton Friedman
chiding New York City and suggesting that cities have to learn to live within their means and
become "honest" again. Author Edward Banfield blamed the citizens of New York City for its
dismal condition, calling them more generous and too moral and righteous to do the right thing,
adding that "you won't find police officers striking in Chicago."- Urbanist Lewis Mumford went
Ibid.
Ibid.
'"Israel Shenker, "18 Experts Advice, Castigate and Console the City on Its Problems," New York
Times, July 30, 1975.
- Ibid.
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as far as declaring New York City a sick patient who cannot be cured- "it is too late to operate,
now we need to make the patient as comfortable as possible."- Urbanist Jane Jacobs expressed
her doubts for New York City and its recovery. Commenting on the city government's desperate
attempts at attracting new businesses Jacobs mused that "you don't attract industries to cities
from towns."-"
New York's fiscal crisis had accumulated from the 1960s, when the city government
ignored budget deficits and deferred loans, used long-term capital funds for everyday expenses,
and practiced shifty book-keeping that relocated state aid over several years. The city historically
has provided more public services than any other local government, hospitals and higher
education systems in the United States. While the 1960s saw an influx of federal financial aid for
social programs that were often tried and tested in the city, the 1970s saw these funds dwindling.
New York City was one of the largest and most frequent borrowers from the public market. Its
borrowing included long-term borrowing for capital projects and short-term borrowing for
seasonal differences between tax receipts and expenditures, and also to cover year-end shortfalls,
and initial funding for capital projects." With the opening of international markets and
reinvestment of petrodollars in major commercial banks in the United States, buying municipal
Ibid.
Ibid.
-The city borrowed against accrued but uncollectable tax revenues, applied long-term debt towards
collective bargaining payments, shifted expenses to capital budget, used long-term debt to finance
non-capital programs such as vocational training, and even to pay municipal salaries. The city
borrowed the largest amount of money in the fiscal year-end June 30, 1975-more than nine billion
dollars while repaying eight billion of previous debt.
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debt was not that attractive for banks. By the end of 1974, banks were selling off municipal debt
and withdrawing from offering it more credit.
The Fear City pamphlet prompted an outcry from the city government who called out the
Committee for "creating fear and panic" in New York City." The campaign and its negative
takedown of New York City were not completely new for the city. The 1960s saw white papers
such as "The Threatened City" that took a decidedly ominous tone for New York's future.
Written by Lindsay's voluntary group, the Task Force for Urban Design, that comprising of
architects Philip Johnson, Robert Stern and I.M Pei, the report was a wordy treatise on New
York City and the New Yorker's growing fear of change. The threat, as the title of the report
alluded to, was the years of demolition-driven urban renewal policies in New York City, which
were "conventional New York solutions-wrecking ball and bulldozers."' The Task Force laced
the language of the report with an underlying narrative of both failure and nostalgia for the city.
According to the Task Force, New York City was a sick organism, whose existence was
threatened by pathologies that needed treatment and intervention from New Yorkers, quoting
San Francisco-based critic Alan Temko-who had moved to the west coast because New York
was spinning towards "Mumfordian doom and malignant weariness." Temko portrayed the city
- Peter Kihss, "Police Leaders Decry Leaflets." New York Times, June 13, 1975.
- New York (N.Y.)., Mayor's Task Force on Urban Design., and William S. Paley. The Threatened
City: A Report on the Design of the City of New York, [New York], 1967, 16. The Task Force also
included planner Jacquelin Robertson, landscape architect Robert L. Zion, investment banker Eli
Jacobs, lawyer and ex-president of Herald Tribune Walter Thayer, philanthropists Vera List and Joan
K Davidson, and chairman of CBS Television William S. Paley as its head.
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as "over grown and over congested, ill managed and ill-kempt, usually sullen, sometimes violent
and scarred by enormous gray areas."-,
The Task Force wrote the Threatened City report with the intention of influencing
legislation. It received little attention outside political circles. The Fear City campaign on the
other hand, was mentioned not only in local newspapers, but also national newspapers such as
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Times. The unions printed one million
pamphlets and on June 13th, when they were to be distributed, the mayor held yet another angry
press conference. He called the campaign a new low in irresponsibility, for as he cited, if Federal
Bureau of Investigation crime statistics were taken into account, New York City ranked only
sixteenth among twenty American cities in the incidence of crime.' The city requested that the
State Supreme Court put a restraining order on the Committee against distributing these
pamphlets around the city, on the grounds that the pamphlets "spread fear, panic and trepidation,
among everyone."5 By June 18 however, the Supreme Court declared that it was okay for the
unions to distribute the pamphlets as it was their constitutional right and they cannot be denied
it."-
- New York (N.Y.)., Mayor's Task Force on Urban Design., and William S. Paley. The Threatened
City: A Report on the Design of the City of New York. [New York]: [publisher not identified], 1967,4
, Glenn Fowler, "Union Guide to Fear City Is Banned by Court Order." New York Times, June 13,
1975; and Kihss, Peter. "Police Leaders Decry Leaflets." New York Times, June 13, 1975.
- Kim Phillips-Fein, Fear City: New York's Fiscal Crisis and the Rise of Austerity Politics, 2017.
, Glenn Fowler, "Fear City Booklet Rights Again Upheld." New York Times, June 18, 1975. Here
there was an interesting difference drawn between legal rights of union members to distribute
pejorative printed material and their responsibilities as public safety officers holding a "public trust."
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The Pamphlet
Tapping into the narrative of a physically, morally and socially bankrupt city, the pamphlet's list
of guidelines included a warning to stay off the streets after six pm in the evening as "muggings
and occasional murders are on the increase in the early evening hours," and how midtown gets
deserted by 7.30pm.,- Another warning was to "not walk," and instead summon a radio taxi by
telephone and remain in the hotel lobby, restaurant or theater until the taxi arrives.' Avoiding
public transport altogether and remaining in Manhattan exclusively were also suggestions as
subway crime was high and police and fire protection in other areas were "grossly inadequate
and will become more inadequate."-, The pamphlet cited the incidence of the city having to close
off the rear half of each train in the evening so that the passengers could "huddle together and be
better protected."' Since Transit police officers had been laid off, the Committee rationalized
that everyone should avoid the subway and only take the bus in daylight hours.
As for the other boroughs, the Committee discussed how South Bronx had been labeled
Fort Apache, as arson had become an uncontrollable problem. A fifth guideline was protecting
your property as even businesses on Madison Avenue keep their doors locked even during
business hours and admit customers after "careful inspection." " With this claim, the Committee
advises visitors that they should engrave "identifying numbers" on all their properties and
Council of Public Safety, "Fear City Pamphlet." Council of Public Safety, 1975.
.. Ibid.
- Ibid.
1 Ibid.
.5 Ibid.
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safeguard their handbags with "both hands" when in public, without a "moment's inattention."
All property needed to be locked and hidden in the trunk or glove compartment as visible
packages in closed cars are also robbed. The eighth guideline was to not leave valuables in hotel
rooms or even hotel vaults, with bank vaults offering only "an acceptable degree of security.",-
The last guideline was for everyone to be aware of fire hazards, as a severely under staffed Fire
Department made evacuations without assistance pretty common, asking everyone to be
familiarized with exits, entries and escape routes.
At around the same time as the pamphlet received all this publicity, the Board of
Education in New York City held a day of mourning for the cuts in the public school system on
June 9, with students calling for a day of boycott later in the month.-,, Senior centers, daycare
centers, and mental health facilities were shutting down with over two thousand employees laid
off from the welfare department. Garbage was deliberately left uncollected all over the city as
sanitation men went on a strike as well. By the end of the month, when no aid arriving from the
state, the city was completely not prepared for what was coming. Fifteen firehouses were closed,
there were traffic jams all over and the recently out of work police officers collected around city
hall for impromptu protests. Firefighters called in sick en-masse when the uncollected garbage
blazed all over the city.'
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ronald Smothers, "School Cuts Prompts Protests." New York Times, June 10, 1975.
Kevin Baker, "'Welcome to Fear City' - the inside Story of New York's Civil War, 40 Years On."
The Guardian, May 18, 2015, Cities Edition, Supported by the Rockefeller Foundation edition.
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On June 17h 1975, the Association for a Better New York (ABNY), a nonprofit made up
of 125 members from real estate, banking and local businesses who called themselves a group of
"passionate New Yorkers," led by real estate developer Lew Rudin, started negotiating with the
unions, promising them support in their cause if they discontinued the fear city campaign.-
When New York's businesss community formed the ABNY in 1971, its core purpose was to
reverse the exodus of middle-class families, corporations, businesses and tourists from the city.
They also wanted to temper the power of unions by bringing in the private sector and its powers
of fundraising to the fore with marketing and lobbying activities such as "Power Breakfasts,"
CEO sweeping drives and funding drives for police initiatives. The ABNY was convened to
tackle "social issues that had previously been deemed the domain of city agencies," with the
belief that private sector spending had to "augment rather than undermine" public spending."
They disapproved of the Fear City Campaign and what they thought were its deleterious effects
on New York City businesses and tourism, characterizing it akin to "burning down the factory in
a labor dispute."-5 After talks with ABNY and promises of support, the unions pulled out of the
Fear City campaign and the distribution of pamphlets on June 17 1975. However, come June
18th, the ABNY retreated and decided not to speak on behalf of the unions after all.-' The
campaign never took off again. The layoffs went through.
- "Association for a Better New York," http://abnv.org/index.php. Also refer to, Joe Merton, John
Lindsay, the Association for a Better New York, and the Privatization of New York City, 1969-1973,
2018. ABNY has appeared several times in this dissertation as one of the earliest examples of private
sector participating in urban governance.
"Association for a Better New York," http://abnv.org/index.php.
Mariam Greenberg, Branding New York: How a City in Crisis Was Sold to the World, (Routledge,
2009). 138
- Ibid, 139
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The MAC
By mid-1975 New York State Governor Hugh Carey promised that he would provide state funds,
but only under the condition that the city permit a state-appointed group of experts who would
oversee the city's spending decisions. This group of experts was the Municipal Assistance
Corporation (MAC), that comprised of public and private sector members such as federal judge
and trial lawyer Simon H. Rifkind, chairman of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
Richard M. Shinn, chairman of R.H Macy and Company Donald B. Smiley and investment
banker Felix Rohatyn, among others. The MAC's first suggestions for the city were to shrink the
public sector by 50,000 workers, enact a wage freeze and a 30 percent increase in subway fare,
close a few hospitals and for the first time in New York's history, impose tuition at CUNY. The
state offered 750 million dollars to the city in return for taking these austerity measures. The city
also had to adopt the State's uniform system for accounts for municipalities and reach a balanced
budget by the year 1978. Rohatyn believed that a major stimulus to the private sector would
increase the city's tax base. The MAC warned the city government that if they defaulted, not
only would it influence the country's economy, it would be a lot of time before the city gets its
fiscal stability back. If New York City did not follow prescribed austerity measures, there would
also be litigation exposing the city to lengthy and expensive court proceedings and judicial
reviews.67
-- "Summary of the Three-Year (FY 1975-FY 1978) Financial Plan for New York City, New York
State Agencies, and New York State November 10, 1975," n.d. Series 12, Box 1, Folder 3. Municipal
Assistance Corporation for the City of New York (MAC) Archive Collection, Baruch College,
CUNY, New York, NY
173
Four months after the Fear City Campaign, October 16th, 1975, Beame announced fresh
budget cuts amounting to 200 million dollars, and proposed layoffs of more than eight thousand
workers.6- A day later, the city's outstanding debt of over 453 million dollars was due. If the city
could not pay back the loan, it would officially be pronounced bankrupt. The city owed money
to bondholders and banks, needed to pay its staff and other public-sector employees, in addition
to all its other city commitments. Even with budget cuts of 300 million dollars, the city could not
be rescued.'9 On October 16, 1975, there was a meeting at the Waldorf Astoria in New York City
for a benefit dinner and a fundraiser for Catholic charities.-oBy this time, banks had stopped
marketing the city's debt, leaving New York City with no ability to borrow. President Gerald
Ford had famously refused the city any help. New York City's imminent fiscal crisis was used
by his administration to stress on the need for urban policy reform and the failures of the city's
welfare policies.
The city had some interest from the teachers retirement pension funds to buy the debt, but
even they were walking back their offer. The fundraiser at the Waldorf Astoria had speeches
from Robert Moses and Connecticut's first female governor, Ella T. Grasso. They both criticized
Beame for being frozen during the city's condition, despite being an accountant. A developer
named Richard Ravitch who worked for the New York State governor, was working on
m Frances Clines, "Beame Submits New Cuts Requiring Added Layoffs." New York Times, October
16, 1975.
- Robert W. Bailey, The Crisis Regime: The MAC, the EFCB, and the Political Impact of the New
York City Financial Crisis, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984).; and George F.
Will, "Bailing Out New York." The Washington Post, June 18, 1975.
- Jeff Nussbaum, "The Night New York Saved Itself from Bankruptcy." The New Yorker, October
16,2015.
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convincing the teachers union to buy the bonds and save the city, rationalizing that if the city
went under, teachers would lose their jobs and raises regardless.
The next morning, on October 17, the teachers retirement pension funds decided to buy
the debt and rescue the city. On the same evening, Ford gave a speech that accused New York
City of stampeding the whole country, and as symptomatic of all urban liberal centers in the
country that routinely promise more than they can provide. While Ford lost the elections, his
position on New York City as emblematic of cities that offer welfare and benefits at the cost of
taxpayer money, endured. Had New York City's default and bankruptcy gone through, it would
have wiped out at least a hundred banks and hurt the value of the dollar. That morning the Dow
dropped ten points, the price of gold escalated, and the bonds of other cities were also not
traded.- On November 15th, 1975 the state legislature adopted the Emergency Moratorium Act
for the city of New York which permitted the city to suspend payment of principle on its short-
term obligations, for three years. The state also increased taxes in the city. Still, the city was
evading default month to month, until finally, on Thanksgiving eve, going back on his word,
President Ford announced plans to give seasonal loans to the city.
1 -I Heart New York
Two years after the Fear City campaign and the near bankruptcy of New York City, the city
experienced a citywide blackout that lasted for twenty-five hours in 1977. It left the city shaken
- Author Kim Phillips Fein, identifies the fall of the Urban Development Corporation and the use of
moral obligation bonds that is discussed in Chapter 3, as one of the deciding moments for New
York's impending bankruptcy. With these bonds, the state was not bound to repay in the case of
losses, and they did not require the approval of voters. When the UDC was later bailed out, the
amount pushed the state's debt limit and also revealed the city and state's dependence on private
finance. When the UDC went bankrupt, it clouded people's judgment on city bonds.
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with looting, arson, fires, and arrests. Mayor Beame had to declare an emergency. The blackout
was significant for further cementing New York City's unreliable reputation in the aftermath of
the already disastrous fiscal crisis that left the city utterly dependent on the bankers and
financiers that comprised the MAC, to approve the city's budgets and expenditure. The city was
far from being the financial capital of the country, with Los Angeles Times running an
embarrassing headline, "City's Pride in Itself Goes Dim in the Blackout."m
"Streams of black water from broken fire hydrants swept the residue of the
looting into the middle of the streets. Burned-out delivery trucks, spilling their
seats onto the pavement, blocked doorways. Twisted steel grilles-some yanked
from storefronts with trucks that were then filled with loot-lay across sidewalks.
In the new Fedco supermarket, shelves gleamed bare and white, while several
inches of mashed produce, packages of squashed hamburger, rivers of melted ice
cream, and broken bottles covered the floors. The stench was overpowering. Up
to 300 stores were cleaned out in the neighborhood, and the next morning sheets
of plywood covered most of their smashed windows. Said Policeman John
Fitzgerald: 'There are only cops and crooks left here now.",-
Mary Cronin who was a Times Correspondent described the night in the passage above. The
blackout and its reporting took a toll on the city that was already reeling from a particularly bad
few years. The year saw more of the corporate exodus that the city had witnessed through the
early 70s. Pepsi Cola, Nabisco, Shell Oil, Avon, Western Union, General Electric and then,
17 Other headlines as quoted in the Time Magazine article are: Tokyo's Mainichi Shimbun, "Panic
Grips New York," West Germany's Bild Zeitung "New York's Bloodiest Night," and London's
Daily Express' "The Naked City."
, "The Blackout: Night of Terror." Time Magazine, July 25, 1977.
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Union Carbide moved out of the city. They took along with them thousands of jobs and tax
paying residents. At the time, William S. Doyle, the deputy commissioner of the New York State
Department approached the commissioner John Dyson and rationalized that getting people to
visit New York City was the most important aspect of reviving the city's economy and stemming
the corporate exodus. The New York State Department of Commerce has an interesting history
from inception. It began as the State Division of Commerce, a consolidation of several smaller
state bureaus and the Bureau of Industry in 1941. Among its many duties was promoting New
York State to businesses in the US and abroad. The department also gathered economic and
demographic data to measure the economy, enforced trade agreements, regulated the export of
local goods, issued patents and trademarks, fostered minority business development, and
promoted economic growth in distressed communities, among other duties. It was renamed the
State Department of Commerce in 1944.
In response to Doyle, the Department diverted its entire tourism spending towards
financing a market research program in 1976-77, which was then used to convince the state
legislators that focusing on tourism was the best way to revive the city that had already lost
sixteen billion dollars in tourism revenue between 1967 and 1976. The Department hired the
marketing and research firms, Yankelovich, Skelly and Wite Inc (YSW) and Consumer Behavior
(CBI), to study New York's tourism industry and its overall perception among visitors by
conducting interviews with CEOs, anonymous experts, large firms, and visitors. YSW released a
- In 1987, it was renamed State Department of Economic Development (DED). In 1995, in an effort
to further reduce the size of government, a new Empire State Development Corporation (ESDC) was
formed that consolidated the Department of Economic Development (DED) and the Urban
Development Corporation.
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report "YSW's Research to Support New York State's Economic Development Activities" that
suggested reducing personal income tax and corporate franchise tax, and eliminating employee
benefit requirements in order to retain firms with large numbers of employees-identified as
"principal targets."" Central to this effort according to YSW, was communicating to these targets
that "both career and leisure goals can be fulfilled in New York," with a strong public relations
effort that tied "advertising with new and existing programs" and a new tourism campaign.-
As mentioned before, the idea of branding and promoting an image was not entirely new
to New York City. Before the I Heart New York campaign, the Big Apple campaign was another
branding effort from 1971, which was headed by the president of New York Convention and
Visitors Bureau Charles Gillett, who called the campaign "a pleasant way of thinking of the
city."-'Mayor Abraham Beame, Governor Hugh Carey and Manhattan borough president Percy
Sutton passed on lapel stickers to visitors in their office and on their foreign visits. The stickers
were later sold on the streets for two cents, to be followed by Big Apple letterheads, brochures
and promotional material.
- Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc. "YSW's Research to Support New York State's Economic
Development Activities: 1977-1982." Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Incorporated, 1983, 1982.
Ibid.
Charles Gillett, the man behind the Big Apple Campaign, traced the origin of the word "Big Apple"
to jazz. He recalls that musicians in the 1920's and 30's had an expression for playing the big time
after gigs in small towns, "There are many apples on the tree, but when you pick New York City, you
pick the Big Apple." There are also other origin myths: Depression-Era sidewalk apple
vendors, a Harlem nightclub, a popular 1930s dance known as the "Big Apple," and a nineteenth-
century "procuress." The Big Apple was popularized as a name for New York City by John J.
Fitzgerald in a number of horse-racing articles for the New York Morning Telegraph in the 1920s.
For more on the campaign: Albin Krebs, "Big Apple Polishers Brighten City's Image," New York
Times, March 27, 1975.
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However, come 1977, the branding of New York took on a scale that the city had never
seen before. On the state's behest, YSW produced a detailed Business Development Plan (BDP)
for the economic development of the city based on private business and tourism. Their marketing
research spoke of visitors wanting to visit Broadway, being extremely scared of muggings and
not knowing anything about upstate New York. Most importantly, the crisis had changed
people's attitude towards the business community, according to YSW, making it okay to be pro-
business and pro-partnerships between government, management, and labor. The BDP suggested
key marketing strategies: show how New York is purging itself from being a union city and a
disaster area. To rid the city of its negative associations, YSW suggested a visual campaign made
up of print and TV advertisements, sport films and music, and policy campaign that used funded
marketing studies to get legislators to increase money for tourism and business friendly policies
in New York City. At its core, this was about promoting the idea that New York was serious
about changing its attitude towards work-life balance.
The Advertisement
In 1977, Doyle and Dyson hired the young advertisement firm Wells Rich and Greene founded
by Mary Wells Lawrence in 1968.- They came up with the slogan I Heart NY which was
accompanied by a jingle by composer Steve Karmen and several television commercials that
show someone in rural surroundings saying, "I live in North Carolina, (and Cape Cod and even,
Brooklyn) but I love New York!" Another TV spot completely focused on Broadway and
vacation packages, which were available on toll-free numbers, with Broadway actors from the
- Mary Wells Lawrence, A Big Life in Advertising, (Paperback: Touchstone), 2003.
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Chorus Line, opera singer Beverly Sills and Angela Lansbury stating their love for New York.
The ad ends with Frank Langella as Dracula saying he loves New York "especially in the
evening."-- The constant barrage of advertisement campaigns were accompanied by a party in
Studio 54 with a new disco version of the jingle, organized by PR people Bobby Zarem and
Howard Rubernstein who worked for the ABNY. The catchy phrase I Heart New York also
became the iconic logo designed by art director Milton Glaser.
By 1978 the I Heart New York television spots were running nationwide. The city was
boasting tourism figures that far outweighed the World's Fair and bicentennial celebrations. The
Theatre District pronounced 1978 to be their busiest year ever due to the success of package
tours.- The dollar devaluation certainly helped foreign visitors. Douglas C. Frechtling, director
of the U.S. Travel Data Center, attributed New York's turnaround to the campaign which he
describes as "the first time a catchy phrase had been backed by dollars."-" It generated tourism
expenditure of 14.4 billion dollars in 1985 with over 650,000 jobs, this was up from 5.5 billion in
1976.- By 1987, New York State became the leading destination in the US east coast, over New
England. The growth in the tourism business led to developers investing in the state, with new
7 Department of Economic Development, Campaign Advertising Agency: Wells Rich Greene, and
logo designed by Milton Glaser, "I Heart New York Advertising Campaign," 1977.
- "Richard Lyon, "I Heart New York Drive Wooing Millions and Bringing In Billions," New York
Times, June 22, 1981.
8 "A Campaign for All Seasons," New York Times, January 31, 1987.
Ibid.
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hotels, convention centers and a record number of property renovations and hotel constructions.
Tourism became the state's second largest industry after agriculture."
What is incredible is that simultaneous to this image of a renaissance in New York City,
the South Bronx was poised for what was called in 1977 as "planned shrinkage."-- The executive
director of the Citizens Housing and Planning Council, Roger Starr discussed the concept of
Planned Shrinkage with respect to what he considered to be the "myth of American
communities," which claimed that not all communities in the United States are as vaunted as
people assume them to be. Some of them, according to Starr, can be disassembled and
reconstituted as "freight trains."" These communities were "sick" according to Starr, and by
hastening their population decline through a withdrawal of city services, New York City could
minimize the problems that had emerged in the aftermath of the fiscal crisis and public-sector
shrinkage.- By withdrawal, Starr meant reducing police, firefighting, garbage collection and
subway services. He specifically honed in on South Bronx that had lost over 36 percent of its
- Tourism-focused marketing and branding became democratic mayoral candidate Mario Cuomo's
campaign platform. Cuomo claimed the city needed to do much more to encourage middle-class
tourism. He eventually lost to Ed Koch in 1977, who pitted the voters against the unions saying "we
need to have a better bargainer on our side of the table," and not be controlled by union leaders. He
ran on the platform, "after eight years of charisma, and four years of the clubhouse, why not my
competence." For more refer to: EJ Dionne Jr, "Cuomo Campaigns On Need to Increase The City's
Tourism," New York Times, October 23, 1977. Also, Nigel Morgan and Annette Pritchard, Tourism
Promotion and Power: Creating Images, Creating Identities, (Chichester; New York: Wiley), 1998;
Christopher M. Law, Urban Tourism: The Visitor Economy and the Growth of Large Cities,
(London: Continuum), 2002.
- Themis Chronopoulos, "The Rebuilding of the South Bronx after the Fiscal Crisis," Journal of
Urban History 43, no. 6 (June 27, 2017): 932-59.
.Roger Starr, The Rise and Fall of New York City, New York: Basic Books, 1985.
M Leslie Lenkowski, "The Rise and Fall of New York City, by Roger Starr," Commentary, July 1,
1985.
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housing stock and 40 percent of its population, with 1/3 of its housing units under damage and
abandonment. South Bronx also had many fires in the 1970s which Starr blamed on arson rather
than city neglect, stating that the South Bronx's alarm rates which were thirteen times that of
New York City, showed the "social pathology" of the neighborhood.- At the heart of the
Planned Shrinkage policy was the notion that the South Bronx was at the last stages of its life
cycle and as triage, withdrawal, and redevelopment from scratch was its only cure. Starr fails to
mention that despite of the unoccupied housing, the South Bronx still had a population of mostly
blacks that was double of the city of Buffalo at the time.
Rohatyn from the MAC recommended that the South Bronx be bulldozed and rezoned for
industrial purposes. In the next decade, the area saw developments such as Bathgate Industrial
Park and Mid-Bronx Industrial Park.- The policies of "benign neglect" towards the Bronx within
a city that was gearing up for a revival, were connected. These two parallel images are both parts
of crisis branding, where one part survived, and the other failed. While the state government
presented New York as a city on its way up with Broadway and Wall Street, they also argued
that the Bronx was bad enough that it needed the Tabula Rasa treatment.
In 1982, president Ronald Reagan was visiting New York City. He gave a speech when invited
by the New York City Partnership, a business advocacy group formed by David Rockefeller that
emerged with the merger of New York Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the New York
- The South Bronx experienced 7000 fires between 1975-77. More than 3000 lots and buildings were
considered vacant and they covered 500 acres.
.Themis Chronopoulos,"The Rebuilding of the South Bronx after the Fiscal Crisis," Journal of
Urban History 43, no. 6 (June 27, 2017): 932-59.
182
City Partnership. In the speech, Reagan wore an I Heart New York scarf and spoke of how the
partnership and its belief in "private initiative" were essential to economic and social progress.,-
The key to rebuilding communities as Reagan announced was "individual initiative, leadership
and personal responsibility," adding how important it is to remember that the function of
government is not to "confer happiness on us but to give us the opportunity to work out
happiness for ourselves."-- In the speech, Reagan announced the cornerstone of conservative
ideology: private human capital is far more valuable and effective than federal money, and that is
how it should remain. The speech is an important marker in the years after the I Heart New York
campaign when in the years after its humiliation with near bankruptcy, the city was rising up
again, becoming emblematic of the end of the American liberalism. Reagan's scarf became part
of the I Heart New York campaign.
In 1986, the New York State Department of Commerce made the I Heart New York
campaign its official slogan. A new Office of Economic Development and State Department of
Economic Development combined the campaign with tax breaks and financial incentives for
investors in the city. As Greenberg points out, this was the point when the campaign started
showing images of Manhattan's skyscrapers, the new Javits Center and other landmarks, over
people expressing their love for the city."
Ronald Reagan, "Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the New York City Partnership Luncheon in New
York." The American Presidency Project, June 14, 1982. Presidential Documents Archive.
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data.php.
- Ibid.
Greenberg, Miriam. Branding New York: How a City in Crisis Was Sold to the World. Routledge,
2009.
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What is an Urban Problem?
"Answering the question "What is an urban problem?" is a good deal like
answering the question " What is a Republican?... .both labels are valuable
precisely because they are misleading."
In the book The Metropolitan Enigma, political scientist James Q. Wilson talks of the common
habit of using the phrase "urban problems" to refer to a variety of unrelated concerns.,' Some of
which, Wilson asserted, were not exclusively urban or even problems in any meaningful sense.
According to Wilson, the phrase has a false sense of specificity and a spurious consensus. The
idea of "urban problems" in Wilson's opinion, are connected to a "conventional mental picture"
of a city-smoky drab downtown with congested traffic, street corner muggings, and stores
having liquidation sales...everybody can think of a problem in such a place.",- The problem
according to Wilson was that this "mental picture of city life" implied wrongly that every
element in the picture is related to every other element. This relation implied that there is a
connection between smoke, congestion, mugging, drab buildings and the liquidation sale, and if
we discover and work on these connections, the problems would disappear. Ultimately, for
Wilson, the idea of the urban encompassed concrete physical manifestations and abstractions and
was deliberately kept vague.--
James Q. Wilson and Joint Center for Urban Studies, The Metropolitan Enigma: Inquiries into the
Nature and Dimensions of America's Urban Crisis, (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1970), 390
Ibid.
"'Ibid.
Ibid.
184
Wilson inadvertently described the strategy of the two campaigns studied in this chapter,
where crisis moments were mediated with images and rhetoric that were specifically designed to
present a cohesive and hard-hitting "mental picture of the city." Fear City singularly focused on
the spatial and emotional aspects of fear in the city-mugging in the subway, robbery in car
parks and streets, dirty plazas etc. As a protest statement, the campaign promoted the idea that
the American city was a failing enterprise due to its shrinking public sector and if the city's
bankruptcy and austerity measures indeed went through, New York may not survive. The modes
of dissemination for Fear City- surreptitiously handed out skull-adorned pamphlets at airports
and bus stops-matched the message. The mayor's angry press conference and the Supreme
Court involvement became anticipated responses that became part of the campaign. The
campaign does not really discuss the nuts and bolts of New York's predicament, solutions or
even the fact that the unions stopped handing pamphlets when the Economic Development
Council promised support from the business community.
The I Heart New York advertisements capitalized on a single slogan that was
disseminated through multiple media-TV spots, jingles, disco party at Studio54 and an
omnipresent logo. The message was clear: New York has turned around a corner and is ready for
visitors. Unregulated duplication of the logo was a planned aspect of the campaign-at least for
the first decade. Here again, the campaign does not offer facts and figures on crime or shed light
on the problems that still existed outside of Manhattan in 1977. Instead, the campaign
concentrates on New York City (specifically, Manhattan) as a timeless idea and a concept that
offers culture and architecture like nowhere else. This is not to say that the two campaigns were
ineffective just because they did not offer compensatory structures in the form of policy or
promises for New York City. As I argue, Fear City and I Heart New York were narratives that
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mediated crisis in very distinct ways. They were deployed to extract a particular response and
engagement from their target audience. Providing facts and solutions were not their modus
operandi.
New York City's history abounds with governmental agencies and private sector coalitions
participating in boosterism, image building, and branding exercises. In the period between 1964
and 1976 itself, there was the Robert Moses organized World's Fair of 1964-65, New York
Convention and Visitors Bureau and Association for a Better New York (ABNY)'s Big Apple
Campaign of 1971, and the citywide Bicentennial celebration of 1976.- The Economic
Development Council, which was a group of New York's business leaders who came together as
an advisory board for Mayor John Lindsay, ran advertisements such as "New York is New York,
is there anywhere else?" that were designed by advertisement agency Young and Rubicam Inc.
to "awaken public pride and confidence" in New York City in 1.966.-- The agency placed the ads
in the Wall Street Journal, New York Times and The News among others. There was also the
- The World's fair was held in Queens, New York City. Moses dedicated the fair to "Man's
Achievement on a Shrinking Globe in an Expanding Universe," but it was really a showcase for
American industries. The fair was accused of financial mismanagement. It returned only 19 cents on
the dollar spent. For more on the fair refer to, Lawrence R. Samuel, The End of the Innocence: The
1964-1965 New York World's Fair, (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press), 2007. The Big
Apple Campaign has been discussed briefly in this chapter. For more, Albin Krebs, "Big Apple
Polishers Brighten City's Image," New York Times, March 27, 1975. The Bicentennial celebration
was organized and planned by a private group called New York City Bicentennial Corp. that had
been set up by the City Council in 1973 to organize a party for the country's bicentennial. There was
also a national advisory body, the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission that was
coordinating 65,000 projects all over the country. New York city was particularly criticized for going
ahead with it despite the fiscal crisis.
- The Economic Development Council of New York City, "New York Is New York. Is There
Anywhere Else?" New York Times, January 24, 1968.
186
"Fun City" moniker, which was inadvertently started by Lindsay when in response to New York
City's problems, he said, "I still think this city is fun." This was later picked up by Dick Schaap,
a columnist for The New York Herald Tribune, who coined the expression "Fun City" for New
York. It became a promotional slogan for the city's many cultural "happenings" until 1973. In the
years after the fiscal crisis, however, the moniker became a term of derision and mockery for
Lindsay's mayoral term and its apparent failures.--
Each of these examples of overt and covert boosterism had been championed and funded
by voluntary and coalition-based groups and private sector task forces, who received backing and
support from governmental agencies. The fiscal crisis and the Fear City campaign brought about
a turning point for the city's outlook on branding and image. With the I Heart New York
campaign, the state government hired the advertising agencies and allocated a budget exclusively
for the purpose of branding, which became an urban government strategy. By the 1980s there
were new departments and positions dedicated to curating New York's image, with a capital-
intensive branding guidebook and even pictograms.- This was a reversal that began in 1975, a
condition of public-ization, where the public sector took on roles that were previously managed
by the private sector.
The whole exercise of branding as Greenberg points out was geared, not for the New
Yorker, but for developers, financiers, out-of-towners, visitors and tourists in the service of
Fun City Revisited: The Lindsay Years, THIRTEEN for W NET.ORG, 2010.
Arch Street Communications for New York State, "New York State Branding Overview and
Guidelines and Architecture," n.d.
https://ocfs.ny.gov/ohrd/OMTV/OMTVfinal/NYS GUIDELINES.PDF.
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place-based industries.- New York's redefinition from a blue-collar manufacturing base to a
white-collar corporate economy meant that the city had to change in an effort to compete with
other cities. The chapter argues that the redefinition of New York's economy required new
imaginaries that could replace the old ones. Much as Jean Baudrillard's postmodern condition of
hyperreality, where images and copies exist without references to an original and pass for reality,
the I Heart New York campaign cemented the narrative of a New York that offers unforgettable
experiences, instead of the Threatened City, Fear City, Ungovernable City, Asphalt Jungle and
Unheavenly City.- The "scrappy" logo that was left open for duplication as a floating signifier of
unexplained love, has since been copyrighted with the original Glaser drawing held in the
Museum of Modem Art in Manhattan. The New York State Department of Economic
Development owns the logo and has trademark registrations for various configurations of the
logo. It has now become the subject of thousands of cease-and-desist letters and penalties to
small businesses that dared to use it without permission.
- Miriam Greenberg, Branding New York: How a City in Crisis Was Sold to the World, (Routledge,
2009).
- Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.)
2 New York State. "ILoveny Licensee Info." Licensing Information (blog), n.d.
httrs://www.ilovenv.com/licensee-info/.
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Conclusion
There were several reasons for centering this dissertation on New York City. Few cities in the
world can compete with the scale and complexity of New York City's operations. New York is a
rich context for the study of privatization as it presents an interesting and extreme transition,
from being the bastion of civic liberalism in the United States to becoming the entrepreneurial
core of corporate America. New York City has also been a trend-setting city. It was the first city
in the United States to develop a comprehensive set of zoning laws, to legislate a privately-
funded conservancy for the management of a public park, to legislate a public-benefit
corporation that could sell bonds to the general public to fund low-income housing, and to
deploy discretionary zoning laws at a broad scale in special districts throughout the city. Since
the 1970s, it has become a model for policy shifts in other cities in the United States and around
the world-Mumbai and Hongkong included.
As of 2018, New York City has over 500 privately-owned public plazas, arcades, and
outdoor and indoor spaces. The city government has granted developers 16 million square feet of
bonus buildable area in return. New York City also has over fifty-one Special Zoning and
Special Purpose Districts that each have their own set of zoning laws designed to promote
economic development, sixty privately-funded conservancies, alliances and Friends groups
managing public parks, and about 230,000 people living in some form of voucher-assisted
privately-managed public housing. These statistics are interconnected. They reveal how
privatization has transformed the public realm of New York City in a profound and irreversible
way since the 1960s. Mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion are incorporated into
privatization's regulatory structures and transactions in the form of park permits, income limits,
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air right ownerships and design guidelines that subtly construct the ideal public: the middle-class
culture-seeking tourist for the Theater District, the apolitical wine-sipping classical music-loving
Central Park visitor, and the middle-income group family that seeks to live close to the upper-
east side by moving to desolate Roosevelt Island.
This transformation of the public realm furthermore brings up questions about the
meaning of the "public" with respect to concepts such as public interest and public goods.
Granted, these are fuzzy and relative terms to begin with. However, their shifting meanings are
now part of the central predicament of privatization: if urban development that served the
broader public interest is in the form of joint investments between public and private entities,
then the preservation of economic activity in the private sector becomes an intrinsic part of
public interest. Certainly, the idea of the public and public interest has always been quixotic,
especially in cities such as New York where the feedback loop of the private sector influencing
urban policy has always been strong. What is different however since the 1960s is how the
feedback loop has been managed, regulated and strengthened by governments themselves.
Privatization can mean the sale of public assets to private entities, the outsourcing of
services to the private sector, or even the withdrawal of government entirely from certain
programs. But no matter the route, at the core of privatization is some sort of partnership and
transaction between the public and private sector. By breaking down the theoretical and
sometimes opaque idea of privatization into partnerships, transactions, negotiations and bargains,
the dissertation offers the framework for studying privatization and its influence on the built
form, in architectural terms.
Architects and architectural historians discuss the problems of the shrinking public realm
in cities, the deleterious urban policies from business-friendly mayors, the rise of luxury
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residential towers while there is a paucity of good housing options, and the prodigious powers
that TDRs (transferrable development rights) and air rights hold over a city such as New York,
or even Mumbai. However there is little discussion on how the processes of building and design
intersect the regulatory and policy structures that have made each of these problems possible.
The use and viability of a public plaza for example, depends as much on legal, financial and
political constraints, as it does on design, materiality and sun exposure. One cannot surpass the
importance of the other. The public realm of a city is indelibly connected to its political,
economic, urban and real estate histories.
Finally, there is the question of the "privatized city"-a term that I have been hesitant to
use in this dissertation, but which is very popular among sociologists, economists and urban
theorists who write about privatization. The term privatized city alludes that the city had been
public before its transformation in the 20- Century. What does a "public city" mean and what are
its historical antecedents? The answer I think, is indelibly connected to the questions of this
dissertation, and which will be the subject of further investigation.
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